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Abstract This thesis investigates the effects of the nation-building agenda carried out by 
the Malaysian state on the sense of collective belonging of the Kadazan people of the 
Bornean State of Sabah. The thesis includes a reconstruction of the formation of the two most 
important forms of collective identification, the nation and the ethnic group, and the analysis 
of the way in which Kadazan villagers identify themselves in relation to discourses 
circulating in various media and the practices in which they get involved in their everyday 
life. Kadazan villagers consistently show a rejection of the state propaganda and a general 
unwillingness to identify themselves as members of the Malaysian nation, which I attribute to 
their marginal position within the Malaysian state. They more often identify themselves as 
members of their ethnic group or village, collective forms of identification that seem to allow 
for a higher degree of participation in their definition than the national one. 
The empirical analysis of the everyday self-identification in relation to practices and 
discourses shows a complex picture, as Kadazan villagers differently situate themselves as 
Malaysian, Kadazan, Sabahan and members of their village in different occasions and 
contexts. One of the explanations of this fact lies in the ambiguous character of Malaysian 
nation-building, promoting unity while at the same time treating citizens differently 
depending on their ethnic and religious background. The official discourse and practice of 
ethnic and religious differentiation has been deeply internalised by the Kadazan and has 
become a primary reason for their opposition to the state, as they feel treated as second-class 
citizens. Another explanation for the development of a sense of belonging to various 
collective forms of identification among the Kadazan rests in the fact that their recent history 
has made these significant as expression of different sets of shared lived experiences, 
providing the basis for the development of senses of commonality with members of the 
national, sub-national, ethnic and village communities at the same time. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This research originated as an enquiry into the effects of the state-led process of 
creating a national culture on a 'tribal' Bornean people, the Kadazan of the Malaysian 
State of Sabah'. Early findings suggested that, similarly to what was concluded by 
Postill (2006) for another Bornean people, the Than of Sarawak, the Kadazan have 
become deeply 'Malaysianised'. I also observed, however, a marked contrast 
between, on the one hand,, the relatively successful establishment of a national culture 
and, on the other, the fact that the Kadazan showed a much stronger sense of 
belonging to their ethnic group and locality than to Malaysia. This empirical 
observation echoes Geertz's (1973 [1963]) point that in post-colonial states conflict 
arises between the modernising state and the 'primordial sentiments' of attachment to 
language, culture, religion and blood of their population. 
This thesis aims to clarify the reasons for the apparent contradiction between the 
involvement of the Kadazan in the 'integrated system of cultural institutions and 
practices' (Postill, 2006: 15) of Malaysia and the evidence showing an enduring 
strength of alternative forms of identification apparently at odds with the Malaysian 
nation-building process. In order to do so it looks at how the Kadazan form and 
express their sense of belonging to the nation, ethnic group and locality through 
discourses and practices. By investigating these aspects, this thesis attempts to 
provide an account of nation-building that 'break[s] out of the teleological and mono- 
directional narrative that informs the predominant understandings of nation building', 
which only allows to conclude that it either succeeds or fails (Mihe1j, 2007). 
In agreement with Geertz (1973 [1963]), 1 consider the attachment to alternative 
forms of belonging demonstrated by the Kadazan to be a reaction to the processes of 
modernisation and consolidation of state power. This process mostly coincided with 
the nation-building project carried out by the Malaysian government, involving the 
formation of a national set of institutions and practices, but also the establishment of 
control over the discursive space through the circulation of dominant discourses 
spread by state- controlled media. These discourses promoted at the same time a 
' See maps in appendix I 
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narrative and ideology based on the notion of modernity, requiring members of 
minorities to change their 'mindsets' and become 'modem', and a social arrangement 
distinguishing citizens on the basis of ethnicity and religion. 
My argument is that the attachment of the Kadazan to forms of collective 
identification alternative to the nation derives from their marginality, a status 
described by Wenger as a restricted form of participation dominated by non- 
participation (1998: 164-66) in relation to the Malaysian state. The notion of 
marginality has been used by various anthropologists (Tsing, 1993; Winzeler, 1997a; 
Rosaldo, 2003) to describe the condition of hinterland minorities in island South-East 
Asia. While the conditions generated by the Malaysian state make it possible for the 
Kadazan and other minority groups to imagine themselves as members of the national 
'imagined community' (Anderson, 1991), at the same time the lack of power to define 
the role they can play in it and the lack of participation afforded lead them to identify 
more strongly with groups over whose definition and destiny they feel they have more 
control. 
In order to understand fully the effects of the conditions brought into being by the 
inclusion in the Malaysian state and its nation-building project on the fori-nation of 
collective belonging among the Kadazan, this thesis provides an empirical analysis of 
the different ways in which the Kadazan position themselves as Kadazan, Malaysian, 
Sabahan or members of their village in relation to the practices they carry out or the 
discourses they encounter or produce. In order to do so, I follow two main lines of 
enquiry: a historical reconstruction of the 'trajectories' of the processes, primarily the 
elaboration of a modem Kadazan and Malaysian culture, through which the 
generation of a sense of belonging to the ethnic group and the nation has been made 
possible, and an ethnographic analysis of the way in which individuals situate 
themselves as belonging to such categories in their everyday life. Such a research 
project requires the integration of a Malaysian frame of reference with the 
consideration of other levels of analysis, including the sub-national and local, but also 
following regional or global connections. 
The next sections of this introductory chapter present the theoretical foundations of 
this research, situating it within debates about the nation and nationalism, nation- 
building, ethnicity, the relationship between indigenous peoples and the state, and 
proposing an approach to identity and collective identification based on the work of 
Richard Jenkins (2008) and Etienne Wenger (1998). The final part of the chapter 
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provides a discussion of the method used in the research and of the status of 
knowledge generated through it. 
The nation, nationalism and nation-building 
The origin and definition of the idea of nation is the object of the debate on 
nationalism, whose participants follow two main approaches, labelled as primordialist 
and modernist. The former is currently dominated by ethno-symbolists, who, like the 
sociologist Anthony Smith (1986,1995), argue that, while nationalism is a modem 
ideology, at least some nations have a root in pre-modern cultural groups, which have 
a primarily subjective persistence, based on things such as memory, values, 
sentiments and symbols. 
The proponents of the modernist approach include Ernest Gellner (1983), 
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) and Anderson (1991), all of whom share the idea that 
nations are modem creations of the ideology of nationalism. Gellner (1983) defined 
the nation as a group whose members share the same culture and recognise 
themselves and each other as members. However, he argued that these characteristics 
define a nation only in the 'age of nationalism', when 'general conditions make for 
standardized, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire 
populations' (1983: 55). Gellner's definition of nation depends on the concomitant 
definition of nationalism as 'a political principle', but also 'a sentiment' and a 
'movement' associated with it,, 'which holds that the political and the national [read 
ethnic] unit should be congruent' (1983: 1). 
Some of the strengths of Gellner's (1983) theories lie in the convincing way in 
which they clarify the modernity of the idea of nation, the political aspects of 
nationalism and the importance of the creation of a widely-shared 'high culture' for 
the existence of the nation, an essential goal in the nation-building agenda of all states 
(see below). A problem of applicability which is of relevance here, however, is that 
Gellner's (1983) idea that the national unit corresponds to an ethnic unit does not 
apply well to the form of nationalism promoted by states that have the coexistence of 
different ethnic groups as one of their defining characters, as is the case of Malaysia 
and other South-East Asian and post-colonial states. In order to account for such 
cases, some scholars have made a distinction between 'ethnic nationalism' and other 
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forms, referred to as 'civic' (e. g. Smith, 1986: 134-40; see Reid, 2001 for a full 
discussion), 'patriotic' (Taylor, 1998, cited in Case, 2000: 132) or 'supra-ethnic' 
(Eriksen, 1993: 118), based on the principle of belonging to the nation by virtue of 
being citizens of a state, and not members of an ethnic group. 
The theories of Benedict Anderson (1991) have the advantage of explaining the 
way in which the nation emerged as a meaningful and relevant entity allowing people 
to identify with it. Anderson (1991) defined nations as imagined political 
communities, imagined as 'deep, horizontal comradeships', commanding a sense of 
fraternity among its members, most of whom will never meet or interact or even hear 
of each other (1991: 6-7). The notion of imagined communities is useful in its 
bringing the constructed character of the nation, and similarly of the ethnic group, to 
the fore, showing how the historical development of certain conditions and 
sensibilities, such as the development of print capitalism and the establishment of 
'empty homogenous time' through clocks and calendars, generated the possibility for 
people to imagine themselves as being part of a community whose existence was not 
supported by direct experience. Anderson's (1991) definition of the national 
community as being imagined does not imply denying its reality but rather stressing 
that its existence implies an effort of imagination that transforms it from an abstract 
concept into a significant experiential reality, as in the famous example of a 
newspaper reader imagining a community of millions reading the same newspaper at 
the same time. In this thesis I am therefore subscribing to Anderson's idea that nations 
and all communities, with the possible exception of 'primordial villages of face-to- 
face contact' (1991: 6), are imagined, and that they are to be distinguished by the style 
in which they are imagined and by the conditions making such imagination possible 
and appealing. 
One of the most difficult tasks faced by the governments of newly established 
countries is that of "making Italians' after they have 'made Italy' or, as expressed by 
Postill, to 'build nations within their allocated territories' (2006: 1). This task is 
generally referred to as 'nati on-bui I ding', a term partially contested within academic 
circles (see Postill, 2006: 5), but which aptly captures 'the bttilt nature of modem state 
and nation formation' (Postill, 2006: 6, emphasis in original). An alternative notion to 
that of nation-building, which I think can be used to complement the former, is that of 
criation making' brought forward by Foster (2002) to stress the importance of 
processes not led by the state - and in certain instances even going against 
it - such as 
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commercial culture and other initiatives of the private sector and the wider population 
in 'materializing the nation'. 
Ethnic groups and ethnicity 
The term 'ethnic group' was first used in the period following the Second World 
War as the main way to refer to human populations with a common origin and culture, 
including both small-scale societies, previously mostly referred to as 'tribes', and 
larger groups constituting significant components of a state population, previously 
referred to as 'peoples', or sometimes 'races' or 'nations'. According to Eriksen, 
while the new conceptualisation. did not challenge the discrete character of groupings 
so defined, it implied that their members were 'aware' and 'in contact with' members 
of other groups (1993: 9). 
The problematic status of considering ethnic groups as bounded entities sharing a 
common culture was firstly put into relief by Edmund Leach, who, through his study 
of highland Bun-na (1970 [1954]), demonstrated the inadequacy of the presupposition 
that members of an ethnic group or a society necessarily share a set of distinctive 
cultural traits. Leach's (1970 [1954]) argument that societies emerge out of subjective 
processes of ascription became the basis of the situational notion of ethnicity that 
established itself through a collection edited by Fredrik Barth in 1969 (Bentley, 1987: 
25). Barth defined ethnic categories as 'organisational vessels that may be given 
varying amounts and forms of content in different sociocultural systems' (1969: 14), 
and identified the boundaries of the ethnic groups, which he considered to be 
permeable to passage of people or cultural traits, as the essential element of their 
existence. Moreover, he emphasised the idea that the concept of boundaries makes 
sense only when at least two groups are considered, and that bounded groups cannot 
exist in isolation. As already mentioned, the approach of Barth and colleagues (1969) 
also stressed self-ascription as the most important element in the definition of ethnic 
groups. 
In its early stage, the anthropological debate on ethnicity was dominated by 
discussions about the origin and objective grounding of subjective claims to ethnic 
belonging. Scholars dealing with these issues mostly followed two main approaches, 
referred to as primordialism and instrumentalism. The former, under which the 
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position of Barth (1969) is often subsumed (see Cohen, 1974: xii-xv), viewed 
ethnicity as a more or less immutable category to which people resort to find solutions 
to the disruption of conventional ways of understanding and acting in the world 
caused by social changes (Bentley, 1987: 26). Instrumentalists, on the other hand, 
considered ethnic groups as being generated under specific circumstances and for 
specific purposes, either to provide a sort of 'cognitive map' needed by recent rural 
migrants to orient themselves in a novel multi-ethnic setting (Mitchell, 1956) or for 
obtaining political and economic gains within situations of struggle over resources 
(Cohen, 1969,1974). Bentley (1987: 26) criticised both approaches for not standing 
up well to empirical scrutiny and for not being able to clarify the processes by which 
collectivities of interests and sentiments come into existence. Moreover, he argued 
that instrumentalist theories did not deal adequately with the individual level, 'where 
ethnic identity formation and manipulation presumably take place' (Bentley, 1987: 
26), therefore not being able to explain why belonging to an ethnic group should 
constitute an essential element of people's sense of who they are and how that takes 
place. 
These issues are an essential element in Jenkin's (2008) 'rethinking' of what he 
calls 'the basic anthropological model of ethnicity', which he mostly attributes to the 
views of Barth (1969). Jenkins presents this model as being based on a series of 
loosely linked propositions defining ethnicity as: 1) being 'about' cultural 
differentiation 2) being concerned with culture but also 'rooted in, and the outcome 
of, social interaction' 3) not being fixed 4) being collective and individual (2008: 
165). 
Among the elements of 'rethinking' of the 'basic anthropological model' proposed 
by Jenkins (2008), some are of particular relevance to the present thesis. The first of 
them is the shift from an excessive emphasis on self-ascription present in many 
previous anthropological notions of ethnicity reached through the appreciation of both 
processes of 'internal definition', the individual or collective self-ascription to an 
ethnic group, and 'external definition', the ascription by others. On the basis of these 
two forms of definition,, Jenkins distinguishes between 'self-identification', which 
takes place both at the individual and group level, and 'social categorization', the 
'identification of others as a collectivity' (2008: 56). The understanding of the latter 
involves the consideration of the power and authority embedded within active social 
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relationships (2008: 55), which have the capacity to influence categorisation in the 
specific contexts in which it takes place. 
Following Jenkins, I therefore consider that a full understanding of ethnicity is 
possible only through the consideration of the specific 'contexts and processes of 
social categorization' (Jenkins, 2008: 65) - what Cornell and Hartmann (1998, cited in 
Jenkins, 2008: 65) called the 'construction sites of ethnicity' - in which identification 
and categorisation take place. Jenkins (2008) situates these contexts along a 
continuum going from the most 'informal', including primary socialisation, face-to- 
face interaction and sexual relationships, to the most 'fon-nal', such as market 
relationships, employment, administrative allocation, social control, organised 
politics, social policy. 
The importance of primary socialisation in the formation of categories has been 
influentially considered by Bourdieu through his concept of habitus, 'systems of 
durable, transposable dispositions, [.. ] principles of the generation and structuring of 
practices and representations [.. ] objectively adapted to their goals without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary to attain them' (1977: 72, emphasis in original). Developing Bourdieu's 
(1977) insights, Bentley (1987) has emphasised the connection between primary 
socialisation and ethnicity, considering the habitus developed within primary 
socialisation to be the source of the recognition of ethnic commonality. While he 
recognises the importance of primary socialisation as 'the realm par excellence of 
categorization, setting a template for our receptivity to being categorized in later life' 
(2008: 66), Jenkins considers it to be just one of the 'construction sites of ethnicity'. 
Other contexts of ethnic categorisation that, as I will show in the next chapters, are 
as important as primary socialisation are what Jenkins calls 'routine public 
interaction', the face-to-face interaction involving the use of verbal and non-verbal 
cues, including both explicit markers and unconscious and involuntary elements, used 
to assign unknown others to an ethnic category, and communal relationships, 'the 
more or less tightly knit networks that evolve over time in residentially shared 
localities, and membership of info rmal groups (2008: 66-67). 
Among the formal contexts and processes of social categorisation, official 
classification is particularly significant in Malaysia, where the state officially 
distinguishes its citizens in terms of their ethnicity, a distinction that has among its 
consequences different access to certain rights and specific policies aimed at specific 
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groups, which deten-nine a form of ethnic categorisation that is significant in many 
aspects of the life of Malaysian citizens. 
Another essential point made by Jenkins (2008) is that ethnicity is fundamentally 
similar to other forins of identification and social categorisation, including the nation 
and locality, which he refers to as 'allotropes of eth-nicity', as they share the same 
basic features (2008: 42-45). Jenkins argues forms of identification and categorisation 
should be distinguished between each other on the basis of what he calls the 'virtual' 
aspect, 'the consequences of name and label, what the nominal means in terms of 
experience' (2008: 43, emphasis in original), as opposed to the 'nominal' 
identification, constituted by name and classification. While 'nominal' identification 
has a hierarchical and segmentary organisation, being constituted by a series of nested 
categories, these should be understood, at least in part, in terms of their virtuality, in 
the way in which, for example, national identification can be distinguished from local 
identification for the different consequences it has in the real world. The nominal and 
the virtual,, moreover,, do not necessarily correspond with one another and their 
relationship is always to be understood empirically (2008: 171). 
In the next section, I consider the notion of identity, clarifying the different 
concepts it expresses and the different usages of the term. Finally, I present some 
views on identity, primarily in the forms of processes of identification, which derives 
from complementing Jenkins' (2008) elaboration of the 'basic anthropological model 
of ethnicity' with the ideas of Etienne Wenger (1998). 
Identity and identification 
The notion of 'identity' was introduced in the social sciences and in public 
discourse in the 1960s in the United States, being separated from its original 
psychoanalytical context and linked to ethnicity and sociological role theory. The 
term soon diffused to other disciplines and regions, establishing itself in social and 
political practice and analysis (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2-3). The usage of the 
term in the social sciences is frequent but ambiguous (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; 
Byron, 2002), and it is difficult to find a precise definition of the term 
2. Brubaker and 
2A search of the encyclopaedias of anthropology found in the Loughborough University Library 
(Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology, eds. Levinson and Ember, 1996; Encyclopedia of Social and 
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Cooper (2000: 6-8) single out five main senses in which the term is used: 1) to 
conceptualise non-instrumental modes of social and political action 2) as a subjective 
or objective 'sameness' among members of a group or category 3) as the core aspect 
of individual or group 'selthood' 4) as an effect of, and a basis, for solidarity and 
collective action 5) as the 'evanescent product of multiple and competing discourses', 
highlighting the (unstable, multiple, fluctuating and fragmented nature of the 
contemporary self' (2000: 8). 
My discussion of identification and sense of belonging to collective categories 
among the Kadazan deals primarily with identity as the basis and effect of collective 
action and as the product of discourses. These notions are based on a constructivist 
perspective, and mostly belong to what Brubaker and Cooper consider as 'weak 
understandings of identity' (2000: 10-11), opposing themselves to the essentialist and 
reified 'strong' understandings. However, contra Brubaker and Cooper (2000), 1 
believe that the different phenomena referred to through the notion of identity are so 
intertwined with each other in their manifestation in the real world that they cannot be 
considered separately. An analytical distinction between them, therefore, while it is 
tight and elegant in principle, is not adequate in practice. As a result, while focusing 
on discourses of collective identification,, this thesis considers at the same time their 
significance to individuals in creating a sense of belonging to these categories and the 
way in which this belonging is used by individuals who define who they are. 
A first essential aspect of my understanding of identity takes the lead from 
Brubaker and Cooper's distinction between 'commonality', 'the sharing of some 
common attribute', 'connectedness', 'the relational ties that link people' and 
groupnesS , *the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidary or group' 
(2000: 20). According to them, 'commonality' is a necessary prerequisite for 
'groupness', whereas 'connectedness' is not. Another element they consider to be an 
essential prerequisite is the presence of a feeling of belonging together, which 
depends on the degrees of commonality and connectedness, but also on other factors 
such as events, narratives and discursive frames (2000: 20). 
The way in which a sense of belonging at the basis of a sense of groupness is 
forined is usefully clarified by Wenger (1998) through the distinction between three 
'modes of belonging': engagement, imagination and alignment. Wenger (1998) 
Cultural Anthropology, eds. Barnard and Spencer, 2002; The Dictionary ofAnthropology, ed. Barfield, 
1997) was unfruitful in finding a definition of the term 
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defines engagement as a mode of belonging, and therefore a source of identity, 
consisting in the direct participation in social practices and in the constant negotiation 
of their meaning among their practitioners. Imagination, a concept he derived from 
Anderson (1991), consists in 'creating images of the world and seeing connections 
through time and space by extrapolating from our own experience' (1998: 173). 
Similarly to what was described by Anderson (1991), imagination can provide 
identity by enabling individuals to feel they belong to an 'imagined community' of 
people sharing some common characteristics or practices, even without being 
involved in the joint development of a shared practice (Wenger, 1998: 181-83). 
Alignment is a mode of belonging involving 'bridg[ing] time and space to form 
broader enterprises so that participants become connected through the coordination of 
their energies, actions and practices' (1998: 178-79). The main characteristic that 
differentiates alignment from imagination is that it entails a coordination of action, 
which constitutes its primary raison d'Otre. Examples of alignment provided by 
Wenger include institutions, religions, political and social movements, but also 
fashions, artistic genres and educational standards (Wenger, 1998: 181). The 
theorisation proposed by Wenger (1998) is useful in distinguishing between ways in 
which the sense of belonging to a group -a 'community' as Wenger and Anderson 
(199 1) call it - is formed and sustained. Both the nation and the ethnic group can be 
considered, according to this typology, as communities of imagination but also, when 
they become the basis for any corporate form of action, as communities of alignment. 
The communities based on engagement, on the other hand, are entities of a smaller 
scale characterised by direct interaction between their members. As I will describe in 
chapter 5,1 consider the residents of the village in which I carried out my fieldwork to 
be 
, in certain respects, such a 
form of community. 
While Wenger does not consider any form of hierarchy between these modes of 
belonging, I follow Vered Amit (2002) in considering communities as being 
conceptualised primarily in terms of what is held in common among their members, 
rather than as oppositional categories distinguishing between insiders and outsiders, 
and as being constituted through the shared experience of participation in particular 
association and events. Amit argues that, even in the case of ascribed categorical 
identities, conceptualised as being anterior to actual social relationships that might be 
attributed to them, and it is actual relationships of intimacy that give them consistency 
(2002: 60). In a similar vein, Anthony Cohen argued that 'it is the level nearer to the 
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experience of the individual [.. ] that most commonly provides referents to one ,s 
identity and that do 'most of the work of identity" (1996: 804). 
Another essential aspect of identity brought to the fore by Cohen (1994,1996) is 
the relationship between collective forms of identification such as the nation and the 
individual. While I agree with Cohen (1996) that the nation can be viable as a source 
of identity only if it gives individuals a reference that makes sense to their experience, 
that does not imply subscribing to his conclusion that nationalism or ethnicity can 
work only as an expression of self-identity. Instead, this thesis follows Jenkins's idea 
that 'any social identity [.. ] must mean something to individuals before it can be said 
to 'exist' in the social world' (2008: 166), and that ethnicity is at the same time 
collective and individual, 'externalized in social interaction and the categorization of 
others, and internalized in personal self-identification' (2008: 14). In agreement with 
Wenger, I think the concept of identity can be used 'to focus on the person without 
assuming the individual self as a point of departure' (1998: 145), taking a perspective 
that is neither individualistic nor societal but uses the concept of identity 'as a pivot 
between the social and the individual, so that each can be talked about in terms of the 
other' (1998: 145). 
This point is further clarified by considering identity as an experience of meaning, 
a process that involves language, but is not limited to it, and involves social relations 
even when there is no direct interaction. This process involves, according to Wenger 
(1998), 'participation', taking part with others in a community of practice through 
active involvement, and 'reification', 'the process of giving form to our experience by 
producing objects that congeal this experience into "thinginess"'(1998: 58). The term 
is used by Wenger also to refer to the product of such process as, he argues, the 
process and the product are the same in terms of meaning (1998: 60). 
Identity formation, considered as an experience of meaning, involves the process 
of identification, defined by Wenger as 'providing material for building identities 
through an investment of the self in relations of association and differentiation' (1998: 
188) and 'negotiability', 'the ability, facility, and legitimacy to contribute to, take 
responsibility for, and shape the meanings that matter in a social configuration' (1998: 
197). Identification consists of both a process of reffication, of 'identifying as' (self- 
ascription) and 'being identified as' (ascription by others) someone, and one of 
participation, of 'identifying with' something or someone, by 'developing an 
association whose experience is constitutive of whom we are' (1998: 19 1). Wenger's 
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(1998) notion of identification largely overlaps with those of 'self-identification' and 
social categorization' brought forward by Jenkins (2008), the former corresponding 
to the 'identifying as' member of a reffied category and the participatory ýidentifying 
with', and the second with the reffied 'being identified as' and 'identifying others as. 
Negotiability, on the other hand, is shaped by relations of 'ownership of meaning', 
a social process in which individuals appropriate their identity by giving it a meaning 
that becomes part of who they are (1998: 201). Ownership of meaning is defined 
within the broader structure of what Wenger calls 'economies of meaning, the system 
deten-nining the relative value of specific meanings within which they struggle for the 
power to define events, actions or artefacts (1998: 198-200). Identification and 
negotiability are in a state of tension, which can take the form of a struggle for the 
ownership of meaning within a common form of identification, or, on the opposite, 
that of identification in a group constraining the negotiability of meanings by 
imposing some 'orthodox' ones. These considerations led Wenger to consider the 
issue of relationship between identity and power, arguing that power has a dual 
structure that reflects the interplay between identification and negotiability', as it 
'derives from belonging as well as from exercising control over what we belong to' 
(1998: 207). The concept of negotiability can be paralleled with the dynamics of 
social categorisation, and their implication with relationships of power and authority 
in specific contexts, considered by Jenkins (2008). 
Following the emphasis on the importance of an explicit understanding of the role 
of discourse in producing and maintaining broader social relations, especially ones of 
inequality remarked upon various critiques of Wenger's (1998) approach (e. g. Barton 
and Harnilton,, 2005; Barton and Tusting, 2005; Tusting, 2005), and the consideration 
of the importance of power relationships in social categorisation brought forward by 
Jenkins (2008), this thesis proposes an in-depth analysis of the broader context of the 
relationships of power and the discourses sustaining them. Such an analysis is 
possible only through a historical understanding of the processes through which these 
relationships of power have come into being and the discourses sustaining them have 
been generated and circulated. Such an approach is in line with the constructivist 
position of authors (e. g. Barnard, 2004; Benjamin and Chou, 2003; Kahn, 1993,1998, 
2006; Lan, 1998; Reid, 2001; Schrauwer, 1998) which Chua defines as locating 
ethnicity in the process by which fixed entities like 'identity' and 'culture' are created 
within state, popular and even earlier anthropological discourses (2007: 262-63). This 
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approach is well exemplified by Kahn, who declares his approach as focussing on 
clarifying how subjectivities in the particular case examined are constituted by 
specific sets of cultural practices and through which social and historical processes 
these practices have been generated (1998: 17). The understanding of the constructed 
character of notions such as those of the nation, however, should not obscure that of 
the effects of such ideas and discourses in the real world (see Kahn, 1993; Banks, 
1996). 
My approach to identity therefore consists in looking at the way Kadazan 
individuals identify themselves as Kadazan, Malaysian, Sabahan or members of their 
village, and how they negotiate the meaning of such belonging within the 
relationships of power and the dominant discourses, such as those of nation-building 
and ethnicity, shaping the Malaysian 'economy of meaning'. The next section 
considers such relationships of power in ternis of the relationship between the 
Malaysian state and the indigenous peoples of Bomeo, looking at the way in which 
the nation-building agenda carried out by the government determined various forms 
of resistance to what is perceived as a treatment as second-class members of the 
nation. 
The Malaysian state and the indigenous peoples of Borneo 
Talking about the specific case of Malaysia, characterised by a multi-ethnic 
population, Judith Nagata (1979) described four possible strategies the government 
could have used to create a national identity: assimilation to Malayness, the culture of 
the majority; the creation of a hybrid Malaysian culture comprising elements deriving 
from different ethnic groups; a pluralistic arrangement in which the main 
communities retain their cultural distinctiveness or assimilation to a 'neutral' 
Westernised culture transcending ethnic identities. According to her, the first 
approach was followed in the emphasis on Malay as the national language and Islam 
as the national tradition, as well as on the choice of other elements such as the sultan 
as head of state, the national anthem and the Malay kite chosen as the symbol of the 
national airline. The second was followed in the presentation of a generalised 
Malaysian culture, in terms of history, cuisine, costume, music and dance, particularly 
in tourism promotion, and the fourth in the development and modernisation discourse, 
especially evident in the Westernisation of the political, bureaucratic and business 
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elites. She concluded that the pluralist model was the prevalent one in the government 
agenda, and therefore that Malaysian society was still to be understood in terms of 
interrelationships between ethnicity, class, status and power (Nagata, 1979: 219 ff. ). 
The pluralist arrangement favoured by Malaysian nation-builders is aptly put into 
relief by the comparison with neighbouring Indonesia made by Case (2000), who 
argues that while the latter, being constituted by an even more complex variety of 
ethnic and religious groups, insisted on the ethnic or racial commonality of all its 
citizens, forming an Indonesian race; in the former nationalism remained quite 
ý'equivocal' (Tarling, 1998, cited in Case, 2000: 132), being weakened by 'important 
continuities between indigenous elites and the colonial power, as well as sharp 
divisions between indigenous and migrant communities' (Case, 2000: 132). 
The equivocal status of Malaysian nationalism, and the conflict between the 
different nation-building strategies, are well exemplified by the position taken by the 
former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad in his book published in 1970, The Malay 
Dilemma,, strongly supporting the idea of the Malays as the 'definitive people' of 
Malaysia, therefore claiming their status as ethnic core of the state and apparently 
moving towards an ethnic fon-n of nationalism based on the primacy of the majority 
ethnic group. In the mid- I 990s, Mahathir shifted decidedly towards civic nationalism, 
declaring the goal of creating a bangsa Malaysia, a 'Malaysian nation', as part of the 
development master-plan Wawasan 20203 , an aspiration that, 
however, at present 
seems still to be little more than wishful thinking. 
All the various strategies to create a sense of nationhood described by Nagata 
(1979) have been applied to indigenous peoples of Malaysian Borneo in various ways. 
The state generally allows them to retain some elements of their tradition and identity, 
as long as these are not perceived as being dangerous for national unity, while some 
of these have even been incorporated into a hybridised Malaysian culture, particularly 
with the aim of using them for tourism promotion. The two most applied approaches, 
however, have been the assimilation to a 'neutral' Westernised culture transcending 
ethnic identities and assimilation to Malayness. The former is mostly associated with 
a modernist ideology, expressed in two main connected discourses, that of 
' 'Vision 2020', a project elaborated by the previous Prime Minister Mahathir N/lohamad, which aims at 
making Malaysia a fully developed country by that year, and which puts the emphasis on Malaysian 
nationalism and Islam. By calling for the development of a 'Malaysian race working in full and equal 
partnership', it implies the subordination of ethnic identity within a national Malaysian identity or 
crace' (bangsa Malaysia), which asks citizens to see themselves as Malaysians before anything else. 
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development and that of national unity, which constitute two faces of the same coin of 
the nation-building agenda and which have often been used by the government to 
justify its interventions on the life of indigenous peoples, generally represented by 
propaganda as backwards and in need to change their 'mindset'. The latter (which has 
been particularly on the agenda in the 1970s, see chapter 3) is source of much 
ambiguity, primarily because of the way it is intertwined with the legal status of 
indigenous peoples of Malaysian Borneo, recognised by the constitution (in its post- 
1969 revised version) as bumiputera (M. 'sons of the soil'), a category that 
distinguishes between citizens indigenous to Malaysia and non-indigenous, such as 
Chinese or Indians, and that bestows special privileges on the former. As bumiputera 
they have often been conceptually assimilated to the majority of the members of the 
class, the Malays, an assimilation that has been at times given as implicit and natural 
and at times forced upon them in a much stronger way than has been the case with 
non-indigenous peoples. 
Rosaldo (2003) argues that, by trying to draw minority groups into nation-building 
projects driven by ideas of development, modernity, assimilation and nationalism, 
metropolitan centres ask members of minority groups to stop being what they are and 
transform into citizens. The hinterland minorities,, on their part, struggle 'to be treated 
with what they define as respect', a struggle that often takes the form of 'cultural 
citizenship', expressed in claims they make as citizens 'against the state' in tenns of 
forinal rights and in terms of recognition as 'full members' against a second-class 
position (Rosaldo, 2003: 1-3). The relationship between the state and minorities 
involves differences of power and of perception of one another, as well as conflicts 
between different projects and cultural conceptions. On the basis of this, Rosaldo 
proposes an argument that fractures the unity of nationalism presupposed by both 
classical theorists such as Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1991) and nationalist 
rhetoric, considering nationalism as ýan ideology that simultaneously includes and 
excludes by defining certain people as full members and others along a spectrum 
ranging from second-class citizens to non-members' (2003: 6). 
Considering the relationship between the indigenous peoples of Borneo and the 
states of which they are citizens (Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei), Winzeler (1997a) 
stressed the similarity, and sometimes continuity, between the treatment of the 
colonised peoples by the European rulers and that of ethnic minorities and marginal 
areas by developing states through the concept of 'fourth world colonialism' or 
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'internal colonialism'. However, he remarked that while European colonialists limited 
themselves to pacification and administration, postcolonial governments go much 
further in their efforts at transforming the indigenous peoples by imposing on them a 
national culture, religion and language and attempting to eradicate traditional beliefs, 
customs,, lifestyles and modes of adaptation that are seen as backward or savage. 
Moreover,, they regard the interests of indigenous peoples as secondary or null in 
regards to the use of the natural resources that are present within their region and 
which are regarded as necessary for the overall development of the country. 
The impositions made on them by the state, Winzeler (1997a) argued, provoke 
diverse and often ambiguous reactions by the indigenous peoples, involving 
dependency and acceptance but also hostility and resistance. Despite the fact that it 
usually does not challenge the developmentalist paradigm, resistance derives from the 
perception of being exploited and of the fact that, despite the proposition of the 
government propaganda, it is very hard for indigenous peoples to reach the level of 
wealth and development enjoyed by the dominant groups of their polity. 
The struggle between the state and indigenous minorities takes place primarily in 
relation to matters of religion and culture (Winzeler, 1997a) and language (Postill, 
2006), and at different levels, including state-level institutions such as the school and 
the media (Rosaldo, 2003; Postill, 2006), but also local-level ones such as, for 
example, ritual speech and village celebrations (Rosaldo, 2003; Postill, 2006). A 
phenomenon that has constituted an integral part of relationship with the state on the 
part of the indigenous peoples of Borneo is the 'rediscovering' of their indigenous 
culture and identity (Winzeler, 1997a, 1997b; Loh, 1992; see chapter 3), a process 
that involved what Wagner (1981) called the 'objectification' of culture, a process of 
making previously implicit practices explicit as 'custom'. 
Describing its usage in Sarawak, Boulanger, concludes that ethnicity can be 
considered as a form of resistance to modemity as it 'defies the logic of capital, 
withholds value from the market, repersonalises exchange and respects subsistence' 
(2002: 231). Because of this character, Boulanger (2002) argues, ethnicity is 
generally depleted as a backward, subversive idea by modem capitalist regimes, who 
attempt to reduce it to a 'guided culture', consisting of superficial elements such as 
costume and cuisine,, to be evident only during events. As a response to the 
unavoidable calls, linked to the national agenda, to change their 'mindset, to adapt to 
the 'New Reality', indigenous peoples are constructing 'versions of ethnicity that give 
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them a degree of control, however minimal, over the process of being overrun' (2002: 
231). 
Chua describes the 'irksome mutterings and anti -Mal ay/Muslim sentiments' which 
constitute the common attitude of the Bidayuh of Sarawak to the Malaysian state as a 
form of 'low-level resistance' (2007: 275). She concludes,, however,, that 'it would be 
injudicious to overstate the reactive character of Bidayuh (dis)engagements with this 
world', and that talking of it as resistance 'reifies 'the local' as the only plausible 
option of dealing with the situation' (2007: 275). As an alternative approach, she 
considers the way in which some Bidayuh deal with one of the aspects imposed by the 
Malaysian state, ethnic fixity, not by resisting it but by 'harnessing the fixed, moden 
[M. modem] categories with which they have initially been presented' (2007: 275). 
As put into relief by the works of the authors I have considered, identity politics, 
and more precisely the definition of indigenous groups' identity in relation to national 
identity, is an essential locus of the relationship between the two. 
The present research 
The present research had two main components: a historical one, trying to 
reconstruct the processes at the basis of the formation of dominant discourses of 
collective belonging and of the establishment of the national and ethnic cultures, and 
an ethnographic one examining the ways in which present-day Kadazan living in a 
specific location generate and express their sense of belonging to different collective 
groups through what they do and what they say. 
The first component consisted in researching academic and primarily 
historiographic, materials as well as various types of mediated texts, such as television 
and radio broadcasts, articles in magazines, literature, public speeches by politicians 
and authorities, but also in interviewing key media and political figures. Part of the 
historical research took place in the period preceding the fieldwork, during which I 
spent about 3 months in the state capital of Kota Kinabalu, taking an intensive course 
in Malay, the national language and local linguaftanca. During my stay in the state 
capital I searched for historical and archival material about Sabah and the Kadazan in 
local libraries, archives and in the state museum, and collected information by 
interviewing members of local cultural associations and some radio producers 
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working for Radio Televisyen Malaysia (RTM) in order to obtain information about 
media history and present radio broadcast produced in Sabah. Staying in Kota 
Kinabalu also gave me the occasion to meet some Kadazan living in the city as well 
as some non-Kadazan Sabahans, giving me some insights into the cultural and social 
dynamics of the state capital, which provided a valid backdrop to the fieldwork 
carried out in the following period. 
The second element of the research took place during a fieldwork period of 9 
months, which I spent living with a Kadazan family in Kituau, a village in the 
Penampang district (see maps I and 2 in appendix 1). The research carried out during 
the fieldwork can be classified as ethnography, which I understand, following Brewer 
(2000), not as a particular method of data collection, but rather as a style of research 
involving various techniques and distinguished by its objectives. The 'critical 
minimum definition' of ethnography brought forward by O'Reilly also characterises it 
as 'iterative deductive research",, by which she means that it evolves in design during 
the study, involving 'direct and sustained contact with human agents within the 
context of their daily lives', and producing an account that 'respects the irreducibility 
of human experience', and 'acknowledges the role of theory', the 'researcher's own 
role' and that 'views humans as part object/part subject' (2005: 3). A definition of 
ethnography that I feel aptly renders my views of it and my experience while carrying 
out the present research is the one given by Piasere (2002), who defines it as an 
'experiment of experience', a voluntary extension of the ethnographer's own 
experience, implying an experiential eradication bringing the ethnographer from a 
known and familiar environment to another expected to become such with time. 
Following O'Reilly's (2005: 211-17) considerations on the problem of how to 
obtain the trust of the readers and establish some form of, however contestable and 
partial, authority and credibility for the ethnographer, I follow her suggestion that they 
can be achieved by 'explaining one's methodological approach and describing one's 
method in full detail' (2005: 212). My method consisted mostly of participant 
observation, complemented by a limited amount of semi-structured interviewing. I did 
not record conversations outside interviews and generally did not take notes while 
interacting with people. Throughout all the research I availed myself of the help of 
two main 'gatekeepers': Jaunis, my host, a man in his early forties, and his sister-in- 
law, Augusta, in her mid-forties. These two gatekeepers, none of whom has a regular 
job, took me with them in their visits to other villagers and at times in their carrying 
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out of daily chores such as shopping at the market. They acted as informants but also 
as translators when needed. 
Through them I met my main informants in a series of different occasions: 
drinking together in houses or at the village bar, visiting friends at their house, 
stopping for a drink and a chat at a coffee shop in the nearby town, shopping at the 
traditional weekly market (tamu), participating in prayer groups and attending the 
Sunday mass in the village church. Other essential occasions for meeting my 
informants were celebrations held for weddings, engagements, funerals and other life- 
cycle rituals as well as sessions of communal works. Counting the frequency with 
which these celebrations take place, I attended an average of one a week, and 
therefore these occasions were central to my research. 
The bulk of my regular informants was constituted by the personal networks of 
these two very connected and social characters. The most important of them was the 
more or less regular group of friends of my host, formed by a core of about six men in 
their late thirties and early forties, meeting for a drink and a chat about twice a week, 
often in the house where I stayed. Other participants I relied on were a group of men 
in their forties and fifties going for a drink at the village bar almost every day after 
work and other middle-aged men I had many occasions to meet. Other, less regular 
informants were a group of elderly women meeting for a chat and for practising gong 
playing, a young male school teacher and various women who were friends or 
relatives of Augusta. Among the family with whom I lived, Jacobina, Jaunis' wife, 
mostly gave me insights into the views of dynamic, working women, as well as very 
explicitly formed opinions, and the children gave me the possibility to have an idea of 
the world of the school-age inhabitants of the village, an age group which, however, 
remained peripheral to my research. Finally, I regularly spent some time with Judeth, 
the woman working in the Sabah Museum who had helped me select my research 
location and find a family with whom to stay, and who also sometimes took me with 
her to see the performances of the cultural dance group she runs. As I have already 
mentioned, the various feasts and celebrations that I attended were an essential aspect 
of my research, and they expanded the range of my informants, sometimes including 
people living in other villages and parts of Sabah. To give a general overview, this 
study is mostly based on middle-aged and senior men, and especially from a limited 
group of them, but also, to a lesser extent, from working women in their thirties and 
forties and, to a very limited extent, from elderly women. 
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Figure I The author with his adoptive family posing in the traditional Kadazan costume. 
2 2 
Figure 2A picture taken on occasion of a group interview with some of the senior residents of 
Kituau. 
Reflexive considerations on the ethnographic research 
I arrived in Kituau armed with a good deal of knowledge about the local culture 
derived from the reading of ethnographic accounts, almost no research experience, a 
very basic level of knowledge of Malay language, and a strong will to immerse 
myself in the way of life of the people I was researching. My first experiences in the 
'field' led me to reallse that people were suspicious of my presence, a fact that 
emerged in the difficulty I encountered in finding a family willing to host me. As I 
was explained by Judeth and Robin, the people helping me throughout my research, 
the villagers were reluctant to take me in their house as they felt nialli (ashamed', 
'shy') of their standards of living, which they felt to be inferior to those of an orwig 
Pita . h, ('white man'). After finally finding a host family, my early walks around the 
village, aiming at getting to know the locals and achieving a comprehension and 
mastery over the geographic extension of the village, led me to the realisation that I 
could not just walk around and randomly encounter the villagers. This was because of 
two main facts: the privacy of the domestic space, which I discovered, to my surprise, 
to be accessible without prior arrangement only by those who know very well the 
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Figure 3 The author Nvith the main group of informants. n 
owner, and the fact that, another thing I had not considered, most of the residents are 
not in the village in the morning and early afternoon, as they are at work or school. 
These early realisations, and the frustration deriving from them, led me to abandon 
the idea of carrying out an initial survey in all households and to resort to the help of 
my ýgatekeepers' to establish a relationship with the villagers. My research plan, 
therefore, adapted to the issue of accessibility by adopting what seemed the most 
appropriate solution to the characteristics of the locality: I took the personal networks 
of my two gatekeepers as my informants and abandoned the idea of gathering 
information from all the villagers or from a representative sample of them. 
I therefore ended up concentrating mostly on middle-aged, and to a lesser extent 
elderly, people, a fact that provided a perspective that allowed me to look at social 
change, which was reflected in various narratives. This was partly an advantage, as 
my research came out to consider primarily the point of view of the groups that are 
most often left out by the majority of studies on social change, which tend to 
concentrate on the youth, the most dynamic and change-prone category. Another 
research strategy determined by the specific characteristics of the setting in which I 
found myself was that of concentrating on practices taking place during the time in 
which individuals were free from working commitments. This choice was also 
determined by issues of accessibility, as I did not have access to villagers during their 
working time, mostly spent in Kota Kinabalu or Donggonggon. As a result, I 
concentrated on the practices the villagers were involved in while not working, which 
mostly take place within the village, offering the added advantage of being able to 
engage in participant observation with more people at the same time. The fact, 
however, allowed me to have only a partial access to most of the participants' lives, as 
their working time remained mostly out of my reach. 
My access to informants was also determined by my own characteristics, primarily 
gender: being male made socialisation with men easier and more likely, in a society in 
which peer groups tend to be gendered, although there were no cultural sanctions 
impeding me from interacting with women. My limited knowledge of Malay and total 
initial inability to speak the language regularly used by adults, Kadazan, also put great 
constraints on my research. While the great majority of the villagers speak English 
relatively well, which made it easy for me to communicate with most of them, 
communicating was more difficult with people who did not speak English, especially 
children and elderly women. While at times I solved the problem using my limited 
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Malay or through the help of somebody translating for me, I ended up relying mostly 
on the knowledge generated through interaction with those who could speak English. 
Moreover, the language barrier put me in the position of not understanding, or to do 
so to a limited extent towards the end of the fieldwork, ongoing conversations in 
Kadazan. My strategy to solve this limitation consisted in regularly asking some of 
those involved in the conversation in Kadazan to summarise in English what they had 
just said, which they gladly did, and to rely much on one-to-one conversations in 
English. 
My approach to the ethnographic fieldwork, and my views about the way in which 
knowledge is, and should, be generated through it (see below) also influenced much 
of the course taken by the fieldwork and as a consequence, the results of the research. 
Because of my methodological position, lack of experience and inappropriate fit 
between my original theoretical agenda of studying the way in which the Kadazan 
were Malaysianised through the ideologies diffused by the national media, and the 
reality I encountered while doing the fieldwork, I soon ended up doing what 
Abramson (1993: 65) called 'abandoning the field', finding myself, like him, in a 
situation in which 'fieldwork slipped its tight theoretical moorings'. While at times I 
felt,, like Abramson,, liberated,, often the situation was a source of great concern and 
distress. Again like Abramson (1993: 66), as a result of the lack of coincidence 
between my theoretical premises and the reality I found, I 'postponed the rational 
pursuit of knowledge' and, being 'theoretically liminal', began to defer to my 
informants' sense of what was appropriate. The first manifestation of this 
'abandonment of the field' took the form of a partial change of method, as 
exemplified by the decision not to carry out the household survey. 
Some ethical considerations are also necessary: after asking the approval of my 
informants, who seemed to be very happy to appear in the study of a foreign scholar, 
and considering the issues treated not to be particularly sensitive, I have decided not 
to change the names of the people and locations mentioned in this thesis. The only 
exception is constituted by my decision not to mention the name of those expressing 
their opinions in a discussion about the news described in chapter 4, as I considered it 
better not to identify the people expressing strongly critical views about the actions of 
the Chief Minister and other local politicians. On the other hand, as mentioned above, 
the deferral to my informants' sense of what was appropriate possibly put me in the 
position to be able, through my account, to voice, at least to a certain extent, certain 
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issues they -found important and that they have limited possibility to express outside 
the circle of village and coffee-shoP conversations. 
Methodological considerations. the generation of knowledge in 
ethnography 
In agreement with Piasere (2002), 1 consider the aim of the ethnographic 
rexperiment of experience' to be the reaching of an 'impregnation' with the host 
community's experiences, schemes, analogies and emotions, derived by the latent 
sitting of various observations in the unconscious of the ethnographer, which 
constitutes the deepest and most meaningful fonn of knowledge. The concept of 
'impregnation' brought forward by Piasere is, similarly to the 'feeling-thought' 
proposed by Wikan (1992, cited in Piasere, 2002), a way of producing knowledge 
through the will and ability to connect with other people's experiences and to take 
part in them, an ability which implies a mutual effort and an anti-utilitaristic human 
solidarity that unites people across cultural divides. Piasere's view is also an 
elaboration of Olivier de Sardan's (1995, cited in Piasere, 2002) notion of 'knowing 
how (to do)', a form of ethnographic competence that comes through intuition, 
improvisation and bricolage (1995, cited in Piasere, 2002: 157). In my case, I started 
as somebody without the necessary competences, the status usually shared by both 
children and outsiders,, in terms of language, social and cultural skills, but also 
practical ones that are nonnal to those living in rural, tropical areas and who at least 
occasionally get involved in some manual work. My attempt to reach the 'knowing 
how (to do)' involved, among other things, leaming how to eat and savour very 
different foods , including some 
'exotic delicacies', appreciate certain types of actions, 
coloursi smellsl sounds, get involved in some form of manual labour such as cutting 
shrubs or making cement, adapt to a certain rhythm of life and style of social 
relationship. 
Piasere defines the method aiming at reaching such goal as 'perductive% consisting 
in a "conscious or unconscious acquisition of cognitive-experiential schemata that 
resonate with already interiorised ones and is an acquisition 
[.. ] that takes place 
through a continuous interaction, a prolonged co-experiencing' (2002: 
56). He 
therefore qualifies the knowledge produced through ethnography as synthetic, 
29 
partially unconscious, even though it is generated in situations in which the 
ethnographer pays attention to the events taking place around him/her, based on the 
acquisition of a practical 'know-how', based on 'perduction', but also on induction 
and deduction. He also remarks that the acquisition of the 'know-how' as well as 
more generally the perductive method, take place within the context of schema 
already formed in the researcher, and are therefore made possible only by the 
researcher voluntarily putting him/herself in a cognitive and empathic disposition apt 
at grasping what is not previously known (2002: 166). 
These ideas about the generation of knowledge within the ethnographic 
'experiment of experience' resulted, for Piasere (1999, cited in 2002: 156) in the 
elaboration of a method he calls 'vivere-con' ('living-with'), which considers "life as 
a method' and which brought him to the point of even abandoning the use of tape- 
recorders and taking notes about events while they were taking place. 
I share Piasere's position on the status of knowledge generated through 
ethnography, which, together with a notion of science as producing falsifiable 
conclusions derived from Popper (1968), leads me to consider the knowledge 
generated through ethnography as not scientific. This premise makes discussion about 
criteria, such as those of representativeness, validity and reliability, on how to judge 
the result of research inapplicable to ethnographic writings, as the knowledge they 
present is too connected to the unique act of its creation and to the characteristics and 
aims of the researcher. Rather than looking for objective criteria on which to judge the 
results of my ethnography I would, following Brewer (2000: 5 1), ask my readers to 
apply 'ethnographic imagination', a sort of ' imaginative leap', consisting in judging 
ethnographic data with openness, accepting as reliable descriptions that, however 
partial and inadequate to capture the whole of reality, are reflexive, and accepting that 
observation on the micro level can 'illustrate features of broader social processes' 
(200: 53) and that interpretations of what individuals believe about the social can lead 
to understanding of the social itself (2000: 53). 
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Thesis outline 
The next chapter situates this research within the context of ethnographic studies 
of the Kadazan and related peoples of Sabah and of other parts of Borneo. It shows 
how the approaches used within traditional ethnographic accounts were mostly 
preoccupied with social structure and with problems of classification of ethnic groups. 
This literature took into account neither issues of identity nor the relationship between 
the peoples studied and the states of which they were citizens. I am therefore arguing 
for the need to apply a national framework in order to be able to look at these issues. I 
then present accounts about ethnicity in Malaysia, describing how the present 
Malaysian multi-ethnic system was created by the administrative and political needs 
of dividing the population into discrete entities, and that it was devised by the British 
and subsequently adopted and firmly established by the Malaysian state. I also apply 
analyses of the status of indigenous peoples of Borneo and other parts of island South- 
East Asia to the situation of the Kadazan, describing the 'economy of meaning' 
(Wenger, 1998: 198-200) within which they attribute meaning to different collective 
forms of identification. 
Chapter 3 delineates the historical trajectories of the two most important 
contrasting cultural projects, the Kadazan and Malaysian. Through an analysis of 
media production and other cultural initiatives from the 1950s to present day, the 
chapter reconstructs the creation and development of cultural material, symbols and 
ideologies that have established themselves as the essential building blocks of ethnic 
and national identification. The analysis of the two 'life histories' highlights the 
development of a Kadazan cultural project, based on the attempt to salvage tradition, 
expressed by a set of objectified cultural traits and customs, while modemising it to 
adjust it to the needs of Christianity and of life in a modem state, and its subsequent 
marginalisation after the creation of Malaysia. The period following the formation of 
Malaysia has been characterised by the hegemony of state-controlled mass media 
such as radio and television, within which the voices of minorities such as the 
Kadazan have been marginalised or muted. 
Chapter 4 looks at one of the main subjects of the historical analysis of the 
previous chapter, the state, and attempts to define the extent to which it has become a 
source of identity in the present day and the way in which it has done so through the 
analysis of episodes showing the reaction of Kadazan villagers to the 
development 
31 
propaganda and the discourses present in the media. The discussion demonstrates that 
Malaysia has indeed materialised among the Kadazan through the involvement in the 
national educational and political system and mediascape but also that the government 
propaganda is re ected on the basis of its perceived Malayising agenda. Moreover, 
consumption practices, and the media messages encouraging them, on the one hand 
constitute a national community of consumers, but on the other encourage 
identification with a global consumer culture and of novel practices and subjectivities. 
Chapter 5 looks at the formation and display of a form of identification alternative 
to the national one, the belonging to the village, within leisure practices, both 
constituted by the regular meetings of peer groups and by festive events. The analysis 
of practices reveals the presence of a powerful and widely spread local ideology, 
positing the village as the central point of reference for its inhabitants' sense of 
belonging and as the locus of a traditionalist 'way of life, based on cooperation, 
sharing and egalitarian principles, and rejecting the modem, multi-ethnic urban world 
from which the majority of the villagers derive their livelihood. This ideology defines 
the village as Kadazan and Christian, determining a rootedness in everyday life of 
ethnic identity as well as a general rejection of government-led nationalist propaganda 
and of its policies. 
Chapter 6 presents an anthropological analysis of the annual Harvest Festival 
(Pesta Kaamatan) focusing on two main celebrations, one organised by the Malaysian 
federal authorities and one by the most important local cultural association, both of 
which took place in May 2006. The chapter argues that the celebrations, and the ethnic 
symbolic markers they display, most of which can be considered 'Invented traditions' 
elaborated from the selection of objectified traditional elements, constitute a primary 
site of struggle between the state and the Kadazan over the definition of the role the 
ethnic culture should play in the national culture. While the federal government used 
the celebration, and its televised broadcast, to advance its project of creating a 
national culture and identity going beyond ethnic differences, the ethnic elites used 
the celebration to re-affirm the centrality of certain ethnic cultural traits and the right 
of the minority to their own cultural specificity, following an established tradition of 
'ethno-nationalism'. Many ordinary Kadazan rejected the appropriation and 
instrumental 1 sati on of their ethnic culture by both the federal and ethnic elites, and its 
commodification by commercial sponsors, contrasting them with a 'lived culture', 
constituted by the festive and everyday practices carried out within their villages. 
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Chapter 7 starts from the description of a significant event, a demonstration organised 
against the planned relocation of squatters in an area near where I carried out my 
fieldwork, to analyse the deeper meaning of a widespread opposition to the presence 
of illegal immigrants, with whom the squatters were identified. By considering the 
press rhetoric, which has become deeply internalised by the people of Sabah, 
implicitly equating immigrants with crime, I follow Hall et al. (1978) in their analysis 
of public opinion about crime as expressing widely held and mostly unquestioned 
presupposition about a society, and as considering crime as the antithesis of a normal 
ýway of life. The opposition with its Other, represented by the immigrants, 
immediately defines the Self as Malaysian, but only in a legalistic way, whose value 
is limited by the widespread consideration that the government actually encourages 
immigration, to the damage of its citizens, as a strategy of its Malayising agenda. The 
present condition, in which immigrants have come to constitute a third of Sabah's 
population, therefore qualifies the rejection of the immigrants as a rejection of the 
state's agenda and of the marginal condition of non-Muslim indigenous peoples, an 
opposition that expresses itself at the cultural and religious levels through a strong 
attachment to Kadazan-ness, the village ideology described in chapter 5, and to 
Christianity. Illegal immigration, however, contributes, together with other elements, 
to make Sabah a borderland, different from the rest of Malaysia. The consciousness of 
this borderland status, and the experience of conditions of life unique to it, often 
expressed through a discourse of racial harmony opposed to the perceived intolerance 
of the Peninsula, constitutes the basis for people's identification as Sabahan. 
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Chapter 2 
Situating the Kadazan 
This chapter situates this thesis within the field of anthropological and 
ethnographic studies of Borneo, Malaysia and island South-East Asia. My 
consideration of the literature starts from the outline of the main ethnographic 
writings about the Kadazan and the wider population group to which they belong. 
These works (see below) adopted a structural -functionalist perspective and dealt with 
the themes dominating the wider field of ethnographic studies of Borneo in the period 
between the 1950s and the 1970s. The preoccupation with the social structure of 
clearly defined indigenous groups characterising the approach, however, channelled 
the attention of the anthropologists away from considerations about social change and 
about the relationship between the indigenous peoples and the state. The Bornean 
framework used in these studies had the great advantage of allowing comparison 
between societies in terms of specific social forms such as, for example, household 
structure or social stratification, using the heuristic device of positing a Bornean type 
of society with certain characterising features (King, 1994 [1978]). In order to be able 
to understand the modern conditions, which is to a great extent dominated by national 
institutions, policies and agendas, in which the Kadazan live at present, however, I am 
arguing, in agreement with Postill (2006: 44) for the need to apply a Malaysian frame 
of reference. 
The other limitation of most traditional ethnographic studies of Borneo is that they 
did not pay any attention to identity. The issue started being considered in the context 
of debates about ethnicity, which in Bomeo were triggered by the empirical 
observations showing the complexity of the phenomenon and the inadequacy of 
traditional models of bounded groups. The empirical problems of studying ethnicity 
led to the realisation that ethnicity was not a natural property of groups, but was a 
reification expressing and influencing relationships between people and groups and 
that it was modified, at least to a certain extent, in the process of 
being practically 
used. 
The last part of the chapter looks at the way in which ethnic categories, which are 
labels used in the process of 'social categorisation' (Jenkins, 
2008), emerged out of 
34 
colonial practices of classification mostly aimed at defining bounded groups for the 
purpose of administration (King and Wilder, 2003; Chatterjee, 2004). While these 
categories later became the basis of the official classification of the Malaysian state, 
they also slowly became internalised by the Malaysian citizens (Shamsul, 1998), who 
started using them as forms of self-identification and categorisation in their everyday 
life. In the final part of the chapter, I look at some empirical examples described in the 
ethnographic literature (Nagata, 1974; Boulanger, 2000,2002; Chua, 2007) describing 
the way in which these categories are used and made meaningful by individuals in 
their everyday life, and how their political and personal significance is produced and 
reproduced through processes of ascription and appropriation. 
The Kadazan and the Dusunic peoples 
The Kadazan of the Penampang district, also known as Tanga'ah (in their own 
language) or Tangara (in neighbouring dialects), are a subgroup of a wider 
population, labelled Dusun, Kadazan and Kadazandusun 4 in different periods (see 
below and chapter 3), and which I will refer to as Dusunic peoples. The Dusunic 
peoples constitute 17.5% of the state population numbering 527,660 individuals 5 
(Malaysian Department of Statistics, 2005, cited in Leete, 2007), spread throughout 
Sabah, with a higher concentration in the area of the west coast. They are divided into 
subgroups differentiated by dialect, traditional customary law (adat) and other 
cultural traits such as festive dress and forms of dance. 
The Dusunic groups were egalitarian, cognatic societies whose subsistence was 
traditionally based on rice cultivation supplemented by rearing domestic animals, 
hunting, river fishing and collecting edible and non-edible forest products. Rice was 
cultivated through a swidden technique in areas of forest cleared by slash-and-burn on 
the hills and, in Penampang and other plains of the west coast area, through wet 
technique, in indi vi dual ly- owned fields, surrounded by muddy banks and irrigated 
through a system of dykes and aqueducts. The traditional fon-n of residence of the 
Dusunic peoples was the longhouse, but, differently from other Bornean peoples, they 
4 For a detailed discussion of the issue see the next chapter. I opt here for the expression 'Dusunic 
peoples', favouring classification based on linguistic elements, to refer to the complex of peoples 
identified by the various names 'Dusun', 'Kadazan' and 'Kadazandusun' 
5 Here I give the number of people listed under the census category Kadazandusun in 2005. 
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had mostly shifted to single-family residence already in the 1920s according to Rutter 
(1985 [1929]). An exception is constituted by the Rungus Dusun, who have retained 
longhouse residence to a certain extent until the 1980s and still do in a few cases. The 
major social groupings among the Dusunic peoples were the domestic family and the 
village 6 and, where present, the longhouse. There was no political unit beyond the 
village, and the decisions affecting it were made in gatherings attended by all adult 
males. This assembly, within which an informal council of elders was particularly 
influentiaL also chose the primary political figure of the village, the headman, whose 
role was to settle disputes and claims through the application of adat, of which he had 
to be an expert (Glyn-Jones, 1953). Everyday life was regulated by adat, which 
consisted of a corpus of customary laws passed orally from generation to generation 
that, together with religion, 'sanctioned, legitimised and regulated social relations and 
behaviour' (Ranjit Singh, 2003: 34). The prescriptions of adat dealt with relationships 
between individuals and individuals and the village, including incest prohibitions, 
rules for marriages and inheritance regulations. The regulations of adat were 
integrated in the traditional religion and spiritual beliefs, according to which improper 
behaviour would create a state of spiritual heat, ahasu, which was dangerous and 
which had to be 'cooled' down by paying an appropriate compensation, the sogit 
('cooling') to the aggrieved party, usually an animal to be sacrificed during a ritual 
feast in which the whole village participated. The Dusunic people had a class of ritual 
specialists, the bobohizan (in Penampang, bobolian in other areas), usually female, 
but in some areas also male (see Williams, 1965), who carried out the rituals 
connected with the traditional religion, including ceremonies to propitiate the spirits, 
calling the spirits of the deceased to ask them questions, curing sickness through 
shamanic healing rituals, interpreting dreams and omens. The most important 
ceremonies carried out by the bobohizan were those connected with the key moments 
of the growth cycle of rice, especially at harvest (Glyn-Jones, 1953). 
6 It must be noted that Rutter (1985 [1929]), in apparent contrast to the other authors, 
did not mention 
the village, and described the longhouse, or a cluster of neighbouring ones, as the 
basic political unit 
provided with a headman. This difference could be attributed to the 
fact that many of Rutter's 
descriptions are about a general 'pagan' way of life, which he mostly modelled on the Rundum Murut, 
a non-Dusunic people of Sabah. 
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Ethnographic writings about Dusunic peoples 
The earliest ethnographic accounts about Dusunic peoples were written in the 
second half of the 19t" century, often being situated within more general descriptions 
of the areas, from geographic or naturalistic Points of view. Two authors stand in this 
early period for their more detailed description of the customs and way of life of the 
indigenous peoples of Sabah, Owen Rutter (1922,1929) and I. H. N. Evans (1922, 
1953). Both of them were colonial administrators working for the British North 
Borneo Chartered Company 7 and not trained in anthropology. Their works are 
interesting for their detailed description of the adat of various Dusunic groupings 
from various districts,, which allow us to appreciate differences and commonalities 
between them. 
A later generation of ethnographic accounts started with Monica Glyn-Jones' The 
Dusun of the Penampang Plains (1953). Based on fieldwork carried out between 1949 
and 1951 in the Penampang district, this research was commissioned by the Colonial 
Social Science Research Council,, sponsoring many studies done in various parts of 
Borneo, among which are the famous and influential ones by Leach (1950) and 
Freeman (1970 [1955]). Glyn-Jones (1953) had a pragmatic approach, focusing 
mostly on economics and land tenure, which might have derived from the interests of 
the commissioning body or from the perceived need to generate knowledge that could 
be useful in improving the situation of the people studied. 
The main ethnographic descriptions belonging to the period, all produced by 
professional anthropologists, include the collection The DtIsun by Williams (1965) 
describing the Tambunan Dusun generally, but paying special attention to religion, 
child-rearing and psychological aspects, the unpublished thesis An Analysis of 
Variation Among Ranau Dusun Communities qf'Sabah, Malaysia by Harrison (1974 
[1971]) and the early works by George Appell (1967,1968,1983,1994 [1978]), the 
most prolific author writing about Dusunic peoples. The works of Harrison and 
Appell8 can be placed in the tradition of the main interests dominating anthropological 
7 The North Borneo Chartered Company, a private company controlling present-day Sabah through a 
British Royal Charter between 1881 and 1943. 
8 More recent works by George Appell have considered different issues, including consequences of 
development on health (1986) sexuality among the Rungus (199 1), and the consequences of conversion 
to Christianity (1997). 
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writings about South-east Asia, and more specifically Bomeo, in the late 1960s and 
1970s. As remarked by King (1994 [1978]: 8), most scholars of Bomeo 'have 
assessed at least some of their findings in relation to Freeman's observations on such 
features of Than society as the bilek-family (or household), the kindred and the 
longhouse. The work of both authors,, like those of others writing ethnographies of 
Bornean peoples, dealt with the description and analysis of the social structure and 
relationships within cognatic societies, attempting to elaborate a model to properly 
account for the characteristic features of this type of societies (see below). 
Glyn-Jones and Penampang in the colonial times 
Glyn-Jones's account (1953) concentrates on the Kadazan, which she referred to, 
according to the colonial usage, as Tenampang Dusun', providing details about some 
of their unique characteristics as well as a description of the situation of the area in 
which I carried out my fieldwork at the beginning of the 1950s, not long after what is 
today Sabah had become the Crown Colony of North Bomeo. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the main economic activity was the cultivation 
of wet rice, which was harvested 5 or 6 months after planting, while the remaining 
time was traditionally occupied by cultivating other crops - garden vegetables, sweet 
potatoes, betel nut and coconut palms - hunting, fishing, collecting forest products or 
carrying out various other activities, including being employed in salaried labour. The 
villagers also raised animals such as pigs and chicken, and buffaloes, which were used 
to work in the rice fields,, especially for ploughing. The buffalo was also a traditional 
form of wealth, necessary for berian, the traditional bride price paid to the parents of 
the woman to be married among the Dusunic peoples, and was killed to hold feasts in 
particular occasions. Since its diffusion in the 1920s, tapping rubber had also become 
an increasingly important and profitable activity. 
Land,, apart from the common areas on which villages were built, was traditionally 
privately owned, officially by individuals but practically by households, and was 
inherited, according to the local adat, only by sons, the eldest receiving two shares. 
Although the majority of rice farmers owned at least part of the land they cultivated, 
there were considerable differences in the size of the holdings and some were even 
landless. However much land they owned, most families worked an area that they 
38 
could manage without outside help, although miiatabang, the exchange of labour 
between members of a group formed for that purpose, was practised by all families, 
especially at the time of harvest. The development of rubber plantations exaggerated 
the differences between rich and poor, as land was granted by the government only to 
those who theoretically had time to tap it, therefore excluding those who worked for a 
salary in other people's lands. As a result a class of landowners living by renting their 
land and one of salaried rubber-tappers started emerging while a few people, mostly 
landless, started counting on salaried labour for their subsistence. 
The main changes brought by colonialism described by Glyn-Jones include the 
establishment of a local administrative system, the building of infrastructure and the 
conversion to Christianity. The first catholic missionaries started converting people at 
the end of the I 9th century and, according to Glyn-Jones, nearly half of the Kadazan 
of the Penampang plains were nominally Catholic by the 1950s, although a great deal 
of syncretism was present, with the identification of the Christian God with the 
Kadazan Supreme Being, the belief in spirits, and the continuation of various 'pagan' 
practices, such as divination, the belief in omens, the interpretation of dreams, and the 
use of a 30-days calendar divided in 'good' and 'bad' days. While traditionally there 
were a few bobohizan in each village, the training of new initiates had ceased in most 
cases by the 1950s because of the diffusion of Christianity, even though at least one of 
them was still present in most villages. 
According to Glyn-Jones (1953), the power of the headman was greater in the least 
educated villages, but in general he was not seen as being in any way part of the 
government, which was seen as a remote 'them', chiefly represented by the District 
Office 'where taxes are paid and cases heard in the courts, and where many forms are 
filled in' (1953: 111). The general attitude towards the official power was summarised 
by a phrase by a Sino-Dusun reported by Glyn-Jones: 'We are like children, the 
Government is our Father. If we do wrong, it is proper that we should be punished, 
but we must be told why we are wrong, so that we may not 
do it again' (1953: 111 - 
112). The power of the headman became, in many villages, overtaken 
by that of the 
police, deriving their authority from being seen as representatives of the 
Magistrates' 
Court. 
According to Glyn-Jones' (1953) account, before colonisation all contact 
between 
Penampang and the outside world was by sea and all 
local transport and 
communication took traditionally place 
by river or in land, either on foot or riding 
buffaloes, but the situation changed with the establishment of a rail connection with 
the capital, calling at the station of Putatan, on the coast,, in 1905 and of a road, from 
Jesselton (Kota Kinabalu) to the Putatan (Moyog) river in 1932. The construction of 
the road shifted the centre of the district from the village of Inonbong to the place 
where it ended, where a village, 'Penampang proper', was established with the 
District Office, the main church and the Mission School, as well as a police station 
and Government rice stores. The road was mostly used by public transport such as 
buses and taxis as well as by lorries, while private transport initially remained mostly 
by river in the plains. 
The first school,, run by the mission of the Mill Hill Fathers,, opened at Inobong in 
1896, substituted then by another one opened at Dabak in 1898, the famous St. 
Michael. Thanks to the Catholic Mission School,, Penampang was the most educated 
rural area during the colonial times, with 470 boys and 230 girls attending school in 
195 1. Children started schooling at the age of 7, or even 9 or 10 if they lived very far 
from the school, and, while few of the boys at St. Michaels stayed long enough to 
complete primary education, most learned to read and write in their language, as 
education was in Kadazan in the first 3 classes and then mostly in English. Secondary 
schooling began in Penampang in 1949 (Glyn-Jones, 1953). 
Glyn-Jones (1953) argued that the introduction of school, whose teachings many 
pupils had not time to assimilate as they left it too soon, encouraged many of them to 
develop a sense of superiority towards their illiterate parents, which led them to 
question traditional authority, and made them grow a series of new expectations and 
desires for consumer goods such as a bicycle or smart clothes. She concluded her 
study by arguing that the Dusun, being in 'a difficult stage of transition from primitive 
culture to Western civilisation', needed 'not merely scholastic education and material 
improvements but a determined fight to restore the people's own faith in themselves - 
their pride in being Dusun' (1953: 113). 
Glyn-Jones's (1953) account is particularly interesting in the way in which it 
describes the changes that were taking place in the Penampang district in the post-war 
period as a consequence of the increasing integration of the area in the colonial state. 
The most important of these changes were the erosion of the authority of the 
traditional village institutions, the headman and the bobohizan, as well as the growing 
importance of two elements that were to prove fundamental in the following period 
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and in the relationship between the Kadazan and the post-colonial state: formal 
education and Christianity. 
Appell and Harrison: social structure 
The works of Harrison (1974) and Appell (1967,1968,1983,1994 [1978]) share a 
common interest in the description and analysis of the social structure of, respectively, 
the Ranau Dusun and the Rungus Dustin of the Kudat district. Both authors looked at 
the societies they studied as examples of cognatic or bilateral societies - those in 
which kinship ties are traced equally through the maternal and paternal sides - and 
connected some of their characteristics with this particular descent system, as 
previously done by Leach (1950) and George Murdock (1960). Starting from these 
premises, Harrison denied the applicability of models derived from the study of 
unilineal descent systems, such as descent or alliance theories, arguing that in 
cognatic societies membership in groups does not depend on consanguineal ties 
(1974: 56). Both authors described residence rather than kinship as the relevant 
criterion for ascribing membership to any social group and for enjoying rights of 
access to common resources. They also stressed the fact that the consanguineal ties 
that existed did not produce any actual social group, such as the kindred, but they 
remained, at the most, simple social categories, and the only social group based on 
such links was the family. Appell (1967) has also attempted to define observational 
procedures to define kindreds, concluding that the Rungus do not have such a concept 
and , in later papers, 
has given a tentative ethnic classification of Dusunic peoples 
derived from linguistics (1968) and examined concepts such as 'corporation' and 
ýcorporate social grouping' (1983). 
Both authors identified the main social groupings of the societies they studied to be 
the domestic family and the village, which they also referred to as ýcommunity', 
together with the longhouse in the case of the Rungus. Both authors described in very 
similar ways, and with a similarly Freeman-influenced terminology, the domestic 
family as 'the only production, consumption and asset-accumulating social isolate' 
and 'the most important corporate entity in the economic, jural and ritual realmsý 
(Appell, 1994 [1978]: 188). Appell (1994 [1978]) defined the family as a social unit 
usually formed by a married couple and their unmarried children and residing together 
in a longhouse apartment with a life cycle starting when a newly married couple takes 
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separate residence and terminating when they move with the domestic family of a 
married child and all the family assets are divided. Harrison (1974) described the 
family as responsible for all its dealings with the administration, other villages and 
any other entity, and directly subordinated to the 'community' only in swidden 
villages where, the property of land being common, each decision made by the 
majority was binding upon all the members. It was also the main unit for 
accumulating assets by converting agricultural surplus into traditional forins of wealth 
(buffaloes, jars, brass gongs and cannons), or, more recently, cash, necessary to pay 
bride price and ritual fees (Appell, 1994 [1978], Harrison, 1974). 
Both authors defined the village as the fundamental political unit and jurally and 
ritually corporate unit'. Appell (1994 [1978]: 210) however noted that its rights and 
duties were less developed than those of the domestic family. Harrison (1974) defined 
the village, as the 'residence and agricultural unit controlled by one headman'. A 
central organisation belonging to the village level was the tabang. The 'community' 
was, at some level, 'a labour aggregating mechanism and a subsistence unit", and the 
same values supported, through the institution of marriage, the family and the village 
at the same time (Harrison, 1974). Appell (1994 [1978]) described how the village, 
formed by one or more longhouses, held what he called 'residual rights' over the land 
within the surrounding area, where domestic families residing in the village could 
carry out cultivation or, in the case of forest reserves, gather natural products, but 
where families from other villages could do so only if granted pen-nission by the 
headman. Appell (1994 [1978]) also considered the status of the longhouse, absent 
among the Ranau Dusun, whose members had no form of corporate action 
in the 
economic sphere, but had forms of 'collective' action in the ritual realm, 
in which the 
rights to ask for compensation for a ritually dangerous act were held 
by each member 
family individually, nevertheless action could be taken by a member on behalf of all 
the others. Harrison (1974 [1971]) described the village as the 
lowest order of 
ascription for the Ranau Dusun, followed by that of the area, 
indicated by a 
monolexemic indicator, such as Bundu, based on the 
dialect spoken, the form of 
cultivation and common adat; and finally that of the 
larger area, usually 
corresponding to the district, as for example 
Ranau or Penampang, which he 
considered as a group whose basis for identification was the reaction 
to a commonly 
shared, complex political structure. 
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An element of analysis that partially differentiates the work of Harrison (1974) 
from those of other coeval Bomeo scholars is the consideration of differences 
between villages determined by the agricultural technique practised - swidden, wet 
rice or cash crop. Harrison (1974) considered a developmental framework in which 
the adoption of a different form of agriculture initiated a series of processes that 
caused further changes. He also considered the effect of the establishment of an 
external administrative control over the area from about 1920 onwards, which had 
various practical effects on the subsistence of communities through the application of 
various policies and the establishment of Administrative Centres by the Chartered 
Company, which were followed by Chinese shops. The work of external forces acted 
also in more direct ways: after entering in contact with them, communities became 
more and more dependent on shops, schools and wage employment. Shops offered the 
villagers living nearby the possibility to optimise the output of their crops. Wage 
employment on the one hand lessened the families' dependence on customary 
subsistence goods and on the traditional social patterns utilised to produce and acquire 
them, while on the other it modified people's behaviour in order to adjust to it and 
created 'a new metaphor for labour relations which can be utilised within the village 
to avoid over-committing oneself to reciprocal labour organisations' (Harrison, 1974: 
530). Nevertheless, it must be noted that the change described by Harrison was mostly 
synchronic rather than diachronic, as it mostly took the fonn of differences between 
villages at the same time, while the description of diachronic processes, such as those 
deriving from the influences of the administration and of changes in the economy 
were relatively limited. 
The description of the way in which the village constituted the essential unit at the 
political level and at that of enforcements of the prescriptions and sanctions of adat 
provided by the accounts of Appell (1967,1968,1983,1994 [1978]) and Harrison 
(1974 [1971]) provides the foundation for situating the ethnographic part of the 
present research in a village context. While I follow the insights of previous 
anthropologists in considering the village a relevant unit, I am not considering it to be 
bounded, but only as a context within which to empirically situate an enquiry that 
looks at the interconnection and interrelation of processes taking place at different 
levels. 
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The issue of ethnicity in the Bornean and Malaysian context 
Anthropological studies of Borneo and, more generally, of South-East Asia, have 
found particular difficulties in defining ethnic units (King and Wilder, 2003). King 
(1982) argued that, while the assumption of a correspondence between a certain sets 
of cultural traits,, especially language, and a 'society' might be appropriate in certain 
cases, it is inadequate for many peoples of Borneo. While some anthropologists 
reacted to that realisation by concentrating on self-identity and 'folk' models of 
ethnicity, this solution also presents some problems when applied in Borneo (King, 
1982; and more generally, see Jenkins, 2008 and chapter 1). This is due to the 
continuous processes of cultural exchange taking place within neighbouring groups, 
involving the adoption of various cultural traits, forms of subsistence, language and 
religion. The latter, in particular, is a very important means of ethnic change, as 
people adopting Islam become assimilated to Malays and usually considered as such 
even if they retain some or many of their original cultural elements. Another problem, 
discussed by King through the analysis of his ethnographic material on the people of 
Western Kalimantan he labels as 'Maloh', is constituted by the fact that those that are 
considered or consider themselves as ethnic groups are often heterogeneous and that 
boundaries are often not sharply defined, which leads him to conclude that 'society 
and culture are the consequence of complex multi-dimensional processes' (1982: 30). 
Moreover, self-identities are often formulated in opposition to other people and, as 
remarked by Rousseau (1975), people using categories to define themselves might not 
be able to list the defining features of the ethnicity to which they ascribe themselves. 
In a later paper, King defines folk taxonomies of Bomeo as comprising 
'overlapping yet often conflicting sets of ethnic categories, labels and defining 
criteria, [which] constitute indigenous attempts to comprehend and bring order to 
complex and dynamic local social and cultural relationsý (2001: 3-4). These 
taxonomies,, he argues, are usually extended to a broader context in a piecemeal way. 
On the basis of these considerations, King (2001) argues for the need to study the 
dynamics of ethnic identity and nomenclature in the context of a social system or of 
the complex of social relationships taking place within a region rather than 
concentrating on single defined and autonomous ethnic groups. 
The problem of ethnic labelling is particularly relevant in regards to the Dusunic 
peoples, described by Dunn as 'a congeries of separate, named groups speaking 
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closely related languages but differing with respect to social and cultural usageý 
(1981: 29). These peoples were referred to by the exonym Dusun (Orang Dusun, 
means 'people of the orchards' in Malay) by the Muslim neighbours, in particular the 
Brunei Malays (see Evans, 1990 [1922]; Rutter, 1985 [1929]), during pre-colonial 
times. The label was used also by the British colonialists for all purposes, including 
census,, and in ethnographic accounts, such as that of Evans, who in 1922, stated that 
'The Dusun are not a single tribe, but an assemblage of tribes, or rather the 
appellation embraces large numbers of village communities' (1990: 35). The term 
Dusun was therefore what Jenkins (2008) calls a form of 'social categorisation' 
generated in the context of the attribution of exonyms by neighbouring peoples and 
then by the colonial administration. The members of the group, on the other hand, did 
not use the term Dusun to refer to themselves, and in fact they had no name for the 
overall group, but referred to themselves only through river-based autonyms. 
From the linguistic point of view, these peoples speak languages that belong to two 
families: the Dusunic and Paitanic. The Dusunic family, by far the larger of the two, 
being distributed in almost all regions of Sabah, is considered by linguists to be 
formed by a chain of dialects which become less and less mutually intelligible with 
the increase in geographic distance (Annual Report of Summer Institute of 
Linguistics, 1980: 1-2, cited in Ranjit Singh, 2003: 13). 
In the 1950s,, however , in the climate of politicisation and growth of ethnic 
awareness inspired by the prospect of a possible independence in the near future (see 
chapter 3), the leaders of the Dusunic peoples established the autonym Kadazan, 
traditionally a label use to refer to the subgroups of the Penampang and Papar 
districts, as the official label for the whole of the Dusunic peoples. The term has been 
used officially until the 1980s, when the dissatisfaction with its connection with the 
people of a certain area, led to the elaboration of the compromise term Kadazandusun 
(KD), still officially in use. 
The history of the elaboration of a label for the Dusunic peoples shows a typical 
example of the problems connected with ethnic naming in Borneo in the shift from an 
ethnically unconscious position, in which people define themselves at a local level 
and are categorised by neighbouring peoples through the use of an exonym, to the 
acquiring of political significance of a more inclusive ethnic label. The new label 
established itself as an official categorisation but also, at least partially, as a form of 
group and individual seff-identification, and it was instrumental in the generation of a 
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sense of common identity turning an ethnic category into a politically significant 
'community of alignment' (Wenger, 1998), acting as a group with common goals in 
the political arena. The adoption of the name Kadazan is, like the establishment of the 
category Dayak (King, 2001), an example of the recent creation of broader ethnic 
identities as an aspect of political and economic change. 
The consideration of ethnicity in the context of Borneo, however, can only take the 
enquiry this far: as politics takes place at the national and, to some extent,, the sub- 
national level a proper understanding of the political significance of the usage of 
ethnic labels and of the drawing of boundaries can be reached only by widening the 
frame of analysis to Malaysian and Sabahan society. 
The development of the Malaysian ethnic system 
While anthropologists dealing with Borneo concentrated on ethnographic 
descriptions of 'tribal' peoples, the study of metropolitan colonial societies was 
carried out by social scientists and administrators applying a wider-scale analysis. 
The most influential early model used to describe Malaysian society was that of the 
ýplural society', elaborated by a British scholar and administrator, Fumivall, (1939, 
1956, cited in King and Wilder, 2003) to describe colonial Burma [Myanmar] and 
Dutch East Indies [Indonesia]. He considered the members of various 'races' as 
constituting 'economic castes', serving different functions within the society and 
interacting among each other only in the marketplace, while in every other context, 
such as family and religion, the relationships were only intra-ethnic. 
The model was revised and applied to Malaysia by Judith Nagata (1979), who 
attempted to join the 'ethnic' and 'class paradigm' by contrasting 'objective' 
distinctions, constituted by emerging class relationship that cut across ethnic 
boundaries, with subjective ones,, based on ethnic,, religious and other traditional 
differences. She described how the three main ethnic groups present in the Peninsula 
- the Malay, Chinese and Indian - had their own 
different status systems as well as 
different perceptions of the overall Malaysian social structure. As a consequence, 
inequality was not perceived in class terins but in individualised terms within patron- 
client and ethnic relationships (1979: 127). 
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Building on models of ethnicity like that proposed by Nagata (19741.1979), and in 
line with a constructivist and post-colonial approach dominant in contemporary 
anthropology, a later generation of scholars have focused their enquiry on the process 
through which ethnic identities have been and are created. Most contemporary 
scholars seem to agree that the 'racial communities' that constitute modem Malaysia 
and Singapore have been constructed by colonial and subsequently nationalist 
discourse (Kahn, 2006: 1). One of the most influential Malaysian scholars within this 
literature is Sharnsul (1996,1998), who locates the origin of the present ethnicisation 
of discourses in Malaysia in the collection of infon-nation - in the form of censuses, 
maps and ethnographic accounts - carried out by the British during colonial times, 
which resulted in what Cohn (1996, cited in Shamsul, 1998) called the 'colonisation 
of epistemological space' and Dirks (2001, cited in Chatterjee, 2004: 37) the 
'ethnographic state'. The categories so established were necessary for various 
technologies of governmentality (Chatterjee, 2004: 36), policies and bodies targeted at 
specific racial groups, which determined the consolidation of these categories. In 
terms of ethnicity these classificatory efforts determined a simplification that brought 
a multitude of ethnic groupings together into a limited number of major categories, 
defined by stereotyped characteristics that, however, obscured intra-ethnic divisions 
between, for instance,, those characterised as Chinese, Indian, Malay or Dayak (King 
and Wilder,, 2003: 203). These data-gathering efforts found their scholarly avenues in 
the sociological model of the 'plural society' as well as in the ethnographic 
descriptions of the early explorers, missionaries and administrators writing about the 
customs of 'tribal peoples'. The structural -functional i st approach of the early 
professional anthropologists (e. g. Leach, 1950; Glyn-Jones (1953); Freeman, 1970 
[1950]; Appell, 1968; Harrison, 1974 [1971]) can also be situated within this mapping 
enterprise, even though they aimed at answering questions that arose from the 
theoretical developments of their own discipline. 
Nagata (1975) described how a 'plural society' was created by the British in the 
colonies that were to become Malaysia through the establishment of an ethnic division 
of labour, an ideology of racial, 'innate' differences and a system of economic and 
administrative division and indirect rule in which the colonisers were the ultimate 
inter-ethnic arbiters. A similar process is described by PuruShotam (1998) for 
Singapore, where an extremeJy diverse population was circumscribed into four 
discrete racial groups on the basis of an 'orientalist' classificatory system constructed 
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by, mostly British, "experts', and this arbitrary system was over time internalised by 
Singaporeans. 
As argued by Shamsul (1998), over time, partly thanks to the division generated by 
separated education in vernacular for different ethnic groups, these categories became 
meaningful to the social actors, a process that involved the transformation of a mostly 
'nominal' category (Jenkins, 2008) into a form of collective identification and 
belonging. King and Wilder (2003: 203), on the other hand, argue that the cultural 
differences fully crystallised into 'macro-level ethnic categories', the bangsa9, only 
relatively recently, within the climate of politicisation of ethnicity and emergence of 
political organisations that took place in the two decades before the Second World 
War,, a process I will describe in detail for Sabah in chapter I 
The process of ethnicisation described by previous authors and its present 
ubiquitous effects seem to confirm Banks' argument that 'the manifestations of 
ethnicity we study today contain within them the ghosts of previous academic 
formulations' (1996: 189) and that the concept has 'escaped academia and spread into 
the outside world'. In this line,, Dentan (1976) has argued that the concept of ethnicity 
was alien to South-East Asian peoples and that it was a concept derived from Euro- 
American racism and nationalism exported to the area by colonialists and scholars. He 
considered applying it to the South-east Asian context to be a sort of Procrustean act, 
moreover one that has negative ethical implications for the way it can be used by 
interested parties. 
The fact that the present ethnic system is a product of colonial and postcolonial 
practices, including scholarly models, however, should not lead into overlooking the 
relevance it has for people and the way in which ethnic groups are perceived as being 
real and based on real differences. It is important to consider that, as stressed by Kahn 
(1993), while all the practices and cultural traits that are conceived as traditions are 
created in social and historical contexts, they are experienced as authentic or 'real' by 
those who practice and carry them, and they are not simply the creations of outsiders, 
but also of the active contributions of the locals. 
As I will demonstrate in the next chapters in relation to the Sabahan context, 
ethnicity has become such a powerful discourse in Malaysia that its citizens, Kadazan 
included, have learnt to express in a ethnic idiom a whole series of constituent 
9 Bangsa is a Malay term that can be translated as 'race', 'ethnic group', or 'nation' and constitutes the 
term through which the concept of 'ethnic group' is usually expressed in Malaysia. I 
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elements of their identity connected with familiarity, locality, tradition that are not 
necessarily connected with belonging to a certain ethnic group. 
The everyday usage of ethnicity in contemporary Malaysia 
Nagata (1974) analysed the situational use of ethnic categories made by 
Malaysians, arguing ethnic groups to be 'special kinds of reference groups, the 
invocation of which may vary according to particular factors of the broader social 
situation,, rather than a fixed anchorage to which the individual is unambiguously 
bound', noting that the same cultural features could be used in certain occasions to 
express differences and in others to express commonality of membership (1974: 333). 
She also argued that some individuals may oscillate rather freely from one ethnic 
reference group to another, without becoming involved in role conflict or marginality, 
that certain cultural items and behaviours are not uniquely and inalienably attached to 
a certain ethnic group, but can be manipulated according to the choice of reference 
group; that in some cases ethnic bonds can be subordinated to other linkages, such as 
common religion, and finally that there is no perfect correlation between census 
categories of ethnicity and actual social usage of ethnic categories (1974: 333). 
She found ethnic categories to be the most relevant form of self-ascription for 
Malaysians, whom she described as, first and foremost, members of their 'race' and 
only secondarily Malaysians. She found ethnicity to be dominant not only as a form 
of subjective classification, but also in the public definition of individuals and groups, 
and found it to be such an ubiquitous category that she concluded that 'currently, no 
"neutral" or "nonethnic" role or culture yet exists for Malaysians, and this is 
reinforced by government policies of identifying all individuals and situations in 
ethnic ten-ns' (1974: 347). 
She located the most important pressures involved in the selection of ethnic 
reference groups in: (1) the desire to express either social 
distance or solidarity; (2) 
expediency, or the immediate advantages to be gained 
by a particular reference group 
selection on a particular occasion; and (3) consideration of social status and upward or 
downward social mobility (normative reference groups) (1974: 
340). On the basis of 
her own research experience in the Malay Peninsula, she concluded 
that 'none of the 
many cases observed showed the remotest symptoms of personal 
insecurity or 
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marginality arising from the lack of firm identity. On the contrary, such easy 
switching of ethnic identity seems to be of positive value in enabling the individual to 
avoid tensions due to inconsistencies of role expectations in any given set of 
circumstances' (1974: 343). Nagata, therefore, argued that, while individuals exploit 
the imperfections of the ethnic classification system, ethnic identity constituted 'a 
deeply-felt and often essentialized aspect of being human for the vast majority of my 
participants' (1974: 343). These views are in line with those of Dentan, who argued 
that 'multi -culturation provides people of South-east Asia, and especially minorities, 
with a series of identities which they can switch and manipulate depending on the 
circumstances and necessities of particular interaction (1976: 78). 
Boulanger (2000,2002) offers interesting case studies dealing with the everyday 
use of ethnicity in Sarawak in the urban context, a topic unfortunately still under- 
researched in Borneo. She describes how members of indigenous groups living in 
Kuching manipulate the system of ethnic categorisation for reasons that are primarily 
political, especially according to the perceived advantages of being part of a larger 
group, but also personal, as in the case of children of intermarriage, who might label 
themselves with a supra-ethnic term such as Dayak to 'resolve what is perceived as a 
personal dilemma' (2000: 60), as not to favour the ethnicity of one parent over the 
other. While she argues that the manipulation of ethnicity for personal reasons is 
increasing, and might even eventually become the most important, Boulanger thinks 
that even the attempt to find solutions to problems involving ethnic identity on a 
personal level have political implications (2000: 62). The main issues connected with 
ethnicity she describes include the concern about the weak political position of ethnic 
groups with a small population, what she calls the 'numbers game' (2000), the 
attempt by urban individuals to Preserve their sense of belonging by making their 
culture in some way 'portable', for example through the use of names (2002: 
227), the 
erosion of traditional culture and its replacement with a generic ýmodern' culture 
promoted by Malaysia (2002). 
Chua, analysing the results of the official ethnic and legal classifications on the 
Bidayuh of Sarawak, stresses the fact that 'official labels are highly pertinent to 
Malaysians in general, for there are economic and political reasons 
for [.. ] minority 
groups to work with and through them' (2007: 266) as tapping 
benefits of dunia 
moden (M. -modem world'). While Bidayuh are 
'fully aware of the relative newness 
and external origin of national ethnic identities, 
they also acknowledge their 
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significance and effect as recognised idioms and channels which mediate (even 
create) their relations with dunia moden' (2007: 266). Joining Malaysia has brought 
the material benefits of dunia moden, but also increased needs and often not provided 
enough means to fulfil them, as Bidayuh are mostly at a low socio-economic level. 
Many Bidayuh attribute this to Malay domination and to the fixity of the ethnic 
system the Malay exported to Sarawak, which requires confori-ning to a fixed system 
of ethnic-based categories and privileges originally defined in relation to Malay and 
bumiputera dominance. Bidayuhs, like Kadazan, consider themselves second-class 
bumiputera as they know that Malays and other Muslim bumiputera have a greater 
share of benefits than they do. Chua then concludes that rather than trying to 
ýpreserve' or 'construct' a distinctive 'Bidayuh identity', her informants are more 
interested in maintaining a certain freedom of movement which they associate with 
being Bidayuh' (2007: 279, emphasis in original). 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the traditional ethnographic literature on the Dusunic peoples has 
shown a lack of consideration of two aspects: social change and relationship with the 
state and identity. This research is attempting to fill this knowledge gap by 
concentrating on identity and considering the state as a powerful agent in its making. 
Malaysia, which, in agreement with Postill (2006), 1 consider to be a 'thick culture 
area" with a relatively established, though partly contested, national culture, appears 
as the necessary context within which to situate the present research. Within this 
frame of reference, in the second part of this chapter I have briefly outlined the 
emergence of the ethnic discourse and system within the British territories that were 
to become Malaysia and shown how it constituted an essential element of the 
establishment of colonial control by means of techniques of governmental ity. 
While it supported the control of the British, the ethnic discourse 
has become the 
rallying point of groups resisting the state in po st- independence 
Malaysia, as I will 
describe in the next chapter. Nevertheless, the Malaysian state and the 
Kadazan and 
other indigenous minorities, despite their struggle, share the same ethnic 
discourse. 
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Chapter 3 
The formation of Kadazan and Malaysian cultures in 
Sabah (1953-2007) 
This chapter reconstructs the history of the formation of a modem Kadazanlo 
culture,, starting in the late colonial period, and its progressive replacement by the 
Malaysian culture promoted by the state through the use of various media. This 
reconstruction involves narrating the history of two often conflicting cultural projects 
and contextualising them within the relationship between the Kadazan and the 
government's nation-building agenda. 
The modem Kadazan culture was created through a process of 'objectification', 
transforming implicit customs into a conscious and explicitly defined set of 
'traditions'(see Winzeler, 1997b: 202). This process emerged out of the efforts of a 
'Kadazan intelligentsia' (Roff, 1969), who selected elements of rural Kadazan culture, 
elaborated them and spread them through the emerging new mass media, primarily 
radio and newspapers, and through the efforts of an association, the Society of the 
Kadazan. Similarly to what happened in Sarawak (Postill, 2006), the development of 
a modem, objectified Kadazan culture was part of an indigenist project of preserving 
indigenous traditions while modernising them through the infusion of Western, and 
primarily Christian-inspired, values and principles. This process went hand-in-hand 
with the generation of a sense of unity among an indigenous population that was 
deeply divided by differences in dialect and adat and that had only a vague sense of 
belonging to an ethnic and cultural unit beyond the level of local river-based groups. 
These developments created the circumstances for indigenous peoples of Sabah to 
imagine themselves as members of a single community, the Kadazan, sharing a 
common culture but also similar life experiences. The formation of a Kadazan culture 
was closely associated with a political movement, termed 'Kadazan nationalism' by 
Roff (1969), which aimed at obtaining a greater recognition for Kadazan interests 
within the colonial state and, once it became clear that the British were about to grant 
independence, to mobilise and unite the Dusunic people to prepare for self-rule. The 
efforts of the 'intelligentsia', therefore, generated the conditions for the creation of the 
10 Here I use the term Kadazan to refer to the Dusunic people more generally, following the usage of 
those involved in the early elaboration of the cultural project I am describing, as well as of various 
authors describing it (Loh, 1992; Luping, 1994) 
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Kadazan as both a 'community of imagination' and one of alignment, imagining 
themselves as a 'deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson, 1991: 7) but also acting as 
a group with a common aim. 
While it is likely that the members of the 'Kadazan intelligentsia' envisaged the 
prospect of leading a majority within an independent, multi-ethnic Sabah, soon the 
situation changed with the constitution of Malaysia in 1963, and the Dusunic peoples 
found themselves to be an ethnic minority with a small demographic weight". The 
Malaysian government has since used the media, and primarily what Postill calls the 
'foundational media forms' of 'state propaganda, writing (literacy), television and 
clock- and-calendar time' (2006: 3), to pursue its nation-building agenda. 
The discussion of this chapter focuses primarily on media production for two main 
reasons: on the one hand I consider, following Postill (2006), the media to be the most 
important means through which the Malaysian government has been building a 
nation within its territory; on the other, the media provide a useful resource to 
reconstruct cultural events of the past. My discussion of this history is based mostly 
on secondary sources written by academic historians and political scientists (Roff, 
1969; Whelan, 1970; Reid, 1997; Loh, 1992) and by a former politician and cultural 
activist directly involved in the events I am describing, Herman Luping (1994), as 
well as on interviews I carried out with political figures, former media producers and 
ordinary Kadazan villagers. 
The early days of 'Kadazan nationalism' (1953-1967) 
The late colonial period in Sabah saw, almost simultaneously, the birth of the first 
local media -a daily newspaper and radio - and the awakening of political 
consciousness in North Borneo. The process of development of a political 
consciousness among the indigenous peoples of Sabah was particularly prominent 
among the Kadazan, leading to a cultural and political movement termed 'Kadazan 
nationalism' by Roff (1969), through an analogy with the similar movement that took 
place among Malays in Malaya before World War 11. Luping (1994) argued that the 
forination of a political consciousness was accompanied by the forging of a common 
11 They constitute about 2% of the total Malaysian population. 
53 
identity, developed on the feeling, based on linguistic and cultural similarities, of 
belonging to a larger group, which had gradually grown out of the changes that had 
already taken place in pre-colonial times under Brunei domination. 
The protagonists of the process were those Roff (1969) called 'Kadazan 
intelligentsia', educated in the Catholic mission schools, fluent in English, able to 
write their own language using romanised script, and many of whom had pursued 
their higher studies overseas. The fact that the majority of the members of this elite 
came from the Penampang district, where the first mission schools outside urban areas 
were established, gave predominance in all media to the dialect from that area. Two of 
the most important members of this 'intelligentsia' were Joe Manjaji, the person 
behind the decision to use the term 'Kadazan' as a label to unite all the Dusunic 
people (P. J. Granville-Edge, personal communication), and Fred Sinidol, who was 
active in Kadazan radio broadcasting; both were from Penampang. The most publicly 
prominent figure, however, was Donald (later Tun Fuad) Stephens, who had mixed 
European, Kadazan and Japanese ancestry, the editor and publisher of the Sabah 
Times and, later,, the first Chief Minister of Sabah. The members of the 'intelligentsia' 
were strongly influenced by the values promoted by the Catholic mission schools in 
their upholding of, at the same time, traditional culture and modernity, seen as 
synonymous with the civilisation of the orangputih, the 'white man', characterised by 
technology, literacy and Christianity. The majority of the mission-educated Kadazan 
shared (and still do) an ideology that attempts to reach a modem Kadazan culture, a 
blend of Catholicism and adat from which certain elements not compatible with 
modernity and Christianity have been discarded. Similarly to later state propaganda, 
Catholic modemist ideology showed in a short time the positive effects of forinal 
education,, which could give access to a fraction of the power of the orang putih. 
Thanks to its contribution to the education of rural Kadazan,, the appeal of its 
modemist ideology and its defence of the Kadazan language and of some of its 
traditional customs,, Christianity had become, by the 1950s, an essential element of 
the fabric of Kadazan culture and way of life. Christianity has since become 
extremely important in Kadazan identity and in the feeling of radical difference 
between the Kadazan and the national majority, the Malays (Luping, 1994; Reid, 
1997). 
The politicisation and the elaboration of a common form of identification for the 
Dusunic peoples were both based on the elaboration of a modem, objectified and - to 
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some extent - standardised Kadazan culture, developing the sense of common origin 
and common purpose necessary to the formation of a community of alignment, able, 
in the projects of the 'intelligentsia', to have an essential political role as well as to 
develop economically and culturally. 
xcl rl-'-dazan associations 
In 1936 Lother Manjaji, with the help of the Reverend Antonissen, the compiler of 
the first Kadazan/English dictionary who was nicknamed 'the sporting padre' for his 
passionate involvement in football, founded the Penampang Sporting Association. 
The Association, which organised sporting events and annual competitions during 
Easter holidays at St. Michael's School, Penampang, was led by prominent educated 
Kadazan working for the Chartered Company (Luping, 1994: 100). 
While there had been a precedent during the celebrations for the royal birthday in 
1939, when traditional dances were performed and, for the first time, separated from 
their ritual context, the Association. was instrumental in providing the occasion for 
another early objectification of Kadazan cultural traditions during its 4 th convention, 
held in 1940,, when the dances were performed in the context of a fund-raising variety 
show (Hiroyuki, 2002: 11). While the older generation initially disapproved of the 
public performance of the dances, in 1940 they were finally convinced, and the event 
attracted so much attention that an interview with the Native Chief LaJunga from 
Penampang about the performance was published in the British North Borneo Herald, 
a weekly paper published by and for the colonial elite. Traditional ceremonies 
provided an excellent opportunity for individual members and for the Kadazan as a 
whole to be spotlighted and to obtain recognition from the colonial government. This, 
according to Hiroyuki (2002: 11) 'explains' the emphasis placed by Kadazan leaders 
of the time on maintaining their traditional culture while modernising it. 
In the period after World War Two, the Sporting Association was reconstituted as 
the Society of Kadazan, registered on 24 August 1953 in Penampang, with the 
declared objectives of taking care of the culture and language of the Kadazan and 
raising their standard of living (Luping, 1994: 100). In 1954, the Penampang 
Kadazan 
Native Chief, Tan Ping Hing (a Sino-Kadazan), became president of the Society of 
Kadazan, and in 1957 Donald Stephens first attended the annual meeting. 
He was 
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immediately elected vice-president, and in 1958 he took over as president. According 
to his niece, P. J. Granville-Edge (personal communication), when Stephens joined the 
society, he had already been indirectly participating in it and 'working behind the 
scenes'. From its beginnings, the Society joined cultural and political objectives, as 
shown by its mission statement as well as by the fact that it soon became an avenue 
for voicing concerns the Kadazan felt important. Among these were the recognition of 
native land reserves - as the land available for cattle in Penampang had become 
scarce since it had been taken by outsiders and used for planting rubber or developed 
in other ways - support for their language and the govenunent's recognition of the 
Kadazan Harvest Festival (Luping, 1994). According to another veteran politician, 
Marcel Leiking (personal communication), most of the society's founders were Sino- 
Kadazan whose primary aim was to obtain the right for people of mixed origin to own 
and inherit land. The. Kadazan, who felt the colonial government was not paying any 
attention to their interests, were eager to have Stephens as their leader as he was quite 
influential among the colonial bureaucrats, was a member of the Legislative Council, 
and had obtained widespread fame through his newspaper. 
Stephens was successful in obtaining the consideration of such issues by the 
colonial authorities, and when he reported at the annual meeting on 21 February 1960 
that the Harvest Festival had been approved as a recognized public holiday, those 
present were so pleased that the Kadazan elders conferred upon him the title of 
Huguan Siou 12 ,, 
brave leader' (Luping, 1994: 101). Herman Luping (1994: 33) 
defined the Huguan Siou as a traditional institution, a 'descent group chief, guiding 
war and head-hunting raids. Reid (1997: 132) argued that the title was used to refer to 
a 'supernaturally powerful warrior' and that it was 'rediscovered by the Kadazan 
nationalists' in the 1960s to be conferred upon a sort of 'paramount chief, probably 
influenced by similar titles used in Sarawak since the Brookes' times. 
By 1960 a network of Kadazan associations, all independent from one another, had 
been established in various parts of the country by people from Penampang living in 
different districts,, where they were mostly employed in the public sector because of 
their higher level of education. As a result of the prospect of North Borneo becoming 
an independent country and especially after the proposal by Tunku Abdul Rahman to 
12 The title was, however, officially bestowed upon him only in 1964, by the Central Executive 
Committee of UNKO for political merits. 
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join North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and Singapore with Malaya to forin Malaysia, 
the Society increased its political role as a representative of the political interests of 
the Kadazan. Eventually, it transformed itself into the first political party of the 
colony, the United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO), in 1961. Later, the 
realisation of the need to distinguish between the political and cultural aspects, led to 
the creation of a new association, only active in the cultural field and taking 
responsibility for the organization of the Harvest Festival, the Sabah Kadazan Cultural 
Association (KCA), or Sinompuuvan Koubasan Kadazan Sabah (SKKS), forined in 
1964 and registered in 1966, with Sinidol, the director of the first Kadazan service 
radio broadcast (see below) as chairman (Luping, 1994). 
Ethnic naming. - the "ViCtory of the Kadazan' 
One of the issues involved in the creation of unity and a shared form of 
identification for the Dusunic peoples was that of establishing a common ethnic label. 
While the members of the 'intelligentsia' and of the Society were mostly from 
Penampang and called themselves Kadazan, the British officially called all non- 
Muslim indigenous peoples of North Borneo - with the exclusion of the Murut (Reid, 
1997) - 'Dusun', a term they had inherited from the Brunei Malays and which they 
used in both everyday and official contexts. 
The connection between the establishment of a common ethnic name and the 
formation of an ethnic group acting as a 'community of alignment' (Wenger, 1998) is 
demonstrated by the fact that the discussion about the issue of ethnic labelling was an 
essential part of the first UNKO congress on 6 August 1961. 'Kadazan' was 
unanimously endorsed as the official name of the ethnic group by the delegates, 
including Murut leaders, who were then in some way subsumed under the category 
'Kadazan'. The decision was a result of the prevailing of the views of leaders such as 
Stephens who, in the pages of his newspaper, the Sabah Times, had campaigned for 
the use of 'Kadazan', arguing that the term was used to ýgive a 'local flavour' to the 
name of the same speech people - the Kadazanic people', and that it could make the 
people proud of belonging to the race, while the term 'Dusun' had been imposed by 
the Malays (Luping, 1994: 103). According to Reid (1997: 126-127), the Penampang 
leaders interpreted the ten-n as meaning 'our people' and as being the autonym once 
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used by all the members of the group, but which had fallen out of use because of 
pressures from the British, who tried to put obstacles in the path of achieving unity 
among the peoples of Sabah. 
The exact origin of the label 'Kadazan', however, was not agreed upon, and is still 
a subject of much debate. Reid (1997) provided three possible etymologies: the first 
would have it deriving from the indigenous word kakaadazan,, meaning 'town', and 
therefore designating semi-urbanised coastal people as opposed to the liwan, the 
upcountry people. The second argues that 'Kadazan' - and the interior equivalent 
Kadayan' - is simply the autonym of the people of Penampang, Papar and other 
nearby areas. Another etymology, as for example that reported by Glyn-Jones (1953), 
would give it the meaning of 'landspeople' as opposed to 'sea-farers'. Lastly, some 
indigenous opponents of the term consider the label as a recent creation deriving from 
the Malay kedai, 'shop', and therefore referring to people living in urban areas, where 
the shops are located. 
There were, however,, some reservations, such as that of leaders from Ranau, in the 
interior,, who said that many of the people of their area thought of themselves as 
'Dusun'. Moreover, there was also some open opposition, such as that led by the 
Native Chief of Tuaran distria, Indan Kari,, who did not attend the meeting and 
refused to accept the label 'Kadazan', preferring 'Dusun', a position that he expressed 
by forming the Dusun Lotud (the name of the sub-group in the Tuaran district) 
Association. That sowed the first seeds of disagreement over the label to be used. 
According to Luping (1994: 104), Indan Kari's reaction was caused by the fact that he 
perceived the chosen label as a form of recognition of the superiority of the people of 
Penampang, who had a long history of enmity and feuds with the Lotud of Tuaran. 
The split was further exacerbated in 1967, when the advocates of the label 'Dusun', 
such as Indan Kari, forined the United Sabah Dustin Association (USDA). 
Nevertheless, the term Kadazan became officially endorsed, and was used for all 
those people previously categorised as 'Dusun' (excluding the Murut) in the first 
Census after independence, in 1970. 
The difficulty encountered in reaching an agreement over the label to be given to 
people previously known as Dusun shows yet another example of the complexity of 
ethnicity in Borneo. This was because neighbouring groupings often traditionally had 
different classification systems to define themselves and their neighbours, which were 
generally extended in an ad hoc fashion to more distant groups, often using a mix of 
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indigenous and exogenous labels, which often have problems in fitting with one 
another (King and Wilder, 2003: 208). 
The label Kadazan served the same purpose as the term Dayak in Sarawak, which, 
according to King (2001), was appropriated by the indigenous political elites to 
distinguish non-Malay' 3 natives and to generate a wider political consciousness and 
union. While the indigenous Sarawakians chose to use the label Dayak, which was a 
pejorative used by coastal dwellers to refer to the indigenes of the interior, the people 
of Sabah took the opposite choice, rejecting the term Dusun, which carried the same 
connotations, in favour of the local term Kadazan. The importance of the debate is 
testimony to the significance of naming in the constitution of a modem culture and of 
the political implications of the choice of labels, which are often implicated in 
relationships of power (see below). 
The media. - early radio 
Radio Sabah, set up with the assistance of the BBC, started regular broadcasts in 
1953, using English, Malay and Chinese to an initial audience of 2,163 licence 
holders. In 1953, out of a total of 424 hours of air time,, 120 were locally produced, 
while the rest were from BBC transcripts, a proportion that remained unchanged until 
1957 (North Borneo Annual Report, 1954). In 1954, Radio Sabah started an 
occasional broadcast in Penampang Kadazan (which was, however, called Dusun 
Section, following the colonial usage), which reached an airtime of 33/4 hours per 
week in 1955 and 45 minutes 6 times a week , in the evening, 
in 1957. 
While both the English and Malay sections used BBC material extensively - the 
Malay section also produced more serious local programming, such as 'Forum of the 
Air', giving profiles of famous men - the Kadazan section mostly broadcast Kadazan 
music, and in 1958 it started the programme 'Down Your Way', written by Fred 
Sinidol (Reid, 1997: 126). In August 1960 talks about old customs and beliefs and a 
programme giving reports about Kadazan communities outside the Penampang area, 
began to be broadcast in the Kadazan section. General knowledge quiz competitions 
among schools and weekly dramatic sketches of village life were also introduced. By 
13 The status of the Muslim-majority Melanau is, however, ambiguous, as they are sometimes 
included 
under the label Dayak and sometimes assimilated to Malays (see Boulanger, 
2000; 2002) 
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1961 the Kadazan section consisted of interviews, music, talks on adat, folk stories 
(broadcast in edited versions), talks on health and agriculture, women's programmes 
to instruct them on their role and duties in the family, educational programmes for 
children conducted by a teacher, as well as interviews with students returning from 
overseas. Another essential part of the broadcast was constituted by the news, which 
was largely based on information provided by the Infon-nation Department, which had 
to approve all the news to be broadcast, but also collected by the radio's reporters and 
by listeners. The radio also covered important public events, sending reporters to the 
scene (Peter Lidadun, personal communication). 
The Kadazan radio broadcast played an essential role in elaborating and spreading 
the modem Kadazan culture, as its programmes, like those of the Than section of 
Radio Sarawak (Postill, 2006), mostly consisted of cultural material collected from 
rural areas, ' re-elaborated in an urban context and spread again to the rural areas. Its 
staff, moreover, was mostly made up by members of the 'Kadazan intelligentsia' such 
as its director Fred Sinidol, Justin Stimol, Wilfred Mojilis, Claudius Sundang Alex, 
Steven Sipaun, Basil Molujang, Vincent Jubilee, as well as various part-timers such as 
Peter Lidadun. All came from Penampang and had been educated at St. Michael's or 
Sacred Heart mission schools, and all knew one another as they came from the same 
village, had attended the same school, or were relatives (Peter Lidadun, personal 
communication). 
The response of the Kadazan to the programme was very good and the radio 
started to build up a library of music recorded in the studio, which reached about 400 
items, as there were no commercial records available. Village music groups were 
eager to go to the studio to record, as exemplified by the case of a group of nine 
people who walked all the way from Ranau to the capital (more than 100 km) just to 
record their music (North Borneo Annual Report, 1957). Following the success of the 
radio programmes, in 1958 RS Recordings began producing commercial Kadazan 
records; nine were produced that year. 
In 1962 and 1963, much attention was given to the Malaysian proposal by all 
sections of Radio Sabah, including the Kadazan, and Malaysia Day's events on 16 
September 1963 were transmitted in relay from Kuala Lumpur. From that time Radio 
Sabah,, re-named Radio Malaysia Sabah, started regular news broadcasts in relay from 
Kuala Lumpur. The Kadazan section was the only one that did not experience such 
realignment, as the majority of its content remained locally produced. 
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Following the Kadazan example, other indigenous groups obtained broadcasts in 
their language: the Murut in 1963 and Bajau in 1967. 
The media. - the press 
In August 1953, the same year that saw the beginning of radio broadcasts, the first 
English daily, the Sabah Times (North Borneo News and Sabah Times after a merger 
in 1954), started publication, and by the end of the year it was already selling 1,000 
copies daily (Whelan, 1970). The newspaper used all the languages spoken in the 
colony (apart from Chinese) in order to reach as many people as possible and to make 
those living in one area aware of what was happening in other areas of the country. 
All the sections featured the same news, including elements of local interest,, such as 
births, marriages and reports on the price of rice. Because of a lack of reporters, the 
Sabah Times depended on press releases collected daily from the Information 
Department and from the news collected by radio reporters as well as voluntary 
contributions from readers. The newspaper often reported news about local social 
events,, such as village and private celebrations, often using freelance reporters. 
The Sabah Times featured a section in romanised Malay as well as the famous 
'Kadazan comer',, a section using the romanised written version of the Penampang 
dialect developed by the Mill Hill missionaries. Donald Stephens justified the choice 
of using that dialect with the fact that it was the most developed in its written forin, 
and therefore best suited to serve the aim of unifying all the Kadazan people by 
standardising their language (Reid, 1997: 126). Among the contributors to the 
newspaper were many members of the 'intelligentsia' and founders of the Society of 
Kadazan (Reid, 1997: 126) such as Fred Sinidol and Herman Luping. It was from the 
columns of the newspaper that Donald Stephens gained his popularity. Due to the lack 
of personnel, he monopolised most of the writing, being the main reporter, and 
is articles or photographs highlighting his participation in various events and hi 
political role were often published. 
In 1963, the year Malaysia was formed, the number of English dailies increased to 
three: the Sabah Times and Borneo Times, both with Malay and Kadazan sections, 
and the Daily Express, with a Malay section. A newspaper written entirely in 
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Kadazan, the Kadazan Times, was also started in the 1960s, but ceased publication in 
the 1970s 14 . 
The media. - books 
The earliest publications in a native language of Sabah were the religious books 
produced by missionaries using the Penampang dialect. The missionaries always 
fav. oured the standard everyday form of the language to the arcane, ritual one, which 
they saw as having strong pagan implications. The published books were a prayer 
book, Vazaan doid Surga, three scripture books, Testamentum Haid, Koimaan Ngaavi 
di Tuan Jesus and Suat Ngaavi do Tadau Minggu om Tadau Tongobitua, as well as a 
catechism. The author of the catechism, Fr. Antonissen, was also the author, in co- 
operation with F. Verhoeven (another missionary), of the famous Kadazan Dictionary 
and Grammar, published in 1958, which established what became the standard 
orthography and grammar of Kadazan language and was readily accepted by the 
government and the press (Rooney, 1981: 144). 
The production of non-religious books started with the founding of the Bomeo 
Literature Bureau, an organisation set up in 1958 by the governments of Sarawak and 
Sabah to promote literary production within the two colonies. The first Kadazan book, 
Tanong do Kadazan ('Kadazan stories'), by Samuel Majalang, was published by the 
Bureau in 1962, followed by Nipizan do pololou ('Daydreaming') by Peter Lidadun 
(1968), an autobiography about the author's youth indirectly giving moral teachings 
about etiquette, proper behaviour and encouraging young people to try to achieve 
something even if they are poor. The Bureau production went on during the 1970s, 
with two books in 1970, Nosostt do atagakan ('Born loser') and Singonuon do 
poguhu (*Abandoned once possessed'), both by Donald Melinggang, and, in 1972, 
Bitk mangasak om kotoinaan do tanak, ('A cooking and childcare book') by 
Scholastica Lanjuat De Harpporte. 
As was the case for the Than (Postill, 2006), the majority of the writers were 
teachers - such as Majalang, Lidadun and De Harpporte - and, moreover, they were 
all connected. Majalang was the teacher of Lidadun who in turn taught Melinggang 
14 1 was not able to gather information about the content or the reasons why publication of the 
newspaper was discontinued. I can hypothesise that it was suspended as a result of the 
language 
policies of the Mustapha government (see below). 
62 
who, however, was not a teacher but a government servant. All were from Penampang 
and had studied at St. Michael's Secondary School, apart from the only woman. De 
Harpporte (who studied at St. Francis Convent girls' schooJ), and those who were 
15 teachers had trained at Gaya College in Jesselton 
The history of the Bureau finished in 1977, when it was taken over by the federal 
body Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, a take-over that detennined the end of all 
publications in indigenous languages different from Malay, while the Bureau books 
written in Bornean languages were allegedly buried and then burnt in Kuching 
(Postill, 2006: 59). This strong opposition was part of an agenda of assimilation of 
the indigenous peoples of Borneo that became established in the 1970s, an agenda 
that, as I am showing in the next section, involved the imposition of Malay and Islam. 
Before concluding the section, I would like to consider the limited importance and 
output (five books) of the Bureau production in Kadazan, especially if compared with 
that in Than (over a hundred titles, see Postill, 2006: 50-58), which leads me to the 
conclusion that literary production constituted a relatively minor aspect of the 
production of a Kadazan culture in the early period in comparison to the radio and the 
press. 
The demise of 'Kadazan nationalism' (1967-1985) 
The first state elections of Sabah history, in 1967, saw the explosion of the 
divisions between the Muslim and non-Muslim factions of the indigenous population 
of Sabah, who had been until then politically united in the Sabah Alliance. After 
obtaining a limited majority, the United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), which 
represented the Muslim indigenous population, was able to take control of the State 
Assembly, sidelining and expelling Stephens' Kadazan-led UPKO from the Sabah 
Alliance, determining the 'demise of Kadazan nationalism, and having its leader. Tun 
Mustapha Harun, nominated Chief Minister (Roff, 1969). 
With the support of Kuala Lumpur, Mustapha's government practised a 'one 
language, one culture, one religion' policy, attempting to assimilate all Sabahans to 
Malayness by imposing the Malay language and culture and Islam, which had its 
15 The name of Sabah's capital until 1963, when it changed to 
its present name, Kota Kinabalu. 
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climax between 1970 16 and 1973. The policies dealing with language comprised the 
suspension of all Kadazan language teaching from 1970 through the 'upgrading' of 
the Native Voluntary schools, which were made part of the national education system, 
followed in 1973 by the establishment of Malay as the sole medium of instruction and 
by the National Language Act, which increased the use of Malay in the legislature, 
bureaucracy and, to some extent, the courts. The imposition of Malay involved also 
the radio, which in 1973 suspended broadcasts in languages other than English and 
Malay and started relaying broadcasts from Kuala Lumpur. Radio Malaysia Sabah 
was re-organised into two networks: National Network, in Malay, and Blue Network, 
in English, for a total of 154 hours a week (Angrick Saguman, personal 
communication). 
In 1973 Islam was declared the state religion, while the State government used its 
authority to encourage Sabahans to become Muslim through various strategies, 
including the expulsion of the majority of foreign priests and missionary workers in 
the period 1970-72. While Mustapha seemed successful in 'removing the key markers 
of KD 17 identity', the decision to expel the foreign priests and missionaries had the 
opposite effect as it crystallized the KD forces and the conviction that KD identity 
was alien to Islam (Reid, 1997: 130). 
Eventually, Mustapha's increasingly authoritarian style and strong stand for 
autonomy became unacceptable to the leaders in Kuala Lumpur and the then 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Razak Hussein, personally encouraged the formation 
of a new multi-ethnic party, Berjaya, led by Mustapha's deputy, Harris Salleh, and 
including KD leaders such as Tun Fuad Stephens, Peter Mojuntin and James Ongkili. 
The support of the Dusunic peoples, and in particular of the Christians, was pivotal in 
the new party's victory in the 1976 state election, which resulted in the formation of a 
new government with Stephens as Chief Minister. However, he died mysteriously in a 
plane crash with other leaders such as Peter Mojuntin shortly after the election and 
was replaced by Harris Salleh (Reid, 1997; Luping, 1994). 
Reid (1997: 13 1) characterises the Harris government between 1976 and 1984 as 
seeing much of the 'federally driven modernization' of Sabah as well as the rise of 'a 
16 There might be a connection between the climax of the prOJect of Malayisation and the 'race riots' 
that had taken place in 1969 in Kuala Lumpur 
Here I follow Reid's use of the acronym KID, standing for'Kadazandusun', which he uses 'in a 
studied attempt to avoid taking sides' in the debate about the label to be used 
for the Dusunic peoples 
(1997: 121 ). I use the term KID as an alternative to 'Dusunic peoples' throughout the rest of the chapter 
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much larger group of educated KDs who could be considered middle-class'. Loh 
(1992), on the other hand, characterises the Berjaya era as seeing the erosion of the 
Twenty Points agreements' 8 and the continuation of the process of Malayisation and 
Islarnisation. In 1976, all government-aided schools were required to use Malay as the 
sole medium of teaching. In 1978, they were required to organise Islamic religious 
classes if at least 15 students in the school asked for them, and teaching of the 
Christian religion was banned in all schools,, including mission schools. Sabah's state 
bureaucracy, as well as police and education, were absorbed into their corresponding 
Federal departments in 1977. On the other hand, under the Berjaya government, 
Radio Malaysia Sabah revived the Kadazan, Bajau, Hakka and Cantonese broadcast 
(Angrick Sagurnan, personal communication). 
Attitudes of the Berjaya govenunent that caused dissatisfaction among the KDs 
were the favouring of Muslim over non-Muslim in all the public service positions and 
the lack of response, often amounting to tolerance or even encouragement, to the 
settling of large numbers of illegal immigrants from Indonesia and the Philippines. 
This appeared as clearly aimed at reinforcing Muslim domination in the state by 
allowing Muslims from outside the country to settle and, in many instances, also to 
become citizens and to gain the right to vote (Reid, 1997: 13 1). 
Among the effects of the increased Federal investment in the State and economic 
growth was the increased funding available for education, which resulted in a twofold 
increase in the number of students enrolled in secondary schools between 1971 and 
1978, reaching 100,000 by the early 1980s. This was accompanied by an increase in 
indigenous graduates from two in 1960 to 2,338 in 1980. Many of these people were 
employed in new statutory and quasi -government enterprises, which provided 
unprecedented opportunities for the emergent indigenous middle class and provided 
the facilities for many indigenous politicians to set up their own business (Loh, 1992). 
According to Loh (1992: 237), the rapid economic growth was accompanied by an 
expansion of patronage and the increase of cronyism, nepotism and corruption. 
In the 1980s it became harder to accommodate the needs of all the members of the 
Burniputera intelligentsiaý because of their increasing numbers and expectations and 
also the economic crisis of 1982. The situation created particular 
dissatisfaction 
18 The agreement made between the colonies of North Borneo 
(Sabah) and Sarawak and Malaya 
establishing some safeguards for the protection of the 
Borneo territories' interests and particularities, 
including autonomy in the control of immigration and language and religion policies. týl 
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among the new graduates who had enjoyed the benefits of the increased access to 
education, as they began to encounter difficulties in finding a job commensurate with 
their qualifications. They started developing the feeling of being 'colonised' by the 
Peninsula as well as of being discriminated vis-d-vis Malays from the Peninsula and 
local Muslim bumiputera in the assignment of government positions. The Kadazan 
intellectuals 'did not voice their dissatisfaction in terrns of their own socio-economic 
discrimination but in terms of the Federal and Sabah governments' neglect and 
discrimination of the Kadazan community as a whole' (Loh, 1992: 240), and in so 
doing they also brought to the fore the problems faced by the Kadazan rural poor. It 
was true that poverty was more common among the Kadazan, as in 1978, while 42.6 
per cent of the rural households lived in poverty, 62 per cent of the rural Kadazan 
households were below the poverty line (Loh, 1992: 240). 
Summing up, this period saw the decline of Kadazan control over Sabahan politics 
in favour of the Muslim/Malay indigenous group and the Malaysian federal 
government. The situation resulted at the State level in the strengthening of the 
nation-building agenda, which took the form of assimilation to Malayness in the 
period of Mustapha rule (1967-1975) and then in a less extreme yet more pervasive 
Malaysianisation, mostly based on increased federal intervention in the economic and 
political sphere and total control of the broadcast media in the Berjaya era. 
The Kadazan Cultural Assoclation and the 'cultural revival' 
The economic, political and social conditions described were at the basis of what 
has been described as a 'Kadazan cultural revival' (Loh, 1992) in the 1980s, a 
movement dominated by the KCA, which increased the number of its members as 
more and more young educated Kadazan joined, as well as its relevance, to the point 
that 'any Kadazan who aspired to lead the community could not afford to ignore it' 
(Loh, 1992: 241). The KCA committee included among its members, and still does, 
Cabinet ministers, members of the State Assembly and Federal Parliament, top civil 
servants, professionals and business people (Loh, 1992: 241). 
Through their participation in the KCA, young city-based members of the Kadazan 
intelligentsia became interested in 'some of the old oral myths of ancestry and 
historical memories of their people', such as the common myth of origin of all the 
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Dusunic peoples, that of Nunuk Ragang. These were then recovered from their oral 
sources, ýwritten up, disseminated among themselves, and sometimes published' 
(Loh, 1992: 241). Traditional music, instruments and dance were also promoted, a 
ýrecovery process' that often involved what Loh (1992: 242) calls a 'measure of 
reshaping what was the traditional', as songs, tunes and dances were divorced from 
their original ritual context and myths were changed and selected for their relevance 
to the present situation. The format was also changed through a mixture of old and 
new that can be found, for example, in songbooks and cassettes, including a few new 
tunes elaborated by the intellectuals together with the traditional ones. 
The KCA was particularly instrumental in promoting and channelling the reactions 
to the two most controversial policies of the Berjaya government in the 1980s. The 
first was the reclassification,, in the census and for all official purposes, of all 
indigenous peoples of Sabah as pribumi, a term used to designate all those of 'Malay 
stock and related groups', in line with the agenda of the main Malay ruling party, the 
United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), which wanted all bumiputera to 
identify themselves as a single people with a single culture. Especially resented was 
the fact that the category also included some recent migrants from the southern 
Philippines and Indonesia, equating them with indigenous peoples (Reid, 1997: 13 1). 
In this instance KCA was used as a forum to debate the issue, resulting in overt 
political action against the government (Loh, 1992: 244). The second, and ultimate, 
cause of dissatisfaction with the State government was the appropriation of the 
Kadazan Harvest Festival and its reclassification as a 'people's festival', named with 
the Malay term Pesta Rakyat, in 1981 (see chapter 6). This was followed, in 1982, by 
the taking over of its running by the government, the shortening of 
its length to one 
day and the removal of the ritual performed by the bobohizan. 
As a reaction, the 
KCA, guided by its president Joseph Pairin Kitingan, organised an alternative 
celebration following the traditional format, in Tai-nbunan, strongly 
demonstrating its 
stand against the government's decisions. Despite the government 
boycott of the 
event, this alternative celebration attracted thousands of participants and marked 
a 
historic step in the rise of a new consciousness among the 
KDs (Reid, 1997: 132). 
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The imposition of national mass media 
The USNO and Berjaya eras were characterised by the continuous presence of the 
media born in the previous period, Sabahan newspapers and Radio Malaysia Sabah, 
and by the arrival of television. 
The new medium made its advent through the setting up of Sabah TV, an 
independent Sabah television station, which started broadcasting on 21 December 
1970, with a limited day service and coverage. In the following year the airtime 
increased to 35 hours a week, the coverage was increased, and Malay became the only 
language used, in line with the language policies of the government. Most of Sabah 
TV's programmes consisted of imported films, local documentaries, children's 
programmes, local songs (mostly from Kadazan-Dusun singers) and the promotion of 
Sabah talents,, with a local focus and attention paid to the local ethnic groups and to 
tourism (Angrick Saguman, personal communication). 
In 1975 Sabah TV was joined by the first national channel, broadcast from Kuala 
Lumpur through a land satellite by RTM (Radio Television Malaysia), and TV Sabah 
became TV Malaysia Rangkaian Ketiga, being broadcast also to Sarawak. In 1983, 
state-run RTM TV2,, which had been present in the Peninsula since 1969, arrived in 
Sabah and Sarawak, and the Sabah station saw its broadcast shortened and then 
terminated in 1984. Since 1984 the RTM centre in Sabah has been entirely devoted to 
broadcasting the national programmes (TV1 and TV2) and has not produced any 
programmes of its own. 
While television soon came under national control, Sabah retained some radio 
production. Broadcasts in languages other than Malay and English were suspended in 
1971 as part of the language policies of Mustapha's government, but were reinstated 
in 1976 with the victory of Berjaya, and in 1978 a new Dustin language broadcast, 
using the dialects from interior areas, was started by Radio Malaysia Sabah. This 
increased the presence of Dusunic languages in the radio, but it fragmented the 
cultural production in Dusunic languages (Rafael Monuil, personal communication). 
Radio remained a bastion of Kadazan and Dustin language and tradition, while at the 
same time updating with more modem content, such as the programme 
'IT and You', 
teaching listeners the basics of using computers. 
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This difference between radio and television should be attributed to the fact that 
while the presence of Kadazan language and culture in the radio would remain mostly 
for internal consumption, their presence in television would have, in the eyes of 
Malaysian policy makers, constituted a breach on the 'tolerable difference' (Rival, 
1997: 138) allowed to the Kadazan and indigenous peoples of Bomeo. 
The period of XD power' (1984-1994) 
Following the success of the alternative Kaamatan festival, in March 1984 Joseph 
Pairin Kitingan was nominated Huguan Siou, the title previously conferred on Donald 
Stephens. This time the conferral was followed by ceremonies conducted by 
traditional priestesses,, the bobohizan, to strengthen the new leader in various districts, 
which in turn united the Dusunic peoples in more remote areas. After resigning from 
Berjaya, and winning a by-election for the Tambunan seat in 1984, the following year 
Joseph Pairin Kitingan formed Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), a multi-ethnic party mostly 
controlled by Dusunic people, and in particular by a new intelligentsia from the 
interior district of Tambunan, Kitingan's home district. After a clear victory in the 
state elections of 1985, Kitingan became the new Chief Minister, despite being 
strongly opposed by Kuala Lumpur for various reasons, including his being Christian. 
The policies of the PBS government included the cancellation of the pribumi 
category in censuses, the restitution of the organisation of the Harvest Festival (for 
which a two-day holiday was conceded) to the Kadazan Cultural Association, which 
also had new, grand headquarters built in Penampang. It is interesting to note that the 
re-instatement of a Sabahan television broadcast was an important part of the electoral 
manifesto of PBS (Jawan, 1994: 220-21, cited in Postill, 2006: 88, n. 31), but the 
project was never reallsed. 
The new political situation of the period, characterised by the ascendancy of 
leaders from the interior, generated the fragmentation of the Kadazan imagined 
community, which, significantly, took the form of a re-opening of the debate over the 
labelling to be used for the Dusunic peoples. 
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Struggle over ethnic label resurfaces. - the birth of the Kadazandusun 
Since the decision taken in 1960, more and more indigenous peoples from the 
interior, especially Ranau and Tarnbunan districts, started resenting the label 
'Kadazan' as a symbol of the political domination of the Penampang people, whom 
they saw as more educated, sophisticated but also arrogant (Reid, 1997). Language 
was the main field of contention, as the people who liked to call themselves 'Dusun' 
started rejecting the spelling conventions used in the press as they were based on the 
Penampang dialect, which had been established by its long use but which was 
recognised in the 1980s as constituting only one end of the chain of dialects that form 
the Dusunic family. The struggle acquired great relevance in 1988, when the 
announcement by the Federal Education Minister that 'Kadazan' was to be taught as 
part of the school syllabus provoked a strong reaction by USDA, who demanded that 
the label 'Dusun' be retained to refer to the language. Their position was expressed by 
organising a separate Harvest Festival in 1989, an action that was highly symbolic and 
which seriously threatened the unity of the 'Kadazan' and 'Dusun' (Reid, 1997). 
In response, the Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA) changed its name to 
Kadazan Dustin Cultural Association (KDCA) in 1989, clarifying, however, that their 
position was that the 'Kadazan' and 'Dusun' are one and the same people, and that the 
two labels were just two different names, the use of which depended on personal 
preference (Reid, 1997: 135). 
On 24 January 1995, during a conference held in the State capital, USDA and 
KDCA reached a historic official agreement that the people known as 'Kadazan' and 
'Dusun' belonged to a single ethnic group and spoke dialects of a single language, 
and that the name of both is 'Kadazandusun'. The Constitution and Rules of KDCA 
define the term in Article (6)(1) as "... the generic and overall ethnic label to 
encompass and cover the following dialectical and tribal groups ... 
[followed by 40 
tribal group names] ... and of a person whose mother 
tongue is any of the above 
dialects and who habitually practises and expresses the traditions, custom and other 
cultural manifestation of the same" (pp. 5-6, cited in Stephen, 2000). 
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From the fall of PBS to the present (1995-2006) 
The slim majority obtained by the PBS in the 1994 elections made it unable to 
resist the alleged buying of assemblymen by the federal government- supported 
Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition in 1995, leaving only three assemblymen standing 
with Pairin in the end, and therefore causing the collapse of the government. The 
electors punished these defectors in the following federal elections, but the state was 
nevertheless lost to the Sabah allies of Kuala Lumpur: UMNO and other BN parties. 
However, the new government, keeping one of its electoral promises, allowed the 
teaching of the Kadazandusun language in primary schools in 1997 (Reid, 1997: 135). 
Reid (1997: 13 6) argues that in the present phase, as in other periods in which they 
lacked political power, the KD intellectuals are encouraged to seek unity and to work 
together in the defence of their language, of Christianity and the preservation of some 
of their cultural symbols. As is normal in the development of modem identities, Reid 
argues (1997: 136), 'a few attractive modemised elements of 'traditional' culture are 
made to carry a heavy symbolic burden'. In the case of the KDs, the famous black 
costume, the myths of origin, the Harvest Festival and some other ritual events would 
be the favourite identity markers, while the 'traditional' inclination to get drunk 
would be taken out as it embarrassed urban leaders. 
A new standard language: In search of a 'literate high culture? 
One of the results of the 'cultural revival' of the early 1980s was the growing 
awareness of a constant loss of mother-tongue proficiency among the new KD 
generations. This was a direct result of the establishment of Malay as the sole medium 
of instruction, as well as to its general promotion within all media, during the 1970s. 
The use of Malay as the medium of instruction had further-reaching consequences 
than might be expected, as it encouraged many Dusunic -speaking parents to speak to 
their children in Malay with the perceived aim of improving their skills in the national 
language and therefore their performance at school (Lasimbang et al., 
1992). 
Reid (1997: 120) described this situation affecting the KD as common to many 
other ethnic groups of the Malay archipelago, where the two 
largest nation-states 
occupying the area, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
have been imposing two standardised 
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forms of Malay, Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia, as their national language 
through a compulsory education system, with the aim of redefining the identities of 
their citizens. He argued that, as a result, most of the hundreds of indigenous 
languages of the area, including Kadazan, are now endangered. This is especially true 
for those which have no written tradition or a very recent one, and are not used in 
modem printed or electronic media. 
In 1994,, there were public expressions of the KD's desire to have their languages 
taught in schools, which led to the setting up of a Kadazan Language Centre (KLC), 
which elaborated a syllabus and carried out a teacher training workshop and a pilot 
language class. The KLC, which became the Kadazandusun Language Foundation 
(KLF) in 1995, worked at the elaboration of a standard language for all Dusunic 
peoples. The standard language, whose name was chosen as Kadazandusun by the 
1995 joint conference of KDCA and USDA, was based on the interior Bundu and 
Liwan dialects, arguably spoken by the majority of the KD, with the notable 
sidelining of the Penampang dialect, which had been the unofficial standard of the 
media. New media were prepared in the language: a language syllabus, a teacher's 
guidebook and student's workbook (Lasimbang, 2004). Eventually Kadazandusun 
was introduced in Sabah schools in 1997 as a complementary subject. In 2001 ý 
it was 
taught to 30,000 children in grades 4-6 in 435 primary schools in 23 districts. Since 
1998 Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) has been offering Kadazandusun language as 
an elective subject (Lasimbang, 2004). 
The teaching of Kadazandusun. in schools encouraged the resurgence of publishing 
of literature, mostly for children, in the language, carried out primarily by KDCA and 
KLF. The latter had published 35 titles by 2004, consisting especially of folktales and 
short stories, partially selected through a yearly writing competition, as well as a new 
trilingual Kadazandusun/English/Malay dictionary (Lasimbang, 2004). 
The importance of language for an ethnic group's sense of identity has been noted 
so many times, both by scholars and lay people, who - like most Kadazan parents I 
encountered during my fieldwork - lament every day that their people will be no more 
once their children are not able to speak their language, that it seems unnecessary to 
consider the argument here any further. Just to quote some Sabahan leaders: 
Language is one of the chief factors for the awakening of nationalism among the 
Kadazan people (Peter MOjuntin, Sabah Times, 11-12/10/1967). 
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If the Dustin language is lost, this means the loss of Dusun identity which forms the basis, the source and the spiritual repository for Dusun culture (Tombung, Secretary 
General of USDA, 1988, cited in Lasimbang et al., 1992). 
There is a general concern, about both leaders and common people, that the future 
generation will be Kadazan/Dusun only in name if they cannot speak their mother 
tongue (Benedict Topin, Secretary General of KDCA, cited in Lasimbang et al., 
1992). 
The importance of language is also stressed by Postill (2006), who considers it as 
one of the chief areas of struggle between the dominant and peripheral ethnic groups 
in Malaysia, and it seems relevant to ask whether the developments just described 
give a completely different picture from the one Postill gives when he says that the 
Than and other indigenous peoples of Sarawak are losing out to the politically 
stronger Peninsular Malays and their local allies' (Postill, 2006: 46). 
While they claim that they strongly value knowledge of the mother tongue as a 
necessary condition for the survival of their people, most parents are very practical. 
They are interested in direct advantages for their children, which can be obtained by 
knowing 'knowledge languages' such as English. As there seem to be no practical 
advantages deriving from knowing a language such as Kadazandusun, they are not so 
committed to helping their children achieve proficiency. Moreover, in areas like 
Penampang, they are often unwilling, or even unable, to speak the standard language, 
which is derived from Dusunic dialects that might be very different from their own, 
and which are felt to be partially alien. 
With the socio-economic conditions favouring the use of the national language and 
of world languages such as English and, increasingly, Mandarin, Kadazandusun can 
hardly be more than a 'language of sentiment' and the literary production more than a 
curiosity or object of affection, unable to pose any threat to the primacy of the 
national language and culture, a threat which, however, might come 
from sources 
beyond Malaysia, in today's world centres of cultural production. 
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The further fragmentation of ethnic labelling- post-ethnic groups? 
The situation of ethnic labelling in Sabah was further complicated by two events in 
the late 1990s. First, the Rungus, a group speaking a Dusunic language, have 
expressed their wish through their own cultural association, SAMORA, not to be part 
of the Kadazandusun (Daily Express Forum, 1/8/99) despite being one of the member 
groups according to the KDCA Constitution. 
Secondly, the media - in particular the press - began using a new term, 
'KadazandusunMurut',, also shortened as KDM. The label was first used in the weekly 
'Ground View' column by Raymond Boin Tombung in the Borneo Mail (11/3/99) and 
it has created a trend in the press that has been followed by various journalists. As 
there have been no official reactions by official bodies such as KDCA, there are 
countless speculations on the actual definition, meaning and validity of this new label 
(Stephen, 2000: 8). Stephen (2000: 9) underlines the dubious value of this new term 
by noting the lack of clarity about whether it 'refers to the language(s) of the 
community or communities, to the ethnic race(s), or both the language(s) and the 
ethnic race(s)'. Although coming from the Borneo stock of group of languages the 
Kadazandusun and the Murut languages are linguistically distant. 
The last development was the creation, on 27 January 2007, of the Kadazan 
Society Sabah (KSS), which gives a new meaning to the term 'Kadazan' by defining 
it as 'any indigenous Malaysian from any of the ethnic group of Sabah origin ... who 
has assumed and acknowledged his ethnic origin and identity is a member of the 
Kadazan community' in their inauguration ceremony booklet (p. 4). The definition 
given by KSS is very significant as it seems to view the term *Kadazan' not as the 
name of an ethnic group but as that of a category composed of indigenous peoples of 
Sabah, or individuals who have a mixed origin, who are defined by their will to 
be 
ascribed to the group by virtue of 'acknowledging their ethnic origin and identity. 
This definition seems a post-ethnic definition of a grouping, not 
based on ethnic 
criteria but rather on political ones. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has told the history of the creation of the modem Kadazan culture 
through a mediated objectification of a traditional way of life. This process, which 
took place in the late 1950s and again in the 1980s, bears many similarities with that 
carried out by European nationalists in the construction of a nation (Gellner, 1983; 
Eriksen, 1993), involving the selection of certain elements and the discarding of 
others as well as the invention of new ones (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). The result 
of this process was the constitution of an objectified Kadazan culture and the 
development of a sense of commonality among previously divided groups. The 
process was arguably determined by political motivations of greater control over the 
resources and the administration of Sabah. 
The most important result of the history I have described in this chapter, however, 
is the fact that it generated the conditions for the Kadazan masses, at least those living 
in Penampang, but most likely also in other areas, to imagine themselves as Kadazan. 
As is generally the case with ethnicity, the Kadazan identity was based on notions of 
common descent, common myths of origin, and local cultures and dialects that were 
variations of the same language and cultural matrix. 
This identity acquired some unique characteristics out of its history, which made it 
strongly imbued with Christian and modernist values, strongly politicized and 
opposed to the Federal Government and its Sabahan allies. In particular, the latter 
element was determined by the resentment provoked by what was experienced as a 
strong repression exercised by the Mustapha government - through forced conversions 
to Islam,, expulsion of foreign missionaries, exclusion of Kadazan and English 
language - and by Berjaya - taking over of the Pesta 
Kaomatan, collapsing of all 
ethnic categories under the label pribttmi, and the apparent exclusion of non-Muslim 
bumiputera from a fair share of the State's resources and of important posts. 
This history associated Kadazan (and Kadazandusun) identity with an oppositional 
stance towards the federal government, and more generally the state, the 
Malays and 
Islam, which often results in the refusal to identify fully as Malaysians, 
despite the 
success of the Malaysian nation-building and the establishment of a national culture 
and identity through various means, the main of which 
has been control of the media. 
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The main reason for the continuing significance and appeal of Kadazan identity 
lies in the fact that the modem, objectified culture on which it was based was well 
attuned, through an efficient feed-back mechanism, to the lived experiences of the 
(mostly rural) masses at whom it was directed and by whom it was absorbed through 
the early media. Thanks to the correspondence between their lived experiences and 
the culture that was being promoted, as well as to the actual political advantages and 
sense of dignity it seemed to provide, the terin Kadazan - or Kadazandusun - became 
the one most people started finding the best to express who they think they are. 
However the controversies over the ethnic name represented since the period of the 
birth of this identity the symptom of deep divisions between the indigenous people of 
Sabah, divisions that mostly had to do with the direction they should take and the 
goals, political but also cultural and economic, they should pursue. 
In the rest of this thesis I will consider these struggles and divisions as part of the 
empirical analysis of their present life of the Kadazan and Malaysian forins of 
collective identification, based on the premise that, once come into being, these have 
acquired a momentum and a life of their own, going beyond the circumstances that 
generated them and their original meaning. 
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Part 11 
Kituau 
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I was sitting on a sofa covered with sheets made of rough cotton and decorated 
ýNith typical Bornean designs within the office of Judeth in the Sabah Museum. 
Judeth, whom I had met through my contacts in the local university, had immediately 
taken the responsibility to help me with a readiness that really took me by surprise, 
used as I was to the slow response of many civil servants I had met up to that point in 
Sabah. She had taken me around the area of Penampang plains, showing me various 
villages and giving comments about them, trying to help me make up my mind about 
where I wanted to stay during the next months. I had chosen one of the villages she 
had shown me for no other reason than it looked more open, more spacious than the 
others I had seen,, the nature there seemed to have a different quality, it looked more 
rural,, which was more in tune with my expectations of the kind of location where I 
would have stayed. Moreover, in the village lived a bobohizan, a traditional Kadazan 
shaman whom Judeth knew well, whose presence made me feel the place had 
preserved more traditions than many others. 
Now I was sitting, waiting while she was calling by phone the village headman to 
explain to him that I would have liked to reside there and to arrange a meeting with 
him. At the end of the conversation, which I listened to with trepidation trying to 
understand the answers she was giving in Malay, I found out that I had an 
appointment for that night and that Robin, who also works in the museum and whom I 
had met through Judeth, was the nephew of the headman and was going to accompany 
me. 
Later that night they picked me up from my lodging in Kota Kinabalu and took me 
to a house in the village, which I found out belonged to Robin's sister and to Jaunis, 
her husband,, who was sitting at a table with about ten men, waiting for me. The 
introduction to the group, and my first experience of the village, was a cheerful one, 
as I was invited to eat and drink with this group of friends and to take part in jokes 
and in the usual exchange of information about the respective cultures and languages 
that usually takes place when people from different countries meet. Like the other 
people I had met before in Kota Kinabalu, all these men spoke very good English, 
which made things unexpectedly easy for me. 
After I had eaten and had a few rounds of beer, I was informed it was the right 
time to go to the headman's house and to be prepared to drink talak, the traditional 
Kadazan rice spirit that I had already had occasion to taste in the past. 
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At the house of the headman, where a small birthday party was taking place, I was 
warmly welcomed and, after being offered the expected talak, made by his wife. I 
attempted to explain to the headman and his son the reason for my being there, what 
the aims of my research were and why I had chosen that particular village. I ended up 
receiving the permit to stay and do my research in the village by the headman, who 
seemed at the same time very happy to have a foreign scholar taking interest in his 
village and slightly suspicious and possibly happy to divert the nuisance to 
somewhere or somebody else. With a mixed feeling but a certain degree of hope I was 
taken back to Jaunis's house for more rounds of beer and chat and then, completely 
drunk,, to my guest house in Kota Kinabalu. 
in the following days I accepted Judeth's and Robin's offer to move to their house 
and headquarters of their cultural association, located at the borders of the village I 
had chosen, to stay there until I could find a host family willing to take me in their 
house. The search, carried out by Jaunis, took almost a month, during which I 
discovered that, while the villagers were very hospitable, much more than I had 
experienced anywhere else, they were also suspicious and unwilling to take me in 
their house due to a feeling I soon learrit to know: malu, 'shame', consisting in the 
fact that they were ashamed to show what they felt to be their inferior standard of 
living to a prestigious orang putih doing research for 'London university'. The whole 
month, during which I was establishing some form of relationship with the villagers, 
thanks to Augusta, who took me with her when visiting friends and relatives, and 
Jaunis, who invited me to drink with his friends, was one of extreme frustration, as I 
felt all the difficulty of being accepted and of moving myself around in unknown 
territory. Moreover what had looked like a positive characteristic, the geographical 
width of the village, showed its downsides: the distances and lack of concentration of 
houses made walking around relatively difficult, and I soon realised that I could not 
'pop up' in the house of somebody to ask questions as I liked, as houses constituted a 
sort of 'private space' access to which had in some way to be negotiated. 
At the end,, out of frustration, Jaunis and Jacobina resolved to offer me to move to 
their house, an offer that I gladly accepted as it gave me the opportunity to live with a 
'normal family' located within the centre of the village. Moreover, the fact that it 
constituted an almost daily meeting point for Jaunis group's 
drinking sessions would 
have given me the possibility to have a direct and easy access to a network of 
natives'. 
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So I started moving my first steps within the new reality of the village, equipped 
with an insufficient knowledge of Malay and total ignorance of Kadazan, armed with 
a knowledge of anthropological theory and methodology that soon appeared to lose all 
their effectiveness once I was 'in the field' doing ethnography rather than reading it. 
The holistic bias and that search for a well-defined group of informants, 
unconsciously identified with 'the village' on the one hand, and the critical 
approaches deconstructing such objectives and methodology on the other, left me, so I 
felt, lost in a sea in which only my ability at establishing relationships could save me. 
Kampung Kituau 
The village has a population of about 1,050 permanent residents, living in 132 
houses, mostly located on two main roads, one of which, constituting the original 
nucleus,, runs along the river Limbanak, a stream not deeper than a metre. Around 
35% of the village population is below 18 years old, while the voters (21 and above) 
are about 40%; more than 10% of the population comprises pensioners, while 60% are 
employed in the public or private sector. All of those employed work either in Kota 
Kinabalu or Donggonggon, as there are no economic activities in the village apart 
from a grocery shop-cum-bar. Some of the residents (around 20) work as unlicensed 
taxi drivers between Donggonggon and the nearby villages 19 . 
The whole population is ethnically Kadazan, apart from a few Chinese and 
foreigners from Indonesia, mostly Bugis, who live in huts in the forest and tap rubber, 
and others (Timur), who work and live in rented vegetable gardens. The population is 
mainly Roman Catholic, with only 5 Muslim families and 2 practicing the traditional 
religion. The village still has a chief bobohizan and two apprentices, all of them more 
than 60 years old. 
All houses have piped water, only 3 houses do not have electricity and use 
kerosene lamps; refrigerators, television and radio are present in all houses with 
electricity. Poverty is rare, with only 3 families applying for support as they 
fall below 
the poverty line. Almost all residents (90%) have title to some 
land, which is used to 
build houses or to grow vegetables or rubber trees; the amount of idle 
land reaches a 
19 All of the data presented in this section were provided 
by the former JKK chairman of Kituau, Louis 
Jalln, or derive from direct observation 
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staggering 30% of the total area, due to the fact that rice is not planted any more. The 
village receives no funding for agriculture, apart from some subsidies available for 
planting rubber trees; the community has been successful only twice in applying for 
federal funding to sponsor projects and infrastructure, and it has a very low level of 
federal and state development investment as compared to other villages. 
Many of the people still of working age hold at least a Form 5 title, while some 
hold a diploma and about a dozen are degree holders. The village is well provided 
with educational facilities,, as there are a kindergarten run by Kemas, a government 
agency which has its regional headquarters here, and a primary school, formerly a 
mission school now run by the govenu-nent, in the contiguous village of Limbanak, 
while Kituau itself has a secondary school since 2003, which attracts pupils from 
various parts of Penampang as well as parts of Kota Kinabalu. 
The institution of the village headman seems to have lost much of its importance 
as many domains traditionally regulated by adat have become secondary to the life of 
most villagers. The significance of the village headman, moreover,, has been reduced 
by the increasing power of politics - the ketua kampong (headman) of the village was 
appointed by the local assemblyman - and of the judiciary system. I would argue, in 
conclusion, that the village economic, political and jural autonomy has been greatly 
reduced by the inclusion within the reality of the nation-state. 
Other characteristics of the present situation of the village are the shift away from 
agriculture to a total dependency on salary, or some form of self-employment, for 
livelihood, the almost total reliance on immigrants in certain sectors - vegetable 
agriculture and rubber tapping (Indonesians), construction (Filipinos), domestic work 
as maids (both) - the economic independence of the elderly given 
by receiving a 
pension. 
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Figure 5 the river flowing through Kituau. 
lot- 
22 
Figure 4A view of the village from above. 
Figure 7 The church of the nearby Limbanak village, the spiritual centre of 
Kituau's Christian 
community. 
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Figure 6 The mosque attached to the local secondary school. Despite the fact that is not 
normally used, the crescent on its top can be seen from almost every part of the village. 
Chapter 4 
Media and belonging to the nation 
Chapter 3 described how, starting from the late 1960s, the new Malaysian state 
enforced its nation-building project through the control of the most important media, 
namely the radio and, from the 1980s, television, while seriously limiting the 
possibilities of development of a Kadazan culture and its access to the media. The 
present chapter builds on the insights of the previous one by considering concrete 
examples of the way in which Kadazan people situate themselves in relation to the 
nation-building process carried out through these media. More specifically, J consider 
how Kadazan villagers situate themselves in relation to the discourses spread by the 
media and how their responses to them takes the forin of an identification with the 
nation or with other collective forms of identification. While the last chapter provided 
a diachronic account, the present one, together with the following chapter 5, takes a 
synchronic approach, based on the ethnographic material gathered in the fieldwork. 
Differently from the previous one, this chapter considers the media primarily from the 
point of view of their consumers, drawing closer to 'audience studies' and to media 
anthropology. 
I am following the approach used by Mirca Madianou in her study of reception of 
television news in Greece (2005), taking identity at the centre of her research project, 
and 'follow [ing] the circulation of meaning in the context of discourses and practices 
about the nation and belonging' (2005: 51), focusing on media and consumption in 
the context of everyday life. Finding no causal correlation between media and 
identity, a conclusion confirmed by my empirical findings - as will be evident from 
the reading of this chapter - Madianou (2005) argues that the media contribute to 
shifts from open discourses of identity to closed ones, characterised by the essentialist 
idea of a homogeneous culture and identity, and to the erection of boundaries around 
it excluding outsiders and stereotyping minorities. 
This approach is an attempt to solve the apparent inadequacy of positions that 
assume a priori either the power of media to influence culture and identities (e. g. 
McLuhan, 1964; Dayan and Katz, 1992; Morley and Brundson, 1999) or that of 
culture to influence media consumption and interpretation (e. g. Caldarola, 1990; 
Liebes and Katz, 1993), and is in line with that of media anthropologists such as 
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Mankekar (1999), Peterson (2003) and of the contributors to two seminal media 
anthropology readers (Askew and Wilk, 2002; Ginsburg et al., 2002). 
The discussion of the relationship between the media and the positioning in 
collective forins of identification provided by this chapter starts with an analysis of 
one of the main 'foundational media forms' considered by Postill (2006), state 
propaganda. Starting from Doolittle's (2005) description of the responses of Sabahan 
villagers, showing some important forms of resistance to the penetration of the ideas 
and practices promoted by government propaganda, I partly question its success in the 
case of Sabah. The chapter then follows with the analysis of another essential 
medium, television, expanding on Postill's (2006) discussion of the form of 
resistance, which he considered as ineffectual, inherent to the rejection of Malay 
soaps by the Iban. The section is complemented by a case study analysing the 
reactions to a very popular Malaysian programme broadcast by satellite television, 
Akademi Fantasia, and highlighting the way in which Kadazan viewers identify 
themselves as a different group within the national imagined community and how this 
position is connected to the perception of exclusion and second-class status described 
by authors such as Winzeler (1997), Boulanger (2000; 2002) and Rosaldo (2003). The 
following section provides three case studies of the readings made by the Kadazan of 
three news items published by the newspapers, showing the coexistence of dominant, 
essentialist readings and of another essentialist oppositional discourse of belonging to 
an oppressed Kadazan and Christian, imagined community. Finally, the chapter ends 
with the consideration of an example of the development of a new sensitivity 
connected with the exposure to different ways of life afforded by the 'glimpse into 
other worlds' (Thompson, 1995) provided by foreign, transnational media forms. 
Theoretical approaches to media and identity 
Madianou. - the news and discourses of belonging 
In her analysis of the mediation process, Madianou (2005) concentrates on the way 
in which audiences react to the discourses presented by the media and the way in 
which they stimulate discourses of identity. Starting 
from previous works on 
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audiences,, she elaborates a set of categories for defining the readings made, 
distinguishing between critical and non critical readings of the news in relation to 
both the news form and its conventions and to its content. She further divides the 
readings critical of news content between those accepting the 'dominant, official 
discourse about the nation and its 'culture" (2005: 102), which, following Hall (1980) 
she calls 'dominant' decodings, and those contesting these dominant decodings. 
Madianou defines these readings as 'demotic', taking the term from Baumann (1996, 
cited in Madianou, 2005: 25), who used it to refer to the discourses challenging 
reifications of culture and identity he found in the multicultural London area of 
Southall. Madianou (2005) also classifies as 'contextual' those decodings that 
interpret the news through a knowledge of the context in which they are placed, 
'historical' those that interpret the news in the light of knowledge of previous events 
and 'analytic' those in which audiences 'attempt to read through the events and 
provide reasons for their presentation - or not - in the news' (2005: 102-103). 
Madianou (2005) also considers the essential interaction between the news content 
and personal experience of the viewers, determining shifts from news to context in 
which identity discourses and experiences are articulated in an essential way. 
Madianou (2005) concludes her analysis of television news' reception in Greece 
by arguing that the news provides a common point of reference for the majority of 
those watching, circulating constantly in people's everyday lives and therefore 
emerging beyond their informational dimension to become a wider socio-cultural 
phenomenon (2005: 134). Moreover, she argues that the news broadcasts, through 
their essentialist discourse based on an 'us and them. ' dichotomy,. contribute in certain 
cases to the shift from an open to a closed discourse identifying the nation as a 
culturally and ethnically homogeneous group, therefore excluding minorities and 
obliterating internal differences. That is especially the case in relationship to 
international issues in which people feel the need to defend their identity by 
essentialising it and to mute any internal dissent in order to present a united image of 
the nation outside its boundaries. 
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Foster- nation making through media and consumption 
Robert Foster (2002) brings forward the notion of nation making to refer to the 
role played in 'materializing the nation' by non-state agents such as commercial 
media and consumer culture. His stress on the importance of mass-mediated 
commercial culture is derived from the specific case he studies, Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), a 'weak' postcolonial polity in which, he argues, the nation has nevertheless 
come into existence, often not through state intervention, and in certain cases even 
against the state, as in the case of discourses about corruption in which citizens 
thought of themselves as members of the nation betrayed by the state apparatus. 
Following Anderson (1991), Foster considers the. nation as a modular entity, 
replicated around the world on the basis of 19th century models. He argues that his 
study of PNG offers comparative material useful to understand the adaptation of the 
nation to different historical and geographical conditions and to clarify some universal 
characteristics of the nation, such as the ideological and ontological similarities and 
connection between the nation and consumerism. He therefore considers 
advertisements as particularly important in creating the sense that commodities sold at 
the national level are embodiments and possessions of 'the nation', as well as a 
vehicle for imagining a community of consumers -a situation that, however, applies 
mostly to members of an 'emergent urban consumer culture' - 'whose shared 
consumption practices and ideals put them in experiential unison with each other' 
(2002: 64). 
While I agree with Postill (2006) that the Malaysian state seems much more 
powerful and more in control of the 'materializing of the nation' than in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), I think Foster's insight can give us clues to one of the ways in which a 
national frame of reference for identity materialises through everyday consumption 
practices. The availability of the same products, the wide circulation of discourses 
dealing with their economic, social or health value, the common understanding of 
notions of distinction connected to the consumption of different commodities, and the 
exposure to the same media messages promoting the values inherent to such 
commodities are all experiences shared by the great majority of the citizens of a 
country, constituting banal, but nevertheless significant, presences. 
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Thompson: self and experience in a mediated world 
Thompson argues that, as the self is a 'symbolic project that the individual actively 
constructs [.. ] out of the symbolic materials [.. ] available [.. ] which the individual 
weaves into [.. ] a narrative of self-identity' (1995: 210), this process of self-formation 
becomes increasingly dependant on mediated symbolic materials in modernity. Two 
of the effects of such iifcreased importance of media in the 'reflexive organization of 
the self discussed by Thompson are of particular relevance here: the 'mediated 
intrusion of ideological messages' and the 'double-bind of mediated dependency' 
(1995: 212-13). By the former he refers to the instrumentality of the media in creating 
ýthe conditions for the intrusion of ideological messages into the context of everyday 
life', a process given in-depth consideration by Postill (2006). However, Thompson 
has a contextual approach to ideology, arguing that whether mediated messages are 
ideological depends on the way in which they are received by individuals and 
incorporated reflexively in their lives, becoming part of their projects of self- 
formation. The second effect of the increased 'mediazation of culture' considered by 
Thompson is that the more mediated symbolic forins are used in the process of self- 
formation, the more the self becomes dependent on media systems behind its control. 
This double-bind goes beyond the realm of the media, including the educational, 
labour and welfare systems, with which individuals become increasingly involved yet 
which they are mostly unable to influence (1995: 214-15). 
Another essential effect of the media considered by Thompson is the possibility 
they provide to experience events that would otherwise not be experienced, either 
because they occur in a different place or time, or because they have become 
'sequestrated' from everyday life, as in the case of crime or mental insanity, therefore 
detaching experience from direct encounter. Thompson therefore distinguishes 
between lived experience - which is situated, continuous and., to some extent, pre- 
reflexive - and mediated experience. The two have a different 'relevance structure', a 
term Thompson, following Husserl (1970, cited in Thompson, 1995: 229) and Schutz 
(1974, cited in Thompson,, 19 95: 229), uses to refer to the relevance of experiences 
for individuals on the basis of the priorities determined by their project of the self. 
While lived experience has a direct and unavoidable relevance, the relevance of 
mediated experience is much more variable, having a 'rather tenuous, intermittent and 
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selective relation to the self (1995: 230). The relevance of this form of experience 
varies between individuals and between situations; individuals, according to 
Thompson, tend to integrate mediated experiences more in their daily schedules the 
more relevant they are perceived to be to the self (1995: 230-23 1). 
Summing up 
This section has introduced the main theoretical approaches I am following in the 
analysis of the relationship between the media and the identification with collective 
forms of belonging among the Kadazan. Starting from Postill (2006) my discussion 
sets itself to investigate the effects of the formation of a 'thick' national culture in 
Malaysia, both through the efforts of state-led nation-building and through the 
establishment of local configurations of consumerism (Foster, 2002), on the way in 
which the Kadazan identify themselves. The first part of the analysis, following 
Madianou's (2005) conclusion that there is no direct connection between the media 
and identity, examines the way in which the readings of the news made by my 
informants show a complex engagement with discourses about the nation, often 
involving shifts to closed discourses which at times correspond to a sense of 
belonging to the nation but often situate individuals within oppositional categories 
that are, nevertheless,, equally essentialist. The nation, however, appears often as an 
essential frame of reference (Foster, 2002; Madianou, 2005). Moreover, following 
Thompson (1995) 1 consider the symbolic material provided by the media to be used 
by individuals to create self-narratives that encompass the various frames of reference 
and discourses by combining lived and mediated experience in a whole that has a 
form of coherence despite the disparate experiential material used to construct it and 
its seemingly incoherent applications. 
The next section deals directly with one of the 'foundational media forms' through 
which Postill argues the Malaysian nation has been built, development propaganda, 
which consists of both discursive and non-discursive elements and which clarifies the 
political context influencing Kadazan reactions to the media. 
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'Sustainable propaganda' 
Postill stresses the use of development made by the state as a tool for nation- 
building by considering it, following Ramakrishna (2002, cited in Postill,, 2006: 89- 
90), as a non-discursive form of propaganda putting into practice the words of the 
discursive part. He uses the term 'sustainable propaganda' to refer to the fact that 
government propaganda on security, development and national integration presents 
itself, according to him, as a form of sustainable development (2006: 89). 
He argues that the propaganda coming from the political and cultural centres has 
rapidly reached even remote areas, where it has become integrated with local ideals, 
giving birth to what he calls an 'ideolect', a sort of ideological dialect of Malaysia's 
nationalist ideology, and shaped the people's worldview to such an extent that it has 
become hardly distinguishable from the views of people from all backgrounds. Postill 
found a striking similarity between the ideolects of Than of different areas of Sarawak, 
which seems to stand in contrast to the quite marked differences in media practices 
among different Than localities (2006: 91-93). 
In his analysis of the ideolect of the Saribas area of Sarawak, he singles out two 
primary loci in which state propaganda has effectively shaped the local ideology: the 
school and the longhouse. The former is the site in which the moral order of children 
is most explicitly and repeatedly articulated through media practices. Essays and 
coursework are analysed by the author as the best way into the children's moral order, 
and as giving insights into the way hegemonic ideology is intemalised by them. Some 
discourses, such as the preference of many boys for becoming policemen and girls to 
become teachers, are highly prevalent, as they are supported by a number of entwined 
social formations, agents and media. Postill (2006) explains this phenomenon arguing 
that the school experience of the almost totality of the Than children he encountered in 
his research elicited only what Rorty (1991, cited in Postill, 2006: 101) called 
'paradigms of inference', which tend to confirm existing beliefs and encompass a 
minimal degree of transformation when new knowledge is acquired. At the level of 
the longhouse, the traditional form of oratory has dramatically declined and, when 
public speeches are often given through public-address system, the speakers are 
generally caught between the knowledge associated with literacy and Malaysia and 
the local and oral Than one, without being able to bridge the gap between the two 
(2006: 93-105). 
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Postill (2006) attributes the success of the state's sustainable propaganda in 
shaping the local idiolect to its strong resonance with traditional values, such as the 
respect for the elders, and to its apparent effectiveness, as deed actually follows word, 
and messages have usually proved to be right, as in the case of education, which 
really gives better opportunities of employment and career. The reality of the state's 
propaganda derives also, to an important extent, from the lban's lack of access to any 
alternative source of information, such as non-government media, which might 
challenge these representations. The problem, however, goes beyond accessibility, as 
most rural Iban, according to Postill, do not have the habit of considering or 
discussing interpretations of events alternative to that provided by the govemi-nent. 
Sabah -a failure of 'sustainable propaganda'9 
Similarly to Postill, Doolittle (2005) argues that development is used in Sabah as 
a central strategy for building a modem nation in which Federal ideologies are 
integrated into local life' (2005: 1), and for increasing the political, economic and 
cultural domination of the Malay-Muslim central and local ruling elites. Rather than, 
as officially declared, alleviating the lower strata's poverty, development practices, 
according to Doolittle legitimise the government and 'facilitate the expansion and 
entrenchment of the ruling, national ideology at the local level' (2005: 2). The 
development agenda, as expressed by the official literature of the Gerakan Desa 
Wawasan (Willage Movement toward Vision', GDW) - the rural development 
program which is part of the Wawasan 2020 master plan - aims at transforming rural 
agriculture from sub si stence- aimed to commercial, a transformation based on the 
ideology of -productive, 'orderly' rural management and on 'highly disciplined 
working habits'(expressions quoted from official propaganda). The GDW official 
propaganda also has a strong Islamic colouring, calling for 'spiritual awareness' and 
for 'spiritually uniting people with Allah' (1996, cited in Doolittle, 2005: 8). 
Doolittle, however, concludes that development programmes in Sabah are 'only 
partially successful at legitimizing state authority at the local level' because of the 
resistance of rural populations, able to demystify the ideology and refuse their support 
to the actualisation of the state agenda. In the case analysed by Doolittle (2005), the 
residents of Tempulong, a village in Sabah's interior, questioned and even rejected the 
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development programme brought forward by the federal agencies and federal 
involvement in local affairs,, not being convinced that it would bring benefits to 
themselves or to the village as a whole. Moreover, 'recognizing the political message 
behind the rhetoric of rural development, residents did not fully embrace UMNO 
ideology, the Islamic religion, or Malaysian nationalism as a result of GDW' (2005: 
3 1). The villagers reacted in a mixed and confused way to the overall project: while 
the appeal of modernisation and development was strong to them, they contested 
many of the propagandistic elements. The reactions included laughing, mockery, 
contempt and statements showing a deep animosity toward the Malay Peninsula 
(Semenanjung), the federal government and its alleged taking over of Sabah 
government. This failure of propaganda was, however, not complete according to 
Doolittle, as a partial bureaucratic reach to the village was obtained by the federal 
agencies and their local UMNO ally strengthened his political base by being able to 
attract the development funds. The government acknowledged the failure of GDW 
projects in the majority of the villages, but, taking an attitude described also by Postill 
(2006) blamed the villagers' 'mindsets' for that. 
The issue of development has a different significance in the Penampang plains 
than in other areas of Sabah such as the one considered by Doolittle (2005), as the 
area, being relatively developed and close to the State capital, is not an object of plans 
from the government. The idea of development, therefore, is not connected with rural 
plans, but with a more general idea of benefiting from education, employment, 
infrastructure and other services. 
The inhabitants of the Penampang plains, as I will show throughout the chapter, 
have a very critical stance towards the state and federal government and, similarly to 
the residents of Tempulong, identify development projects as instrumental in 
establishing Malay-Muslim control and in furthering a Malayisation agenda. As 
described by Doolittle for Tempulong (2005: 23), Penampang Kadazan from all 
backgrounds regard allegiance to UMNO as a betrayal of their ethnic identity, and 
openly acknowledge the use made of development to get votes for UM-NO and for 
expanding the federal power. The marginal status of the Kadazan within Malaysia, in 
my view (see also Winzeler, 1997, Rosaldo, 2003), explains the apparent lack of 
success of development propaganda and the rejection of Malay(sian) media -and not 
only- products (see below), without unwarrantedly 'elevating marginal viewers to 
interpretive parity with the intelligentsia'(cf Postill, 2006: 9). Differently from the 
92 
situation described by Doolittle in Tempulong in the mid-1990s, however, most 
Kadazan of Penampang in the mid-2000s share a lack of trust also in their own 
leaders and in previously cherished institutions such as PBS and KDCA. 
In the next sections, after briefly describing the patterns of media consumption in 
Kituau, 1 provide a discussion of the way in which the village residents position 
themselves in relation to dominant discourses present in the media. 
Media consumption in Kituau 
Television is a very common medium, as all the households with electricity own at 
least a set. Satellite television has also become very popular since the setting up of the 
Malaysian provider ASTRO in 1996, with more than half (around 65%) of the 
households with television subscribing to it. Currently, the service provides 68 
television, 17 radio, and 5 pay-per-view channels plus various interactive services. 
Many of the villagers also have a DVD player for watching DVDs or Video CDs, 
which they can buy at low price from street vendors and exchange with friends and 
relatives, though they most often watch television. 
Television is the main form of evening entertainment for the majority of the 
villagers, and people generally tend to stay in the house watching it with members of 
their family. Some informants told me that when they had no television they would go 
to bed early or spend time chatting with their family and friends, a fact that bears 
many similarities with the shift of evening activities from the public area, the 
'gallery', to the private apartments (bilik) in Than longhouses (Postill, 2006: 19). 
While television is on most of the times in Kadazan houses, very often people just 
keep it on as a background to their activities, and just get a glimpse of the images and 
the sounds being broadcast, as described by Bausinger (1984), that is especially the 
case for women preparing meals. 
Excluding the illiterate minority, the majority of my informants considered the 
newspapers as their favourite source of news, arguing that they are more independent 
and reliable than television and radio. While both locally produced and national 
newspapers, coming from the Peninsula are available in Sabah, all of my infon-nants 
and acquaintances always read Sabahan newspapers, choosing among one of the 
three,, the Daily Express, New Sabah Times and Borneo Post, published in a tri-lingual 
- English, Malay and Kadazandusun - version. They justified their preference for 
Sabahan newspapers, and in particular for the Daily Express, considered the most 
independent, with their focus on events often not reported in the national media. A 
good knowledge of either English or Malay provides a full access to the news, while 
the Kadazandusun sections only consist of two pages, and therefore include only 
certain items, while they also have some unique contents, such as village news and 
letters or poems sent by readers. Retired men and those not working at the time also 
often meet at some coffee shop in Donggonggon and discuss the news they have just 
read as well as local events which have happened to members of the family, friends or 
other villagers. 
Radio is, at present, less of a favourite medium than television!, but it remains, 
together with tape player, the preferred medium used while driving to work or to the 
shops, and is also often played at full power in the public buses. There are only two 
Sabahan stations available, both run by the public broadcaster RTM, but various 
commercial stations from the Peninsula can also be received. Most of my informants, 
however, told me they were mainly interested in the Kadazan broadcast, which can be 
heard in the early mornings and between 2 and 4 in the afternoons. 
The Kadazan Section of Radio Malaysia Sabah constitutes the main medium using 
the language, which makes it suitable for those who prefer media in their mother- 
tongue. People told me they were interested in the Kadazan broadcast because it 
provides local news about Penampang and nearby districts as well as entertainment in 
the form of Kadazandusun music, both traditional and modern. People who listen to 
the Kadazan Section often do so animated by a sense of nostalgia for the old times, 
especially satisfied by 'classical' Kadazandusun music recorded by famous stars of 
the past, as well as by an interest, coupled by a sort of pride, in things that are 
peculiarly Kadazan and that, among the media, can be found only on the radio. 
Among those are discussions about adat, the traditional customs, as well as traditional 
myths and legends belonging to Kadazan oral literature as well as - the one to which 
people listen with most care - the announcement of somebody's death, accompanied 
by the sound of Kadazan flute, the tuahi, which some people even use as a ring tone 
for their mobile phones, which carries an emotionally reassuring sense of continuity 
with a traditional, pre-modem condition. 
In rural Penampang only a minority of the population regularly accesses the 
internet or acquires much information through it. The situation can be attributed to 
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the fact that the only internet connection available within the village was, until very 
recently, a dial-up one, which was comparatively slow and quite unreliable. The lack 
of access to the internet, however, cannot be attributed solely to problems of access, 
as many of those working in Kota Kinabalu have some access to it - though limited 
by working constraints -from their offices. The majority of the adult population just 
does not seem very interested in using the internet or in leaming about it, and the 
internet remains mostly a domain of youth in their teens and twenties, who usually 
access it in internet points located either in Donggonggon or, more rarely, Kota 
Kinabalu. 
The mobile phone, on the other hand, is very common and it is the most used and 
valued interpersonal medium, and its use spans from the exchange of funny SMS 
chains or the making of arrangements for the time at which to meet at a pub to the 
circulation of SMS asking for support to an anti-government protest campaign and 
soliciting participation in a huge popular demonstration against a resettlement 
scheme. Moreover, the mobile phone has substituted the wristwatch as the primary 
time-keeping medium, incorporating two different functions into a single object. 
Mobile phones are used by the majority of adults and increasingly by teenagers, while 
the elderly are usually not attracted by this relatively new technology, which has 
become a vital possession for all those who learned how to use it and have quickly 
become used to it. 
A site of contestation? Reception of Malay TV dramas and 
films 
When asked about television programmes, villagers consistently, across 
distinctions of age or gender, replied giving negative opinions about Malay TV 
dramas. A recurrent discourse expressed dislike for Malay soaps dismissing them as 
Malazu - (Malay in Kadazan) an expression often used with some sort of 
disdain by 
the Kadazan - implying that they were made 
by Malazu for Malazu, therefore 
catering for the tastes of the Malays and only representing their 
lives and their 
experiences. 
This identification of the soaps with Malayness is arguably based on the main 
features common to the genre, which Anuar and Kim (1996) identified 
in the use of 
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Malay language, the almost totally Malay casting and setting in locations such as 
Malay villages or neighbourhoods. Moreover, these dramas mostly focus on the 
socio-cultural implications of modernisation upon certain members of the Malay 
community, generally presenting successful Malay professionals, while sometimes 
expressing concern over certain elements of a modernised society, proposing recourse 
to the Islamic values promoted by the government as a solution to the contradictions 
emerging. They rarely represent non-Malay characters, distancing themselves from 
the everyday life of Malaysians, which involves constant inter-ethnic encounters, and 
marginalising members of other ethnic groups. They also represent women in a very 
limited way, as wives and mothers, or, rarely, when involved in business, as unable to 
look after career and family at the same time, bringing negative consequences to their 
family (Anuar and Kim, 1996: 270-72). 
The dislike of Malay soaps I found among the Kadazan corresponds to what 
described by Postill (2006: 107-110), who found that Malay soaps ranked very low in 
a survey about the popularity of television programmes he carried out among the Than 
in the Saribas region of Sarawak. Postill (2006) explains what seems to be a 
ýcollective rejection of an entire television genre on their basis of their being 'full of 
rich people eating in expensive restaurants' (2006: 108) by arguing that Malay soaps 
constitute an irritating anomaly, a 'matter out of place' like dirt in Mary 
Douglas'(1966) famous conceptualisation, in the Saribas lban's ideolect. The soaps, 
while they belong to the 'ideolectally- correct' genre of television drama, by 
presenting 'urban Malays flaunting their wealth on television' (2006: 109), would be 
at odds with the Than egalitarian principles that form part of the Saribas ideolect. At 
the same time, they would also belie the propaganda ideology, intemallsed in the 
idiolect, according to which all Malaysian races, Than included, are simultaneously 
developing towards prosperity. Another relevant aspect of Postill's discussion (2006) 
consists in the explanation he provides for the apparent contradiction between the 
rejection of Malay soaps and the positive reaction reserved for Western soaps such as 
Dallas or Dynasty, similarly portraying the rich and the famous. Postill argues that 
Malay soaps would be part of a 'system of commensurate difference' (Gewertz and 
Errington, 1991, cited in Postill, 2006: 108-109), constituted by the Malaysian inter- 
ethnic frame of reference, while the world of the orangputih, would 
be beyond such a 
system and incommensurate to it. 
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This interpretation seems valid for explaining the preference for Western media 
products expressed by the majority of my informants, based on the widespread 
opinion that their much higher quality - in terms of actors, make-up, costumes, 
special effects, directing - cannot be equalled by Malaysian ones. As described by 
Postill for the lban, aesthetic accomplishments and race seem to be inseparable, as the 
products of the orang putih, 'the most advanced race on earth', are well shot and 
acted and 'have logic' (2006: 109), while Malay dramas are pale imitations of them. 
The same sense of 'incommensurate difference' between the West and Malaysia was 
expressed by some of my informants, especially the elderly, through a different 
attitude towards violence and other 'immoral behaviour' when portrayed in Western 
and Malaysian media products. An example is given by the village bobohizan, who, 
like other villagers, argued that Malay television dramas present an excessive level of 
violence and other 'bad behaviour', encouraging negative attitudes in the youth, but, 
when asked about whether the same problem was true for Western products, replied 
that 'these things are part of the culture of the orangputih, so it is normal that they 
show their society as it is'. 
It must be noted,, however, that most villagers also appreciated soap operas from 
other non-Western countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Mexico, despite 
the fact, that their lack of production resources is similar to that of Malaysian ones. 
These products are usually appreciated on the basis of seemingly completely different 
aesthetic criteria: as expressed by Judeth, an avid viewer of Indonesian soaps, 
'Indonesian soaps are better than Malaysian ones, as they have good acting and 
imaginative plots. Yes, they are unrealistic, but they are not meant to be realistic as 
the Malay ones, they are set in sort of magic world, a fairyland'. Again, we can see a 
system of incommensurate difference (Gewertz and Errington, 1991) in which, 
despite a lack of hierarchy as that perceived between the West and Malaysia, other 
foreign media products are judged according to different canons from those applied to 
the Malaysian ones. Another essential aspect of the interest of many Kadazan in 
foreign media product is constituted by the possibility it gives to get a 'glimpse of 
other worlds', to vicariously experience life in other places and other times through 
them (Lull, 1991; Thompson, 1995: 212). Western films and soaps, moreover, have 
the added educational value that, as told me by Jacobina, they offer the possibility to 
improve one's level of English, a fact that is much appreciated by parents, considering 
97 
the high value put on knowing the language and the predominance of Malay in the 
national education system. 
Postill considers the rejection of Malay dramas as one of the 'key tensions and 
contradictions in some of the media practices that shape the maintenance of the 
ideolect' (2006: 105), but concludes that it constitutes an 'ineffectual form of 
resistance,, for it perpetuates the illusion of a nationwide equality despite mounting 
evidence to the contrary' (2006: 110). Considering that the dislike of Malay dramas 
was never explicitly expressed by my informants in terms of disapproval of the way 
of life of the rich and the powerful, however, I would explain such attitude through a 
lack of fit between the life experiences portrayed in such media products and those of 
the Kadazan viewers, conferring a low position in the 'relevance structure' 
(Thompson, 1995) of Kadazan viewers. The life experiences encountered through 
foreign media are certainly even more alien, but being part of an incommensurate 
system are not questioned and appreciated because they provide the knowledge of 
other worlds and,, in certain cases,, some skills necessary to understand and imitate the 
'most successful race in the world',, whose way of life is becoming, thanks to the 
media, less and less foreign. The Malay soaps, on the other hand, show the 
experientially far, yet familiar, world of, mostly urban, Peninsula from the point of 
view of the Malays, an experience to which the Kadazan cannot and do not want to 
relate. The lack of interest in relating to this world should be attributed to the general 
resentment of Malay domination within Malaysia and to the consciousness of the 
second-class status of the Kadazan vis-d-vis the politically dominant Malay and 
economically powerful Chinese. From such a perspective, the Kadazan are 
encouraged to make an 'oppositional' reading of Malay media products, including 
soap operas, identifying, often unconsciously, a propaganda element promoting a 
national culture based on Malay and Islamic values. 
Akademl Fantasia 
The television programme Akademi Fantasia (AF), broadcast since 2003 on the 
satellite channel Astro Ria and reaching its fifth edition 
in 2007, was, at the time of 
my fieldwork, one of the most popular among my infon-nants who, 
like many other 
Malaysians nationwide, followed regularly its Saturday, night 
broadcast and daily 
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repetitions and updates. The programme, whose format was first developed in the 
Mexican show La Academia (www. wikipedia. org), is Malaysia's first reality show. in 
which young aspirant singers, stay in a house called 'Akademi', are imparted daily 
singing lessons and perform on Saturday night in a prime-time show at the end of 
which a contestant is eliminated every week. 
What is unique about Kadazan people's relationship with the programme is that 
they seem interested only in the - performance of Kadazandusun or Sabahan 
contestants. As expressed by Denis (40 years old), who said 'I watch it just to see how 
our kind does', by which he meant Kadazandusun contestants,, Kadazan people seem 
to be interested in the programme mostly as an arena for their own 'kind' to show 
their worth at the national level. The interests they put in the way Kadazandusun and 
Sabahans perform seem to derive from the unconscious desire to 'beat the Malays' in 
their own field: the national arena and especially the media, strongly controlled by the 
centre, thanks to their skills,, in this case singing, an activity Kadazandusun are very 
fond of and in which they pride themselves to excel. In so doing, Kadazan seem to 
want to dispel some prejudices held by the people from Semenanjung according to 
which Sabahans would be unrefined country-bumpkins or even savages, 'still living 
on the trees' 20 . This reading seems to be confirmed by a statement by the same Denis, 
who lamented that one of the contestants, Velvet, was very rough and unrefined and 
gave a bad image of the Kadazan. This interest for Kadazan and Sabahan participants, 
which is shared also by non-Kadazan Sabahans I have talked to, is often associated 
with a dislike for Malay- participants, especially exemplified by Mawl, the winner of 
the third edition and now a famous singer and public character, often labelled as 'a 
fanatic from Kelantan 21. ) and 'a negative model they are trying to promote, just 
because he is Malay'. - 
An important recurrent topic of conversation and discourse relating to AF was the 
one about how, during the third edition a Kadazandusun finalist, Marsha, had been 
eliminated from the programme despite the fact that she had received many votes, 
allegedly because the reception of SMS ftom Sabah had been disenabled, and 
therefore the votes of her supporters had not been counted. While the event had later 
been recognised as a technical fault, and Marsha had been re-entered in the 
20 That is what more than one Kadazan told me Peninsula people think of Sabahans 
21 A State of Peninsular Malaysia known for the very Islamic attitudes of its majority and 
for being 
ruled by the Islamic opposition party PAS 
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competition, the organisers made sure, according to those exposing this sort of 
'conspiracy theory', that she would not win against the Malay Mawi by manipulating 
the votes during the final. This 'conspiracy theory' is in tune with the feelings of 
being sidelined by the state establishment, as well as misrepresented and mostly left 
out from the media, that appeared to be common among Kituau residents. On the 
other hand, it must be acknowledged that AF is a particularly Malaysian phenomenon 
in which, despite their opposition, Kadazan are still situated, and situate themselves, 
as consumers of a national media and political arena and whose rules they follow. 
The circulation of discourses in the news 
Most of my informants, and particularly the males, seemed to be very interested in 
all types of news, and they generally had a highly politicised and critical approach 
(see below). The press arguably has a strong agenda-setting role, as news items very 
often trigger conversation about the reported issues, and the knowledge about the 
facts reported by the newspapers is often an implicit prerequisite for much 
conversation. 
In the following sections, I analyse three case studies constituted by three debates 
among some of my informants triggered by their reading of three news items in the 
national press, the favourite source of news. The issues reported by the news were not 
particularly important, but I have chosen them as relevant examples of how my 
Kadazan informants react to the. discourses present in the media by situating 
themselves within particular frames of reference and projecting themselves into 
collective forms of identification. 
The Singapore bridge issue 
On 13'h of April 2006, the newspapers (e. g. Daily Express, 13/4/2006) reported 
that Malaysia had decided to stop the construction, started in 2003, of the -scenic 
bridge' meant to replace the existing causeway between Malaysia and Singapore. 
The 
decision was justified by the arising of 'legal implications and complications' as well 
as by the fact that, according to the prime Minister, Malaysian people were unhappy 
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with the conditions posed by Singapore as a prerequisite for their acceptance of the 
proj ect. Later, the press reported criticisms moved by former PM Mahathir 
Mohamad, the 'mind behind' the project, who said that Malaysia should not have 
bowed to Singapore's pressure. The criticism was one among various moved by the 
former PM to the present government since he has retired (Daily Express, 14/4/2006). 
As is usually the case with news items from the press, the issue became a topic of 
discussion among a group of people sitting outside Jaunis' house chatting and 
drinking some beers. The people taking part in the conversation divided themselves 
between those agreeing with the decision and those agreeing with Mahathir's position. 
None of the participants in the discussion made a reading critical of the news as 
genre or of the journalistic conventions, nor did they make what Madianou (2005: 
102-103) calls analytic readings, 'attempt[ing] to read through the events and provide 
the reasons for their presentation - or not - in the news'. The readings of this item of 
news, on the other hand, was contextualised with previous knowledge derived from 
previous media reports, most likely other newspaper articles but also television news, 
which provided people with the basis on which to form their opinion about the present 
and former PM and Cabinets and their way of working. Some people criticised the 
bridge project as another result of Mahathir's politics of grandeur, while others like 
Jaunis argued that criticising this type of project was short-sighted, as in the case of 
the construction of the Formula I circuit at Sepang, initially criticised by many as 
another unnecessary 'show-off by Mahathir, which not only ended up being a 
commercial and economic success, but it gave Malaysia fame and renown by putting 
the country on the map of one of the world's most popular sports and therefore giving 
it international visibility and respect. 
In this case the readings of the news were articulated in a way not directly 
informed by personal experience or by alternative sources, but rather on personal 
opinions derived from the previous mainstream news. 
The readings of news contents by all discussants, whether they took a pro- or anti- 
government position, should be considered as dominant, as neither of them challenged 
the official discourse about the nation and the presupposition that all readers 
belong to 
it. The readers did not contest or seem aware of the 'banal nationalism' 
(Billig, 1995) 
identifying the readers as naturally belonging to the nation, and as 
being part of the 
Malaysia to which the article attributed the decisions and actions taken 
by the 
government. Moreover, the people participating 
in the discussion not only took for 
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granted the fact that the issues discussed in the paper involved, despite the lack of any 
direct connection with their life, them as Malaysians, but also that, within the 
international order constituted by a world of states, states should try to increase their 
political, economic and symbolic power vis-d-vis the others. 
The Danish cartoon events 
In February 2006, Malaysia was involved in the worldwide controversial issue 
regarding the reprinting of cartoons allegedly representing Prophet Mohamed by the 
Danish Jyllands Posten and then by various European dailies. The reaction of 
Malaysian Muslims was not as strong as in other countries such as Indonesia, and it 
did not escalate into acts of violence. The Malaysian public opinion was further 
stirred when the Sarawak Tribune, Sarawak's oldest daily, published some of the 
Danish cartoons. Many Muslims reacted with outrage and the government called the 
paper's editor for questioning and eventually revoked the Tribune's publishing licence 
(Daily Express, 9/2/2006; 23/2/2006). 
The stir created by the news reached Sabah, where people, like all Malaysians not 
living in Sarawak, had no occasion to see the cartoons under discussion,, a fact that 
created much curiosity about the cartoons that could determine such a strong reaction 
around the world, and the issue became subject of discussion among the villagers of 
Kituau. The reading made by those I discussed the issue with, as in the case 
previously examined, was critical neither of the news as genre nor analytic. The 
reading they made was dominant as it did not challenge the Malaysian state ideology 
that issues such as religion and ethnicity are sensitive and the media should therefore 
avoid offending sensitivities at all costs. This principle is not only completely 
internalised by the media producers, who consistently practise a form of self- 
censorship, partly as a result of fears of having their newspaper's licence revoked, but 
also by Malaysian citizens such as my Kadazan informants who took it for granted 
that issues of religion and ethnicity are sensitive and should therefore 
be treated with 
the maximum caution or even not treated at all. 
The issue triggered a reflection on the different reactions to issues of this type 
between Muslims and Christians and on the different protection of the two groups' 
sensitivities afforded by the Malaysian government and media. 
One of my informants, 
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Jacobina, expressed this view saying that 'Muslim sensitivities are much more easily 
hurt than those of Christians' and that if such cartoons had been published about 
Christian religion nobody would have protested with such strength, nor would have 
the Malaysian government. She supported such view by citing the example of the 
debate on the controversial Da Vinci Code, which was condemned by the Catholic 
Church as presenting a false view of the life of Jesus Christ and of the history of the 
early Christian Church, but which did not determine any reaction in the Malaysian 
government. Moreover, she argued, 'we Christians did not make a big fuss as the 
Muslims did about the Danish cartoons'. 
This kind of reaction should be read as deriving from the experience of being a 
Christian minority within a Muslim country, and to the deriving feeling, reinforced by 
the memory of the various policies of Islamisation and Malayisation described in the 
last chapter, of not being fully accepted by the government as such. 
While various villagers expressed the curiosity to see the cartoons in order to judge 
for themselves whether the reactions were justified or not,, implicitly agreeing with the 
Sarawak Tribune's choice, they did not have such a chance. Among my infon-nants 
only Martha, one of the few people who obtain a significant amount of infon-nation 
through the internet, was able to see the cartoons through a website, and she told me 
she thought the reaction to them was excessive, as the mocked character was never 
directly identified as Prophet Mohamed. 
My informants, therefore, got involved in the series of international events started 
by the publication of the 'Danish cartoons' through the media, not challenging the 
dominant position demanding to avoid 'sensitive issues' but also Interpreting the 
debate in the light of their unique, local, condition, opposing themselves as a 
perceivedly oppressed minority who feels they are not being treated with respect 
(Rosaldo, 2003) by the Muslim-dominated state. This reading, while challenging the 
implicit depiction of Malaysia as a Muslim country, and implicitly asking 
for 
recognition of the rights of minorities to equal treatment, responded with another 
closed, essentialist discourse of identity, confirming Arendt's argument 
(1968, cited 
in Madianou, 2005: 137) that upholding an identity is a usual reaction to the 
feeling of 
it being under attack through defamation and persecution. 
103 
The Sipadan incident 
On the 17th of May 2006 , the Sabahan newspaper reported the collision of a large 
barge, loaded with building materials, with the coral reef of Sipadan island, a national 
park and one of the main tourist attractions of the State, attracting a great number of 
divers from all around the world (Daily Express, 17/05/2006). After the incident, 
many official sources and NGOs called for a review of the proposed RM5 million 
project (about 700,, 000 pounds) to construct a restaurant/club house, dive shop and 
staff quarters, possibly using concrete materials and apparently involving heavy 
machines. Sabah's chief Minister intervened in the matter ordering the suspension of 
all construction activities and a full probe on the destruction of corals. He also 
decided that projects carried out in environmentally sensitive areas should have prior 
Cabinet approval in the future (Daily Express, 17/6/2006; 18/6/2006). The press later 
reported that the State Minister of Tourism replied to a question from a local MP by 
saying that the project carried out at Sipadan was aimed at providing basic facilities 
like toilets and a resting place for tourists and divers, following the Government's 
decision to cease the operations of resorts there. The project also included the 
construction of quarters for 12 army personnel, seven police personnel and eight 
Sabah Parks' staff who are on duty there (Daily Express, 1/7/2006). 
My informants made an analytical reading of the news regarding these events, 
attributing the incident to the desire of the politician and businessmen involved to 
make the highest possible profits without taking care of the measures necessary to 
safeguard safety or the environment. This"reading identified this way of acting as the 
deep, real cause of the incident, and was critical of the journalistic conventions not 
reporting the real causes of certain events when these go against the interest of the 
powerful. In this reading, similarly to what was described by Madianou (2005: 105- 
106), my informants referred to the journalists, media owners and politicians through 
the pronoun 'they', implying a symbiosis between the media and politics to cover up 
the real facts in order to defend the interests of the powerful. From this point of view, 
one of my informants argued that, considering the Chief Minister is 
from an area of 
the East Coast very near Sipadan and that he owns or participates in most of the 
companies of the area, it was very likely that he 
had a personal interest and some 
stake in the business causing the incident. My 
informant therefore considered the 
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stance of the Chief Minister to be hypocritical and argued that he had stopped the 
building on the island only because of the negative local and international reaction - 
some international diving blogs reported the incident - and that he might re-start the 
operations once the fuss calmed down. 
This attitude is often corroborated by personal experience, as exemplified by the 
great amount of wealth amassed by a villager who was involved in politics and has 
bought a great amount of land and built an extravagant villa on top of a hill 
dominating the kampung. The same informant who accused the Chief Minister of 
being hypocritical told me that, while visiting the local MP at the State assembly to 
discuss a project, he saw many people going to him asking for money, even as little as 
20 ringgit. He described the event as non-nal, arguing that the life of the MP is much 
about managing people who come to ask for something, providing a view, which I 
found to be widespread among the villagers, seeing the relationship between 
politicians and voters as one in which the fon-ner act as patrons, getting votes from 
their clients and then redistributing the resources, deriving from people's taxes, either 
in form of contracts or even in cash. While the villagers seem to accept this patron- 
client relationship as a normal component of politics, they are, on the other hand, as 
shown by the reactions to the Sipadan incident, ready to denounce, and even to infer 
without concrete evidence, the misconduct and corruption of politicians. 
This attitude is expressed through an essentialist discourse that identifies 
politicians, of all parties and ethnic origin, as being primarily moved by self-interest 
and as putting such interests before those of the people they represent. Nevertheless, 
this attitude provokes an ambiguous moral stance mixing condemnation and the idea 
that the behaviour of the politicians is intrinsic to the exercise of power. 
Subjectivities for the new modernity 
Postill argues that television plays, together with the Malay-medium school 
system, an essential role in the 'double westernisation' of Sarawak and 
Sabah, a term 
by which he describes 'the two-step flow of ideas, images and practices 
from the 
Western world (especially the U. S. A. ) selected and recycled in 
West Malaysia and 
then re-exported to East Malaysia'(2006: 84). 
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The advent and widespread diffusion of satellite television have arguably 
reinforced this flow while limiting to a great extent the control the state exerts on it. 
Satellite television is in fact the ultimate vehicle of the spread of the global modernity 
linked to consumerism. This is a type of modernity which is, however, different from,, 
and at times at odds with, the one promoted by both Malaysian and Kadazan 
modernists. The main carriers of this global consumerism are foreign-produced 
television programmes, going from films to television show formats (e. g. AF) to 
advertisement to 'lifestyle' programmes and documentaries. The latter, in particular, 
showing people going around the world visiting attractions or sightseeing, going to 
restaurants and hotels,, showing dream houses or world cuisine, by appealing to 
viewers' interest in glimpsing at other worlds and having vicarious experiences 
(Thompson, 1995), spread a global form of consumerism and the appreciation for 
features of different places and activities seen as possibilities for almost limitless 
spending and consumerist pleasures, encompassing all aspects of life, from leisure to 
working, from everyday life to vacation. 
In disagreement with Foster (2002), 1 would argue that the form of consumerism 
promoted by these commercial media, despite their being a Malaysian configuration 
of global ones, does not generate a national frame of reference, but rather a global 
one, which Kadazan individuals seem to find highly appealing, possibly for the 
promises it bears of direct access to the culture and way of life of the orang putih, 
bypassing the control and limitation imposed by the Malaysian state and by its Malay 
ruling elites. 
The new form of modernity promoted by the media has slowly been penetrating 
urban Sabah and -spreading from cities, modifying the lifestyle of many of the 
relatively well-off and modernised inhabitants of Penampang, especially those who 
have a direct contact with its practical embodiment in the working and shopping 
practices of the State capital. Young and earl y-middl e-age women, in particular, tend 
to be more attracted by this ideology because of their often most dynamic role and 
because these messages focus more on elements belonging to the feminine sphere: 
ways of keeping the house and cooking, household products, raising the children, 
beauty, and products offering to obtain it. Young Kadazan women also seem 
to be 
more involved in another aspect of the consumerist cosmopolitan ý 
lifestyle, 
travelling and going out to pubs and restaurants, which I would argue 
is connected to 
their stronger connection with the urban environment and 
their more 'modem' 
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patterns of social interaction, while the men generally tend to prefer more traditional 
patterns of consumption and of leisure. 
The personal experience of one of my informants seems also to suggest the 
influence of television in the development of new subjectivities, in line with 
Mankekar's argument that media consumption is 'a contested space in which 
subjectivities are constituted' (1993: 471). Similarly to what described by Mankekar 
(1999), representations of family on television caused personal and subjective family 
experiences to surface. My informant, however, seemed to be able to articulate them 
by elaborating the discourses about family that were implicit in various media 
products she had consumed. Jacobina, a 38 year old bank clerk, argued that by 
watching foreign, and especially American, films she understood the importance of 
creating bonds within the family by showing affection to the other members and by 
showing her inner sentiments and teaching her children to do the same. This new 
subjective position led her to question and criticise the Kadazan - and more broadly 
South-east Asian - traditional cultural character, which sees expression of inner 
emotions negatively, a character that she sees as exemplified by her husband, who 
'never hugs or shows affection to his children'. 
The new subjectivities exemplified by Jacobina, which I found to be common also 
- although often in a less articulated way - to other young women often 
involves a 
discourse paying attention to people's behaviour and mental states and explaining 
them on the basis of popularised and simplified psychological notions. This 
psychologistic discourse is associated with a more general medical one, spread by the 
media, especially through health-related surveys on television or columns of 
newspapers and magazines, dealing with arguments such as diet, general 
health, good 
parenting, solving emotional and relational problems and even 
horoscopes. The 
penetration of this medical discourse is evident in everyday 
interaction, where talk 
about health in pseudo-medical terms is very common, such as in 
the very common 
case of an adult man meeting a friend and asking 
how he is and being answered -1 am 
ok, but I have the usual problems with BP 
[blood pressure], I should do some 
exercise' or people talking about the cholesterol content of some of 
their favourite 
traditional foodstuffs. 
This medical discourse can be compared with the 
discourse of health, 
communicating ideas of physically strong and morally sound 
bodies, constituted. 
according to Foster (2002) by the imagery and exhortations 
of commercial 
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advertising. This discourse, which involves the idea of athletic, medically sound and 
morally acceptable bodies, invokes according to Foster, the dominant themes of 
Western individualism, considering the person to correspond to the body and to be the 
individuated and discrete locus of autonomous agency (2002: 88). In one of the 
adverts that Foster cites as an example, the image presented power as allowing 
individuals at the same time to make their body more self-controlled and in control of 
the world as well as allowing them to choose what to incorporate by choosing what 
products to buy (2002: 95). 
This modernity, however, is not sweeping all the discursive space, but rather is 
confronted with ambiguity and a bifocal approach: on the one hand an inward-looking 
perspective, looking at locality and local values and practices, on the other an 
outward-looking one, looking at the world as a global place. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the Kadazan have a strongly negative 
attitude towards development and other forms of state propaganda, as well as more 
generally towards Malay products. This negative attitude is derived from a strong 
resentment towards Muslim-Malay domination and what is Perceived to be a 
colonisation of Sabah by the Peninsula, as well as from the feeling of being second- 
class citizens, not enjoying the benefits that official Propaganda and policies attribute 
to the native population. This attitude also informs the reading of the news, in which 
Kadazan individuals tend to demonstrate a critical stance towards the government and 
the world of politics. The essentialist discourse of nationhood widely present in the 
press is therefore generally contrasted through an equally essentialist discourse of 
ethnic and local belonging. 
The reaction to news and other media products is also informed 
by a local 
ýrelevance structure I (Thompson, 1995) stressing the importance of 
lived experience 
and therefore leading to the rejection of Malay dramas on the 
basis of their lack of fit 
with it. The reading of the news is similarly influenced 
by a stress on personal 
experience (Madianou, 2005) whenever its application 
is feasible. 
On the other hand, even while rejecting the discourse of the nation, 
the Kadazan do 
so within the national frame of reference (see Foster, 
2002), not having an alternative 
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one. as exemplified by the reaction to the alleged discrimination within Akademi 
Fanttisia. This national frame of reference is not simply discursive, but, as argued by 
Postill, depends on the fact that Malaysia has come to be, in most regards, "an 
integrated system of cultural institutions and practices' (2006: 15). 
One of the most essential features of this system is the ethnic discourse, which is 
shaping the relationships within it in a way that has allowed Malaysia to be a stable 
and relatively successful state, but also determining the continuous relevance, 
especially in the case of minorities that feel marginalised, of ethnic belonging for 
individuals' sense of identity. 
Finally, the direct contact with global culture and consumerism seems to offer a 
possibility to bypass state control on culture and therefore to enjoy a greater cultural 
and identity freedom, a prospect that seems attractive to the Kadazan, but whose 
results are still largely unknown. 
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Chapter 5 
The constitution of village belonging through leisure 
sociality 
This chapter analyses the way in which a powerful form of identification 
alternative to the national and the ethnic onesý that of belonging to a village 
(kampung), emerges out of the continuous interaction between residents taking place 
during their non-working time. While the previous chapter looked at the way in which 
the villagers of Kituau situate themselves, consciously or unconsciously, as members 
of collective categories in response to the discourses circulated by various media, the 
present one looks at the way in which they do so through their understanding of a set 
of practices in which they are involved in their leisure time. In order to understand the 
way in which a sense of belonging emerges out of practices, I apply the notion of 
ý-community of practice', defined by Wenger as a group 'created over time by the 
sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise' and defined by the leaming derived from 
engagement with each other, which results in the development of shared practices 
(1998: 45). The belonging to this community, deriving from engagement in practice, 
is substantially different from that associated with the nation and the ethnic group, 
which depends on imagination and alignment. My argument is that the sense of 
belonging derived from such practices is significant to the villagers as it allows for a 
higher degree of participation and ownership of meaning than the belonging to the 
nation or ethnic group. 
While the sense of belonging to the village is generated through engagement in 
practice, the meaning attributed to it is informed by a local discourse, recurrent in my 
informants' expression of their views on the village and its members. This local 
discourse identifies the village as the centre and archetype of rural life, and as being 
characterised by different economic and social relationships than those of towns. 
This 
discourse, which I should call ýkampungism' for want of a better term, 
declares the 
kampung as autonomous, ignoring its integration within the regional, national and 
global economic and political system. Kampungism contrasts an alleged sense of 
closeness and sharing characterising the village with the 
individualism and social 
fragmentation of the city. 
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This discourse has its origin in a dominant national, 'official' discourse about the 
kwii1ning, appearing in urban-dominated media, opposing the village to the city and 
presenting it as the locus of authenticity, especially for Malays (Thompson, 2002). 
The Kadazan 'nationalists' have also appropriated this discourse by associating the 
kampung with authentic Kadazan-ness, as is evident from the stress put by the early 
Kadazan media, especially radio, on the rural origin of the Kadazan culture they re- 
elaborated and broadcast (see chapter 3). Therefore, while the meaning of the sense of 
belonging to the kampung is created through an engagement in practice over which 
Kadazan villagers exert a high degree of control, its meaning is negotiated with the 
dominant discourses and relationships of power forming the Malaysian 'economy of 
meaning'(Wenger, 1998: 198-200). 
Kituau as a community of practice 
Wenger (1998) considers the main defining feature of a community of practice to 
be what he calls 'mutual engagement', being engaged in actions whose meanings are 
negotiated between members. Together with mutual engagement, he presents other 
two dimension that are essential in constituting a community of practice: 'a joint 
enterprise', its raison d'etre, defined in the very process of being pursued, and a 
'shared repertoire', a set of 'routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, 
gestures, symbols, genres, actions, or concepts that the community has produced or 
adopted in the course of its existence,, and which have become part of its practice' 
(1998: 83). The notion of community used by Wenger refers specifically to groups 
that 'arise out of engagement in practice and not out of an idealized view of what a 
community should be like', and it does not have connotations of mutual support or 
peaceful coexistence (1998: 76-77). 
One of the strengths of the notion of community of practice is that it offers the 
possibility to define the unit of analysis in terms of what people 
do and the meaning 
they attribute to what they do rather than on fixed criteria of 
belonging. In the case I 
am considering, the community can be considered to 
include a subset of the village 
residents,, which however constitutes the majority of the 
inhabitants, comprising those 
actively involved in the social life of the 
kampung. This understanding of the 
community of practice shows a significant correspondence with a 
folk notion 
expressed by some of my informants, who happened to be among those most involved 
in village sociality, attributing 'full' membership in the kampung only to those who 
demonstrated an active participation in the life of the village and a concern about its 
affairs. This folk notion of membership in the kampung was reflected in the scornful 
attitude demonstrated towards those not participating in other families' celebrations or 
simply not buying a round of drinks when it was their turn. An extreme example was 
offered by the case of a family whose members, because they never attended the 
celebrations of other villagers, became in fact excluded from the community, a fact 
that resulted in their having to hire people to participate in the funeral of one of them. 
In spatial terms, the great majority of the members of the community of practice 
live within the geographic boundaries of the village. The practices in which they are 
involved also take place mostly in Kituau, but also in nearby villages, where residents 
of Kituau visit friends or relatives or attend their celebrations,, and in Donggonggon, 
where they go to the local market (tamu) or to the shops or supermarket, to the kedai 
kopi (coffee shop) or restaurant or, in rare cases, to one of the pubs or karaoke bars. 
With the notable exclusion of those commuting daily to Kota Kinabalu for work, the 
horizon of most villagers is mostly limited to the Penampang district, where the 
majority of their relatives and friends live and where they are able to carry out the 
majority of tasks necessary for everyday life. Many villagers also tend to express an 
aversion towards going to the capital, often adducing the reason that it is too busy and 
hot 22 there. A relevant yet extreme example of such attitude towards the city is given 
by Denis' mother, an elderly woman who has never been to Kota Kinabalu and told 
me she saw no need to go there, 'To find what? Heat, noise and too many people'. 
In the next section, I develop the frame of analysis based on the concept of 
community of practice through the examination of specific leisure social practices 
I 
have observed during my stay in KItuau. The cases I am presenting include 
the 
occasional informal meetings of groups of friends - especially those of a group of 
adult males frequently meeting at the house of my 
host - prayer sessions carried out at 
people's houses during Lent and classes of 
Kadazan traditional dance held for 
children in preparation for the annual Harvest 
Festival. Moreover, I also consider the 
22 While I heard the Malay term (panas) being most often used in this case, it is 
interesting to note that 
the Kadazan term for hot (ahasu) traditionally also carried the connotation of 
'spiritually hot', a notion 
referring to a negative state often caused 
by the breach of adat that needed to be redressed by 
appropriate offerings to the spirits. 
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organisation of special one-off events such celebrations for life-cycle events of some 
village resident and 90tong-royong. The gotong-royong (a Malay expression common 
in popular and official use in Malaysia and Indonesia, see Bowen, 1986) is a 
communal work occasionally 23 carried out by villagers for the maintenance of the 
local infrastructure, such as roads or bridges, or to clean rubbish from the area. The 
life-cycle events include the 'full moon birthday' - held around the reaching of a 
month of age of a newborn baby and corresponding, in Kadazan tradition, with the 
first cutting of the child's hair - engagements, weddings, funerals and anniversaries of 
death, house-warmings and birthdays. Considering the number of people each 
individual is connected with through ties of kinship and friendship, everyone will 
have an invitation to a party or celebration on most weekends, and at times more than 
one on the same day. 
Mutual engagement 
The community of practice constituted by the engagement of residents in village 
leisure is sustained by a great investment of free time, money and other resources by 
most of the villagers, which can be considered as one of the main elements of mutual 
engagement Wenger refers to as 'work of community maintenance' (1998: 74-75). 
This is particularly the case for what concerns the organisation of feasts to celebrate 
life-cycle events, which constitutes a considerable economic and organisational 
burden for the families holding them, with an expenditure that goes from as little as 
100 ringgit 24 for a simple birthday to several thousands for a big wedding or 
engagement. Guests are expected, if they can, to contribute some money to the 
expenses for holding bigger celebrations such as weddings and funerals. These are 
given in the form of angpau 25, an envelope with some cash, the amount of which 
depends on the relationship linking the guest to the host and to the economic means of 
the former. In line with the folk notion of membership I have outlined before, my 
informants put the emphasis on the social duty of participating in celebrations rather 
23 During the period of my stay in the village I participated in two such occasions, 
both taking place on 
a Saturday, once to repair a damaged wooden bridge over the river, once to 
free the main road from 
over-grown vegetation 
24 Corresponding to about 15 pounds at the time of my fieldwork, butcorresponding to 
100 pounds if 
compared to the cost of life in Malaysia 
25 The term, and the use of giving money in a closed envelope, usually red in colour, is 
borrowed from 
the Chinese tradition 
113 
than on contributing economically and stressed the freedom of participants in giving 
the amount they wanted and could afford. 
The importance and character of present-day Kadazan village sociality show 
important continuities with the tradition of the Dusunic peoples, which involved a 
great number of religious and life-cycle celebrations (Evans, 1990 [1922], 1953; 
Rutter, 1985 [1929]; Glyn-Jones, 1953; Phelan, 2001). 
Another important form of investment in the community is the offering of free 
labour in the case of gotong-royong, which usually ends with a small feast, in which 
drinks and food are sponsored by the participants but also by those who have not 
taken part, who are asked to contribute at least financially, a contribution that is 
usually also requested from drivers passing by the road or the bridge where the work 
has been done. On other occasions, also referred to by the term gotong-royong or the 
Kadazan mitatabang ('working together'), village residents offer their free help to a 
single family for some work requiring a great amount of labour. On one such occasion 
in which I participated, about twenty village men offered their help to build a cement 
platform on the back of a house so that the owners could have some extra space where 
to welcome the guests during the forthcoming wedding of a family member. The 
family benefiting from the work fed the members of the gotong-royong party and 
offered drinks and more food at the end of it. The remark made by one of the 
participants, who said that, considering the amount of money spent on food and drinks 
- including expensive whisky - by the host family, it would have been cheaper for 
them to hire some Filipino workers, shows how 'community maintenance' can be an 
end in itself as well as a pleasurable and rewarding activity (see below). 
The work of community maintenance does not only take the form of special 
occasions such as feasts and gotong-royong, but also takes place in the frequent 
visiting of villagers, on their own or in groups, to other villagers, and in the facility 
with which the gathering of one or two friends in a house grows into a small party 
with the joining of others. 
Friendship is one of the main relationships at the basis of the community of 
practice I am considering, the other being kinship and neighbourhood. 
These ties 
between people at the same time give rise to the community of practice and are 
reinforced through it. As the members of the community of practice interact 
frequently, and are in many cases related to some extent, they can mostly 
be 
considered as connected by what Granovetter 
(1973) called 'strong ties'. that is 
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characterised by a relatively great arnount of time spent together, emotional intensity, 
mutual confiding and reciprocal services. The predominance of social interaction 
between people linked by strong ties gives a substantial basis to the contrast between 
village and urban areas made by the kampungist discourse, differentiating the village 
social forms from those prevalent in the urban environment and in the workplace, 
which arguably include a higher proportion of weak ties. 
Another essential character of communities of practice considered by Wenger is 
that their existence does not entail homogeneity, but rather that differences as well as 
similarities can be created through mutual engagement, and each participant has a 
unique place and identity within them (1998: 75-76). The unique place and identity 
allowed to its participants is an element that is stressed by the villagers of Kituau, who 
often make reference to the unique character and personality of individuals, their 
ýstyle' as Jaunis calls it. This 'style' usually corresponds to typical patterns of 
behaviour or speech, such as that of Sarapine, called the 'loudspeaker' for obvious 
reasons, or Kenneth, known for his silence, or Jivolin, named 'the starring' for his 
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Figure 8 One of the numerous drinking sessions of my main informants, having a few 
cold beers and eating piisas in the table outside the house. At the bottom of the picture a 
mobile phone: an essential tool in contacting people to join the session, as well as to keep 
track of the time. 
frequent attempts to take centre stage, which leads him sometimes in the situation of 
starting a fight with people who are physically much bigger and stronger than him. 
The fact that the community of practice is not homogeneous is aptly shown by the 
remarks of a Kadazan man in his fifties, George, who, in the course of an interview, 
talked about what he feels to be one of the main divisions in the village, age. He 
expressed these differences in terms of a local discourse I have encountered other 
times in the village, that of the 'generation gap, distinguishing between a senior 
generation, used to the traditional life and to practise agriculture, and a junior one, 
grown up in when life had already become 'easy' (senang). This is how he expressed 
the concept: 
George: 'In this village there are two different groups, one is the senior citizens, that is 
all of us here, the other is the junior. The youth are different from the senior citizens. 
Fausto: 'Can they mix together? ' 
George: 'They can be mixed, but the attitude is different. When there is a gathering all 
mix,, but for what concerns the development of the village they are far different. ' 
Fausto: 'Why? ' 
George: 'Because of many changes in the world... Too much TV and they forgot 
manual work, planting paddy, tapping rubber'. 
Joint enterprise 
Kituau residents share the joint enterprise, 'defined by participants in the very 
process of pursuing it' as a 'negotiated response to their situation' (Wenger, 1998: 
77), of making their lives better under the conditions in which they live. This involves 
enjoying themselves in their free time while establishing meaningful and satisfying 
relationship with other villagers. Reaching these goals gives to the members of the 
community of practice a sense of fulfilment based on a feeling of belonging and of 
being rooted in a familiar environment that complements other fulfilments they might 
derive from other practices and aspect of their lives such as working. 
This 
corresponds to what Warde (2005: 142-43) defines as the 'internal rewards' of a 
practice, in which the fulfilment is derived directly 
from the practice. On the other 
hand,, Warde (2005: 142-43) argues, practices also provide external rewards, 
consisting in the prestige, economic advantage or access to privileged social networks 
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enjoyed by the practitioners. In the case of Kituau residents, the establishment of 
relationships involving collaboration and mutual help, providing a useful form of 
local welfare, can be considered as an 'external reward' of sociality practices. 
Examples of this form of help are provided by the contribution of fellow villagers to 
the work and expenses needed to organise celebrations and to do some works on each 
other's houses that I have described earlier. 
Another essential enterprise shared by the villagers is that of maintaining what 
they perceive to be their tradition, such as language, religion, some aspects of adat 
and,, more generally their 'way of life'. An example of the efforts to maintain such 
traditions is constituted by the teaching of sumazau to school-age boys and girls. 
Sumazau is the traditional Kadazan dance, formerly used in shamanic rituals 
connected with traditional religion and with successful return from head-hunting, 
which has become an iconic marker of the Kadazan, of which they are very proud and 
for which they are renowned all over Sabah. Boys and girls participated in practice 
sessions held in the dewan raya -a wooden structure standing in the middle of every 
Malaysian village which is used for any type of village-level meeting or celebration - 
and were taught the right steps by a local schoolteacher, Benson, who regularly 
devotes some of his free time to the activity. These sessions took place, in the year in 
which I was in Kituau,, almost every afternoon for about three months in the period 
before Harvest Festival, preparing the boys and girls to perform in dancing 
competitions and other events taking place in the festive period. 
Learning the beautiful eagle-like an-n movements and characteristic foot play and 
war cry characterising the dance constitutes a significant example of the constitution 
of ethnicity through primary socialisation (Jenkins, 2008). The form of learning 
Kadazan-ness constituted by learning sumazau corresponds to the locus classicus of 
acquisition of habitus considered by Bourdieu, constituting a 'structural 
apprenticeship which leads to the em-bodying of the structures of the world'(1977: 
89), inscribing Kadazan-ness in the children's body. As argued by Bentley (1987) and 
Jenkins (2008), in their development of Bourdieu's (1977) ideas, primary socialisation 
is essential not only to the development of categorisation, 
but also to a sense of self- 
identity that takes the form of a deep sense of belonging and oneness with those 
sharing similar early life experiences. In this case, the children 
learn physically, 
through their bodies, to be Kadazan by moving as Kadazan, 
by acquiring bodily skills 
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that not only make them able to properly court a suitable Kadazan partner, but also 
unequivocally express their Kadazan IdentIty and distingulsh them from outsiders. 
Another essential element of a community of practice is that the negotiation of a 
joint enterprise determines relations of mutual accountability between its members 
(Wenger, 1998: 81). In the case of Kituau, this mutual accountability takes the form 
of the need to respect the unwritten rules of the community as well as to solve 
conflicts when they arise. This form of mutual accountability can be attributed to the 
Kadazan tradition in which, according to adal, individual actions could result in a 
state of ritual danger for the whole village and in which breaches had to be amended 
with the involvement of the whole community (Harrsion, 1974). Despite the erosion 
of the importance of atlat, some of these principles are still valid in present-day 
Kituau. An instance of their application I could observe during my stay there was 
constituted by the carrying out of a monogit or makan sogit feast, which consisted in 
the slaughtering of a buffalo, as a compensation prescribed by adat from a young man 
who had made a young woman pregnant outside marriage. Following the tradition, the 
buffalo was eaten in a feast held at the house of the aggrieved party at which any 
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Figure 9A group photo of the children practising sumazau on occasion of a district-level 
competition held during the Harvest Festival period. The children wear the traditional 
Kadazan costume, including the sigah headgear and hisad palm leaves bundles for males. 
The girls are wearing the headgear traditionally used by the bobohizan during shamanic 
rituals. 
inhabitant of the village can take part, without the need to be formally invited or to 
contribute to the expenses, which were paid by the family of the offender. The event, 
which was attended by the majority of the villagers, was a significant example of the 
role of festive events in creating social cohesion and allowing for the reconciliation of 
offenders with. the community. This traditional approach to the breach of adat forms 
an important aspect of the way Kadazan individuals are mutually accountable for their 
actions even if all but a few villagers do not - or at least affirm not to - believe in the 
spiritual dangers connected with the breach of odot. 
4 
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Figure 10 Various villagers get involved in 
butchering Of the buffalo for the makan sogif feast 
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Figure 12 Following Kadazan tradition, the possessions of a recently deceased person are burnt 
by the relatives. The occasion involved a syncretic celebration, mixing 
Christian prayers recited 
by the local Christian leader, the village headman, with 'pagan' rituals such as the 
burning of the 
clothes and gong playing at a specific moment when the soul of 
the deceased is believed to be 
leaving the house. 
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Figure II Another stage of the preparations for the makan sogit. 
Shared repertoire 
The villagers of Kituau also form a community of practice by sharing a repertoire 
of 'routines, words, ways of doing things, stories, gestures, symbols, genres, actions' 
produced or adopted by the community and which have become part of its practice 
(Wenger, 1998: 83). This repertoire reflects the history of mutual engagement and 
provides a set of established interpretations, which, however, do not necessarily 
constrain the generation of new meanings. In the case of the kampung, the repertoire 
involves both cultural traditions inherited by its present members and stories and 
understandings generated within their mutual engagement. The two, however, should 
not be seen as completely different, as even traditions dating back to an unidentified 
past and considered part of an ethnic culture are constantly appropriated and 
negotiated, and sometimes changed, by individuals through their engagement in 
practice. 
An essential element of the villagers' shared repertoire is the notion of aramaiti, a 
Dusun word (more commonly used than the Penampang variant alamaiti), deriving 
from the Austronesian root ramai ('rnany'), and which might be translated as 
something like 'being many together', describing a joyful meeting of people. The 
terin expresses both a Kadazan notion of commensality, connected with traditional 
values of equality and hospitality, and the pleasure deriving from it, and the actual 
social gatherings in which it is practised. The social gatherings referred to by the term 
aramaiti often involve the consumption of alcohol, a practice so common in Kadazan 
gatherings that the term is commonly used by all Sabahans to mean something like a 
drinking session or feast. 
A part of the shared repertoire of the kampung community of practice consists of a 
shared taste and understanding of the different value and prestige of different 
practices and products involved in aramaiti. On ordinary occasions, these evaluations 
are mostly limited to the alcoholic beverages being consumed, which are placed on a 
scale that goes from the least prestigious home-made traditional 
drinks, talak 26 and 
lihing 27 
, to 
beer,, to the most prestigious and expensive whisky and cognac. The 
evaluation of festive events, on the other hand, takes place at 
different levels: the 
26 A Kadazan rice liqueur traditionally distilled by all families and still made at 
home by some women 
27 A traditional drink made of fermented rice 
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quantity and type of drinks and food offered, the place at which the celebration is 
held, the presence of a band playing live music or of a competent speaker, and the 
type of decorations used. The inclusion of imported elements offers many more 
possibilities for the display of extravagant, expensive or grand features which, 
however, while bearing witness to the 'modernity' and 'cosmopolitanism' of the host, 
are not necessarily perceived by guests as being of a higher quality. Nevertheless, 
some imported practices have already become established as local traditions, as is the 
case with the serving, along with some Kadazan delicacies such as hinava 28 , of food 
cooked in Chinese style. This mix of local and imported practices and elements also 
distinguishes the Kadazan of the Penampang plains from other Dusunic peoples of the 
interior, where, as I could observe on one occasion in which I attended a wedding, 
feasts tend to be more simple and traditional. This comparison between Penampang is 
also expressed by the Kadazan themselves, who consider their celebrations as being 
more 'modem% while a person from the interior confirmed this view telling me that 
their celebrations are more traditional, while the people of Penampang are very 
'sophisticated', to the point that at times they can become 'arrogant'. While the 
association of a different value and prestige to different products and practices 
according to widely shared 'taste' can be considered as an incipient form of 
'distinction' (Bourdieu, 1984), the prestige deriving from the offering of highly 
evaluated products and practices by a host is only limited to the event, and does not 
build into a higher status or associate with a class. For the Kadazan, as for the Muria 
Gonds, a tribal society of India described by Gell, 'social feasting and drinking is not 
undertaken in a competitive spirit, in order to demonstrate superiority along the lines 
of Melanesian ceremonial exchange, but is intended to demonstrate commitment to 
the village and to [ethnic] values' (1986: 119). This fact can be attributed to the 
enduring of the Kadazan egalitarian ethos as well as to the 
fact that, with a few 
notable exceptions, there are no important class differences 
between the residents of 
Kituau. 
28 A Kadazan dish made of pieces of raw fish marinated in lemon and characterised 
by the sour taste of 
the seeds of bambangan, a local fruit similar to mango 
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Boundary 
Another essential characteristic of communities of practice is that, differently from 
communities generated through imagination or alignment, they are bounded. The fact 
that they are bounded, however, does not mean they can be considered in isolation, 
but, on the contrary, they can be understood only in relation to other communities 
formed by other practices (Wenger, 1998: 103). 
Despite the fact that the boundaries of the community of practice I am considering 
are not clearly marked, its members seem to have no doubts about who belongs and 
who does not. The most striking aspect of the definition of boundaries is constituted 
by the exclusion of the immigrant population residing within the geographic space of 
the village. These immigrants - either Bugis from Sulawesi, mostly working as rubber 
tappers, or Timur, coming from various islands in South-east Indonesia, mostly 
renting and cultivating vegetable gardens or working as housemaids - number, 
according to unofficial sources, about 200 people, only a handful of whom possess 
regular permits. While they work for Kadazan landlords, the contact with these 
immigrants is kept to the minimum necessary, and they are rarely invited to the 
1 'I) 
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rigure IJ A wedding held in the KDCA Hall. Note the Western-style dresses worn by the bride 
and groom and the special seats arranged for important guests to the left of the married 
couple. 
houses or celebrations of Kadazan villagers. This exclusion was epitomised by Jaunis 
who, when I asked him if any of them spoke Kadazan, told me: 'of course not, we 
Kadazan would never want to teach them our language'. 
The consideration of the boundaries of the communities involves an understanding 
of the space within which it is situated. Its inhabitants associate the village with 
leisure, relaxation, shorts and sarongs, in opposition to the space of the city, 
characterised by work, big buildings, air-conditioning and forinal wear. The two 
environments are differentiated also in terms of leisure: while in the village free time 
is spent in socialising with fellow members of the community, free time in the city 
means ý entertainment',, comprising of practices relatively alien to most adult villagers 
such as going to the cinema or shopping, as well as 'less respectable' activities such 
as going to the karaoke bar. The village space is also a familiar space, which, as 
defined by Edensor, 'forms an unquestioned backdrop to daily tasks, pleasure and 
routine movement',, constituting 'an habitat organised to enable continuity and 
stability, and which is recreated by [.. ] regular existential practices'(2002: 54). Space, 
he argues, is understood and experienced not only cognitively, but also through 
sensual, practical and unreflexive knowledge. Edensor uses the notion of taskscape, 
ýspace to which inhabitants have an everyday practical orientation', not determining 
actions, but allowing a certain range of them and limiting others. Edensor, however, 
argues for expanding the notion of taskscape, which he considers to be useful to allow 
an appreciation of the 'unreflexive constitution of spatial belonging' (2002: 57), with 
the consideration of ways of inhabiting space that are not connected with specific 
tasks, such as relaxing, resting and dwelling in the world. 
An important intersection point is constituted by the only village shop, a kedai 
runcit (grocery shop', a sort of village comer shop), which offers the opportunity to 
consume beer and home-made talak on a few tables placed in the compound or to 
watch television, play snooker or cards at the premises. The shop, called Usang from 
the name of its owner, an enterprising Sino-Kadazan, is the only public space - apart 
from those with special functions such as the school or church - available 
in the 
village. It is a male domain, as women and children generally stay only 
for the short 
time necessary to buy some provisions. The shop is also the non-nal meeting point 
for 
a group of men drinking together there almost every 
day after work, but other groups 
of men, including that of my main infon-nants, also often go there. 
Usang is also the 
main place where the residents meet the immigrants, mostly 
the Bugis living in the 
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huts around the village, who often spend their free time in the shop. The interaction, 
mostly consisting in short discussions or playing cards or snooker together, offers 
some boundary- crossi ng while at the same time reinforcing the boundary, as it is 
rather different from that between the members of the community, and it is limited to 
a 'neutral',, non-domestic space. 
Alcohol consumption, morality and boundaries 
Douglas (1987: 12) argued that alcohol consumption plays an essential role in 
marking the boundaries of personal and group identities and considered it a practice 
of inclusion and exclusion. Along the same line, Wilson thinks that alcohol 
consumption should be understood as 'a historical and contemporary process of 
identity formation, maintenance, reproduction and transformation' (2005: 12). 
Alcohol consumption is an almost ubiquitous element of Kituau residents' 
leisure 
practices, with various alcoholic beverages being drunk 
during the meeting of groups 
of friends, being offered to those visiting one's house, at the end of prayer sessions 
and of gotong-t-oyong as well as, usually in large quantities, 
during the celebrations 
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Figure 14 People playing pool at Usang's shop. Note the Chinese dragon mask hanging on the 
wall, showing the mixing of Kadazan and Chinese cultural elements common among the large 
sino-Kadazan population of Penampang. Also, on the left, is Sabah's flag. 
for life-cycle events. The belonging to the kampung is very much centred around 
forms of sociality that include alcohol consumption as a shared defining practice, 
embodying in the sharing of a drink that of a whole way of life, and making drinks 'a 
medium for constructing the actual world' (Douglas, 1987: 9). Drinking together and 
participating to the expenses for buying alcohol or in the preparation of beverages is 
an essential aspect of showing commitment to the village and its values. 
At a broader level, the production and drinking of alcohol have always constituted 
an aspect of the identity of the Dusunic peoples, confirming the significance of 
drinking and eating practices in defining the uniqueness of regional and ethnic 
character, and the associated identities, remarked upon for places as far from each 
other as Yucatan (Ayora-Diaz and Vargas-Cetina, 2005) and the Basque Country 
(Kasmir, 2005). The Dusunic peoples are characterised by their penchant for drinking 
alcoholic beverages, the unique drinks they produce and drinking practices such as the 
habit to always accompany alcohol with eating pusas, certain types of food. Some 
drinking practices also have a regional character, such as the selling and buying of 
beer according to the sepuluh-tiga (M. 'ten-three') principle, consisting of three cans 
of beer, a 'set',, being sold for 10 ringgits, a very low price made possible by the wide 
availability in Sabah of beer smuggled from the nearby duty-free island of Labuan. 
Alcohol consumption also has traditionally represented an essential element of 
distinction between them and the Muslim/Malay population. This form of distinction 
is even more relevant at present, as the Kadazan live in a Muslim-majority country in 
which by law it is an offence for Muslim citizens, but not for non-Muslims, to drink 
alcohol. Alcohol consumption, therefore, can be considered as embodying and 
materialising the sense of being Kadazan and acting as an identity marker within the 
Malaysian ethnic systems, a marker that is at the same time proudly upheld and 
embarrassingly contained in its excesses within the confines of the ethnic group and 
the village. 
This ambiguous position held by alcohol consumption, between the positive value 
attributed to it within discourses stressing its importance in aramaiti and therefore its 
importance in village and ethnic sociality and identity, and the negative ones that 
consider it as a form of excess and a social ill, is well captured by a conversation 
I 
was involved in during my stay in Kituau: 
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Jaunis was killing some quiet afternoon time sitting at the round, wooden table in the 
covered part in front of his house, having a took at the newspaper, smoking cigarettes and 
chewing pinang when he received a visit by Marcellus. The conversation soon was 
directed to the news reported on the front page of the Daily: a woman had been found 
unconscious near Kobusak, on the main road to Kota Kinabalu, where she had collapsed 
after drinking a large amount of ialak, as described by various witnesses. Jaunis 
commented the fact was again another embarrassing episode for the Kadazan/Dusun 
people; despite the fact that the ethnic origin of the woman is not reported, Penampang'9 
always features in the media for stories that have to do with drunkenness and damages 
deriving from it. Marcellus, who works for the Daily and therefore had more precise 
insider's information, agreed with Jaunis in condemning the episode. Struck by their 
attitude, I asked them how they could judge the case negatively while, being good 
drinkers, they could end up in the same situation. They agreed in replying that getting 
drunk is a behaviour acceptable in the house or in the village or during special occasions, 
but not like that, in the middle of the road in the city in front of everybody. That would not 
be decent behaviour. 
The comments of Jaunis and Marcellus reflect an attitude towards alcohol that 
seemed to be shared by the majority of Kituau residents, approving of its consumption 
while at the same time criticising its excesses. This stance is part of a general 
morality, which extends to other fields such as working ethic, which could be 
considered as part of the Kadazan's ideolect, which Postill (2006) defines as a local 
variant of a dominant ideology propagated by the state. The elements concurring in 
the Kadazan ideolect are, together with the state ideology, their traditional culture and 
ethos,, but also the Catholic modernist ideology deeply embedded in the modern, 
Kadazan culture created since the 1950s. State ideology and Catholic modernism, 
however, share some common elements, one of which is the idea of moderation and 
working hard, seen as ways for the individual to reach success, 
but also as duties to 
the nation and to God. This perspective also shows 
how attitudes towards drinking 
alcohol should be placed within more general conceptions and organisation of 
time, 
and in particular in the division between working time and 
leisure time characterising 
modem societies. Alcohol, as argued by Gusfield 
(1963, cited in Douglas, 1987) 
stands , in 
America as among the Kadazan, in opposition to coffee as a marker of 
29 Penampang, despite being a multi-ethnic district, is widely identified with 
its non-Muslim and 
primarily Kadazan majority 
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shifting from worktime to 'playtime', the occasion on which it is considered 
appropriate to consume it. 
The moral stance deriving from this ideolect is evident in the disapproval and 
ridicule expressed towards those who 'go beyond the limit' and drink instead of going 
to work or spend the majority of their salary on alcohol. This attitude is exemplified 
by the ridiculing of two famous village characters, who spend hours and hours at any 
time of the day drinking at Usang: their stories show how, being 'defeated by the 
drinks', as one of the villagers put it, they lost or risk losing their job, have problems 
with their family and their health. One of them, in particular, after being the first to 
get a diploma in the village, used to be an important civil servant with good prospects, 
but lost his job because he preferred to drink with friends rather than go to work. 
Alcohol consumption is also an object of contention between the modernist, and 
primarily urban, elite, who are ashamed of the habit of consuming great amounts of 
alcohol of many Kadazan and of the fame of drunkards they have traditionally 
attracted, and the, mostly rural, masses, who do not see any reason to be ashamed of 
their habit and in some, more or less explicit, way consider drinking to be an essential 
part of their tradition and culture. 
The issue of alcohol consumption is not limited to local discourses, but it can be 
fully understood only within the wider arena of public morality and reputation at the 
national and state level. The consideration of the national and state arena is implicit 
also in the local arena, as evidenced by the conversation between Jaunis and 
Marcellus. While they implicitly accepted a discourse common around Sabah that 
identifies alcohol consumption as a defining characteristic of the Kadazan, they are 
on, the one hand, proud of this characteristic constituting an identifying character as 
well as an expression of commensality and hospitality and, on the other, very 
concerned about the way in which the reputation of their ethnic group might be spoilt 
by excessive alcohol consumption or other acts that are considered shameful. This 
attitude can be understood through the notion of 'cultural intimacy' developed by 
Herzfeld, a notion that refers to 'the aspects of cultural identity that are considered a 
source of external embarrassment , 
but that nevertheless provide the insiders with the 
assurance of their common sociality' (1996: 3). The effects of this situation are the 
efforts to provide a positive and idealised representation of the group 
that hides the 
negative elements, which are nevertheless forming part of the collective 
identity. ThIs 
effort at managing self-representation of a group takes the 
form, among the Kadazan 
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as among many other groups all over the world, of 'washing one's dirty linen at 
home', attempting to present a public image of people who follow the ideal 
behaviour while accepting deviations from such principles as long as they are not 
exposed outside of the group. As demonstrated by the conversation I have analysed, 
the public arena within which ethnic groups (bangsa) compete for status and prestige 
and to defend their public image is national and, even more sub-national, and is an 
arena that is actively created through the media. 
These considerations have shown that, while a community of practice is formed 
through the mutual engagement of its members, it cannot be considered in isolation 
from other communities of practice and from the larger context in which it is located. 
Moreover, practices cannot be considered in isolation from the discourses through 
which they are attributed meaning, which can be produced by the members of 
communities of practices themselves but also, more often, by powerful institutions 
such as the state. The next section investigates this relationship by looking at the 
discourses informing the understanding of the practices I have described so far, and 
the way in which they contribute to connect them explicitly with fon-ns of collective 
identification. 
Discourses about the kampung 
Thompson (2002) argues that the kampung is the subject of a Malaysia-wide 
hegemonic discourse,, which appears ubiquitously in urban-dominated media, 
primarily the national curriculum and school textbooks, but also television, 
newspapers and popular music (2002: 54, n. 3). Within this discourse, according to 
him, ýýkampung embodies ideas about modernity, tradition, class, ethnicity, morality, 
belonging and anomie'(2002: 54). The discourse circulated by the media presents the 
kampung as '-the residue of an unchanged past, where residents "still" (maslh) engage 
in gotong-royong mutual self-help activities', people are placed outside of consumer 
economy and infrastructures are still lacking (Thompson, 2002: 
57). Applying 
Raymond Williams' notion of 'structure of feeling', 'a particular quality of social 
experience and relationship, historically distinct from other particular qualities' 
(1973: 
13 1, cited in Thompson, 2002: 54) Thompson argues that the 
kampung has an 
essential position in a 'structure of feeling' contrasting rural and urban 
Malaysia. 
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Similarly to what Thompson argued for the Malays, the ethnic group most closely 
identified with the kampung and rurality in the national discourse, the Kadazan are 
not just passive recipients of these discourses, but they 'weave those ideas and images 
into their own lives, desires, and interpretations of sub ective experience'(2002: 54). 
In the case of the Kadazan, however,, this is appropriated and used as the foundation 
of the local discourse I have called kampungism. This discourse maintains some of 
those Thompson called 'hegemonic associations', such as that between the kampung 
and security and public surveillance of each other's actions, and distinctions, such as 
the rural-urban one, of the national, official one. Another essential association at the 
basis of both the national and the local discourse is the association between kampung 
and ethnicity (Thompson, 2002), which in this case considers the village as the 
domain of the Kadazan rather than that of the Malays. As argued by Thompson (2002: 
68), the 'spatial' and 'ethnic' discourses reinforce each other, as, paraphrasing what 
he said about the Malays, what makes the Kadazan Kadazan is their residence in the 
kampung, which gets its character by being Kadazan. 
The kampungist discourse circulating among the inhabitants of Kituau appropriates 
the main associations and distinctions of the national one in order to give meaning to 
the practices that I have previously described. It stresses the primacy of the kampung 
as the locus of real belonging and of authentic social ties and contrasts the 
togetherness of the villagers with the individualism of city dwellers. This ruralist, 
conservative discourse denies the suburban state of the village and its 
interconnectedness with the state capital and the wider Malaysian system. In the realm 
of economics, the kampungist ideology tends to conceal the fact that the resources 
necessary for the social practices that materialise the kampung derive from the urban 
environment. The kampung practices are also controlled by the urban economy in the 
fact that they take place in the residual time, leisure time, free from working 
commitments, taking place within a strict temporary regime regulating life through 
the use of clock and calendar time (see Postill, 2006). 
However, while the Kadazan derive their livelihood from participating 
in urban 
cash economy, either in the form of salaried labour or of self-employment or in 
the 
receiving of a pension, their expenditure is mostly limited to 
basic items such as food, 
clothing and household items and bills and petrol, and 
leaves a great amount of 
economic resources to be spent in village sociality, especially 
for sponsoring feasts. 
Again, the Kadazan are similar to the Muria Gonds in the fact that 
for them 
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-production adheres to the premises of one kind of economy, whereas consumption 
[in many cases] continues to be based on the premise of a quite different economy' 
(Gell, 1986: 110),. 
Following the hegemonic association between kampung and ethnicity, the 
inhabitants of Kituau identify Kadazan-ness with kampung way of life. This 
identification was at the very basis of the elaboration of the modem Kadazan identity, 
since, as I have described in chapter 3, the cultural elements through which it was 
formed were collected in rural areas by the intelligentsia and subsequently spread in 
their re-elaborated way to the villagers, who were the target of their diffusion. The 
proponents of this modem culture always emphasised its rural origin as a source of 
authenticity and continuity with the past. This stress on the village also presents an 
actual continuity with Kadazan tradition due to the fact that, as I have described in 
chapter 2, the kampung was the most basic level of ascription for the Dusunic peoples 
as well as the main political and jural unit (Harrison, 1974). The inhabitants of Kituau 
consider their village to be a 'Kadazan village' a conception based on the fact that 
almost all its residents,, and the totality of those forming the community of practice I 
have considerd so far,, are Kadazan and that the village is situated in the 
predominantly Kadazan area of Penampang. This equation of the kampung with 
Kadazan-ness, however involves the exclusion of its foreign inhabitants. In this sense, 
the kampungist ideology, by equating Kadazan-ness with kampung life, regulated by 
adat and by the principles of equality and cooperation, appropriates the structure of 
feeling revolving around the kampung declaring it as belonging to Kadazan-ness, and 
the practices in which it appears and out of which it emerges as being in continuity 
with Kadazan traditions and values. 
Another essential aspect of Kadazan-ness, as perceived by the people of Kituau, is 
its link with Christianity, which, as I have shown in chapter 3, has been established 
since the elaboration of the modern Kadazan culture. Christianity has come to 
constitute an essential rallying point in difficult times as well as an essential form of 
distinction between the Kadazan and the Muslim Sabahans and, even more, the 
Peninsula Malays. Again, the equation between the village and the Christian 
community involves some ideological work leading to the 
forgetting of some intra- 
village differences, namely the presence of three families of 
Muslim villagers. The 
status of these villagers is highly ambiguous as their religion 
in some way, according 
to the hegemonic Malaysian discourse on ethnicity, gives them the possibility to 
be 
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identified and identify themselves as Malay, therefore partially denying their Kadazan 
ethnic origin. Fellow villagers respond to their ambiguous status either by considering 
them as non-members of the kampung, or by allowing them membership by forgetting 
their religion or providing ad hoc justifications for their status, such as that they had 
to convert under certain pressures, as for obtaining a job or a scholarship or a 
promotion, but that 'deep inside', 'in reality' they still are Kadazan. This treatment of 
fellow-villagers can, on the one hand, be attributed to an attempt to construct the 
village as homogeneous, therefore allowing for its identification with Kadazan-ness, 
and, on the other, to the attempt to solve the ambiguities inherent in the Malaysian 
discourse of ethnicity in relation to indigenous peoples of Borneo. 
The kampung and modernity 
The issueof modernity is central to the relationship between the national discourse 
and kampungism, which reflects the ambiguity present in the relationship between the 
Kadazan and the Malaysian state. While, on the one hand, the state rhetoric presents 
its rural population as the repository of traditional values and lifestyle, on the other, 
and this is particularly the case with indigenous peoples of Borneo such as the 
Kadazan, it presents them as needing to modernise and to change their 'mindset'. 
This ambivalent position towards the rural population is expressed in discourses of 
nostalgia on the one hand and development on the other. The Kadazan, on their part, 
aspire to the development and well-being promised by the state, allowing them to 
'walk abreast 'along the path to prosperity" (Postill, 2006: 109), while they wish to 
be able to keep their culture and way of life. Realising that, as argued by Rosaldo 
(2003), in order to become developed, the state asks them to stop being what they are, 
they react, on the one hand, by emphasising their sense of belonging to the kampung 
and, on the other, by proposing an alternative narrative of modernity to the one 
brought forward by the Malaysian government. 
Similarly to Malay villagers (see Thompson, 2002: 57), the residents of Kituau 
consider modernisation mostly in terms of infrastructure, economic 
development and 
change in lifestyle as well as having an international position as a country. 
As told to 
me by various villagers whom I asked about their 
life history, those belonging to the 
senior generation have seen the majority of these changes 
taking place and have 
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experienced them as changing their way of life, in terms of providing them, in most 
cases with some level of formal education, enabling them to carry out manual or 
clerical salaried jobs, progressively replacing rice farming as a source of subsistence. 
They have witnessed the building of the first sealed roads in the rural areas and the 
development of a modern hospital and other infrastructures, as well as the reshaping 
of the rural and urban areas. Their life has been made easier by the diffusion and 
availability of electricity, piped water, telephones, cars, air-conditioning and many 
other technologies. Those who have experienced these changes mostly told me they 
considered them as positive, making life easier and more comfortable. They identified 
most of these changes as having taken place in the post-colonial period, and therefore 
attributed these developments to Malaysia, which they consider the most powerful 
source of modernisation in the recent past and in the present. 
At the same time, however, more than one villager implicitly attributed modernity 
to the influence of orang putih, who initiated all these changes by bringing their 
superior technology and political organisation during the colonial era, and who were 
the first to establish education, infrastructures and Christianity. On the basis of this 
account of modernity alternative to the one promoted by the nation-building 
propaganda, many villages implicitly advocated the possibility of a different form of 
modernity from that promoted by Malaysia, involving development in infrastructure 
and material conditions of life but without the cultural homogenisation and surrender 
of their cultural uniqueness that they see as inherent to the official one. 
Conclusion 
The inhabitants of Kituau invest most of their time, and the money and resources 
they obtain from their work, which mainly takes place in towns, in various 
forms of 
village sociality. The practices constituting this sociality, 
by involving a 'mutual 
engagement', a 'joint enterprise' and a 'shared repertoire', make those taking part 
in 
them a ýcommunity of practice'. This community of practice, which is sustained 
through the constant investment of resources and time, provides various 
forms of 
falfilment to its members as well as the basis for obtaining 
help from each other. This 
community of practice is also a source of identity 
for its members, who often identify 
themselves and their practices as belonging to the kampung. 
This sense of belonging 
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is expressed in an idiom of authenticity and difference from the city that derives from 
a widespread dominant national discourse, but which is appropriated to stress the 
alleged independence of the kampung from the outside world, and especially from the 
very source of the discourse, the state. Through the 'kampungist' discourse and the 
investment in the local sphere, therefore, Kadazan villagers generate and sustain a 
sense of belonging based on participation and that allows them a higher degree of 
ownership of the meaning of their experiences. Mostly unable to participate and make 
their voice heard in the national and international arena, the Kadazan concentrate 
many of their resources and their search for belonging to a level, the local, over which 
they feel they can exert a certain degree of control. 
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Chapter 6 
A Tale of Two Celebrations: the Pesta Kaamatan as a 
site of struggle between the Kadazan and the state 
It was the 3 I't of May. We were covering the few kilometres' distance between the 
kampung and the big KDCA headquarters on the road to the city, riding the old 
Toyota with the windows open, feeling the excitement that grew all around us, for that 
was the great day, the climax of the whole month, possibly of my whole period of 
fieldwork. My host and guide, Jaunis, was keen to show me the great display of the 
Kadazan culture, its dressing itself for the special day, its hospitality at its excessive 
best. I was full of expectations for all that and eager to show a visiting Japanese friend 
the best of my adoptive culture, the thing I had been preparing myself for during the 
past few months, whose build-up I had been able to breathe day by day in the village 
and everywhere else, even in the supen-narkets displaying replicas of stalks of padi, 
baskets filled with agricultural bounties or smiling faces of women in black dresses 
and wearing conical rattan hats. The street was full of cars heading in the same 
direction as us, so, after passing Donggonggon, with its tamu grounds, its van drivers 
sitting in small groups and its coffee shops, Jaunis took a turn out of the main road to 
a secondary one. The street went through the kampung of Peter Mojuntin, the hero of 
the early Kadazan nationalism, the 'golden son of Penampang', tragically killed in the 
plane crash of 1976, where his family house still stands, then all the way through what 
used to be a series of Kadazan villages now engulfed by the urban sprawl to reach the 
last of them, Koidupan, where we parked the car just behind the net which fenced the 
compound of the KDCA. Once inside, past the big gates, we found ourselves in the 
middle of a huge crowd of women, men and children, dressed in all colours and 
fashions, many wearing the black Kadazandusun traditional dress, all walking from 
one side to another, stopping here and there to be taken in a vortex of music, dancing, 
eating and drinking. The whole open space within the fences was filled up with stalls 
selling food and drinks, handicrafts, books or music, stands set up by the sponsor, 
Nestl6, to promote its products, and various stages where different groups performed 
ethnic dances or music. The most animated area was towards the 
front, where 
members of each Kadazandusun group gathered in the replica of their traditional 
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house and there danced, played music drank, chatted and entertained long-time 
friends as well as occasional visitors. 
Meanwhile, in the main hall the highlight of the celebration, organised, as every 
year, by KDCA, had just started. After shortly browsing around the stalls and the 
traditional houses of the different Kadazandusun SZ'IkI130 for a while, we entered the 
hall,, filled to its maximum capacity, where people were gathered to follow a neatly 
organised and timed show, consisting of music, dance, and entertainment and attended 
by the major authorities of Sabah, and conducted by well-rehearsed presenters. 
After following the highlight of the event, the ritual cutting of padi stalks, followed 
by gong beating, officiated by Sabah's Governor, as well as the finals of the Unduk 
Ngadau beauty contest, we quickly moved out of the hall to reach, after another short 
browse around the stalls, the campus of Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS), at the 
other side of the city, where a second celebration, organised by the federal authorities, 
was starting at seven. 
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1 The term used to refer to sub-groups of the Dusunic peoples, Identified by the area they inhabit as 
well as cultural traits such as dialect, traditional costurne, or different adat 
b-Im. 
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Figure 15 The side of KDCA main hall, built in a style re-elaborating traditional architectural 
designs; note the replicas of gongs, one of the symbols of Kadazan-ness, on the walls. 
Introduction 
The annual Harvest Festival celebrations, known as Pesta Kaamatan or simply 
Kaamatan, can be considered as the most important 'celebration and assertion of 
Kadazan-ness' (Loh, 1992: 243), of which it has emerged as 'the most important 
symbol' (Loh, 1992: 247-48). It can also be considered as the most important public 
form of reification of Kadazan identification and,, as such, as a significant site of 
struggle between the Kadazan and the state over the definition of the role that 
Kadazan culture and identity can have within Malaysia. This significance is made 
evident by the analysis of past Kaamatan celebrations, which have constituted an 
essential assertion of Kadazan resistance to the assimilationist direction taken by 
Malaysian nation-building. The importance of these past events is evidenced by their 
permanence in the individual and collective memory of the Dusunic peoples. 
In this chapter, I analyse two Kaamatan celebrations that took place almost 
simultaneously on the 3 I't of May 2006, one organised by the Kadazandusun Cultural 
Association (KDCA) and the other by the Malaysian federal Government. My 
argument is that the two events corresponded to two different positions in regards to 
the definition of Kadazan culture and the role it should play within multi-ethnic 
Malaysia. According to the government projects, the culture of the various ethnic 
groups should enrich the national culture within the limits of 'tolerable difference' 
(Rival, 1997: 138), which means without challenging the nation-building agenda and 
Malay supremacy. The KD leaders, on the other hand, use culture as a rallying point 
for uniting the KD in order to obtain certain political goals. The analysis of the events 
shows how the Kadazan identity making, similarly to the organisation of the public 
events in which it is represented, is deeply embedded in the Malaysian system of 
constitution of ethnic difference and in the political context that makes them 
significant. 
Modem Kaamatan does not only contribute to the constitution of Kadazan 
individuals as Kadazan and as Malaysian citizens, but also as consumers, as 
evidenced by the effort to entice them as a specific class of consumers within 
advertisements elaborated specifically for the period. 
Finally, I will show how Kadazan villagers show a partial rejection of the 
discourses and strategies constituting them as Kadazan, Malaysian citizens and 
137 
consumers and by opposing a notion of lived culture, constituted by tactics (De 
Certau, 1984), to that of an objectified culture. 
The significance of Kaamatan: symbolic, political, historical 
Figure 16 The banner for a Kaamatan sponsorship party organised in April for the 
representatives of Nestle Malaysia, the sponsors of the event. The banner shows some of the 
prominent symbols associated with the event: on the background of a just harvested field, a stalk 
of padi, a traditional basket and conical hat and the most famous KD musical instrument, the 
sompoton. The banner also reports the motto of the Kaamatan 2006, 'Mitatabang Mongomot 
Kovosian'. 'Together Towards a Good Harvest'. 
According to a myth shared, with some variations, among all Dusunic peoples, at 
the beginning of times the human race, created by Supreme Being Kinoingan, 
experienced a great famine. Kinoingan's maiden daughter, Flummodun')], immolated 
herself to provide human beings with food, producing the main staple, rice, together 
with other essential crops such as coconut, tapioca, ginger, maize and yams, through 
different parts of her body. Subsequently, the myth goes, when the human beings 
According to Regis and John Baptist (1996), this version of the myth derives from the 
m is understand i ng, of the figure of Huminodun, who would be another name of 
Suminundu, 
Kinoingan's wife, and not of their dau-, hter 
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harvested the first crop, she was transformed into Unduk Ngadau, a spirit coming out 
of a big jar in which the rice harvested on the first day was placed. Another essential 
element of the myth is the direction given by Huminodun that, before starting the 
harvest, the father should take seven stalks of padi (called toguruon) and tie them to 
one end of a spliced bamboo stick and plant them at the centre of the field) and then 
take them home in the rice storage container after the harvest was completed. The 
seven stalks of padi would represent the spirit of rice, Bambaazon (Bambarayon in 
interior dialects), responsible for bountiful harvests (Gobile, 2006: 105-106). 
This myth had a central role in the traditional belief system of the Dusunic peoples, 
and it was at the basis of a whole set of rituals carried out every year at the time of the 
rice harvest. The most important of these was the magavau ceremony, officiated by 
the bobohizan to recover grains of rice that might have been lost during the harvest or 
left in the field for some reason, carrying the Bambaazon with them and therefore 
causing a scarcity of future crops, (Gobile, 2006: 104). The rituals connected with 
harvest were the most important of the year, and they entailed a good deal of 
celebration and feasting within villages. 
As I have described in chapter 3, the members of the Society of Kadazan decided, 
as part of the creation of a modem Kadazan culture carried out by the Kadazan 
intelligentsia in the 1950s, to hold a unified Harvest Festival for all the Dusunic 
people on the same day, and aimed at obtaining its recognition as an official holiday 
by the British authorities. In 1960, thanks to the efforts of Donald Stephens, they 
obtained the official recognition and organised the first celebration at the level of the 
whole colony. 
The first celebration, which was designed expanding on the model established 
during other native festivities during the 1950s (Hiroyuki, 2002), already included the 
features that have characterised Kaamatan throughout its history: some ritual acts 
connected with rice harvest, such as the cutting of seven padi stalks and the niagavau 
ceremony, and the Unduk Ngadau beauty contest. While these elements are presented 
by the KDCA to bear strong continuity with the traditional celebrations held in 
villages before 1960, Hiroyuki considers them to be mostly a modem invention. He 
describes the Unduk Ngadau as deriving from an interest in beauty pageants 
developed in the mid-1950s, mostly provoked by the visit of a famous Indonesian 
actress and beauty queen (2002: 9-10). The banqueting and merry-making associated 
with modem Kaamatan, on the other hand, would derive 
from another traditional 
139 
ritual, the moginaktar7, which involved great expense and was held on the occasion of 
particularly good harvests, but also for the reconstruction of a house, delivery of a 
baby or recovery from illness (Hiroyuki, 2002: 3). In a similar vein, Regis and John 
Baptist (1996), on the basis of their analysis of the rinait, the sacred verses 
traditionally used by ritual specialists of various Dusunic groups, argue that the myth 
has been romantically developed over the years in order to validate and confer moral 
and symbolic value to the holding of the annual beauty contest for the selection of the 
Unduk Ngadau. 
In its present form, the Harvest Festival consists of a month-long celebration, 
starting at the beginning of May with an official opening, which takes Place every 
year in a different district, and of a dense calendar of village and d1strIct-level events 
orgamsed throughout the month, culminating on the 30"' and 'W', the Tadau Tagazo 
Kocimaon (literally ýgreat day') at KDCA's headquarters. During these days, the 
Hongkod Kohýa. an, KDCA's cultural centre in Penampang, comes to constitute the 
symbolic centre of the celebrations taking place at different times and places 
during 
the month, where the events taking place on a smaller scale are replicated and 
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magnified. The symbolic and ritual centrality of the event inevitably gives it a great 
resonance and symbolic significance, making it the site in which the KDs are 
represented to themselves and to the others. The Festival constitutes an essential 
display of symbolic markers, such as the black-and-gold costume, sumazau dancing, 
gong playing and rice symbolism, that have established themselves within the last 
fifty years (see chapter 3) as essential reifications of people's sense of being Kadazan. 
Considering the fact that the vast majority of KD are at present Christian or 
Muslim, the ritual should be considered as an act with powerful symbolic value rather 
than a religious re-enactment of the myth. The connection with the rice cycle, 
moreover,, has a merely symbolic value for the urban elites organising the event as 
well as for those,, like the inhabitants of Kituau, who do not depend any more on 
fanning for their livelihood. 
Kaamatan between political significance and collective memory 
In his consideration of the significance of Kaamatan, Loh (1992) analysed three 
specific Festivals - the ones of 1960,1976 and 1982 - arguing that they marked 
important turning points in the historical memory of the Kadazans'. He saw the 
importance of the first Harvest Festival in the fact that it provided the Kadazan with a 
sense of being 'in control of Sabah and, of their own destiny', as well as being the first 
time in which the harvest was being celebrated together in the same place and time 
rather than taking place in each locality after each single harvesting (1992: 247). An 
essential element of the first Harvest Festival was its connection with the Catholic 
Church: the celebration was held in the grounds of St. Michael, Penampang, a mission 
primary school, and the first act of the event was a sung mass followed by a 
procession of the Holy Eucharist, which had been postponed from Corpus Christ, to 
coincide with the occasion. The main organisers were Donald Stephens and Fred 
Sinidol, director of Radio Sabah's Dustin Section, who took charge of the musical 
programme , inviting gong players and singers 
usually performing for the radio. The 
party consisted of playing music, dancing sumazau, much eating and tapai 
drinking, a 
beauty contest to elect Miss Penampang, a Native Costume 
Competition for men, a 
football match and a free cinema show. The programme also 
included speeches by 
Stephens as well as the British Chief Secretary and Father Antonissen, the author of 
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the Kadazan-English Dictionary we already encountered in the third chapter 
(Kaamatan Kg. Ramaya 2003 Souvenir Booklet: 28-33). 
Similarly, the 1976 Festival,, held after the electoral defeat of Mustapha (see 
chapter 3), was experienced as a symbol of Kadazan political victory and as the 
occasion in which the importance of the event in Sabah's calendar was re-instated 
(Loh, 1992: 247). The 1982 Kaamatan took place at an even more important turning 
point, determined by the opposition between the KD and the government. In 1981, the 
State government had declared the Harvest Festival a Pesta Rakyat ('People's 
Festival'), transforming it into a celebration for all Sabahans, and taking over the 
sponsorship and organisation of the event. Moreover, the 1982 Pesta coincided with 
the official visit of Malaysia's Head of State, the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong ('King'), 
whose participation in the event determined a shortening of the celebration from two 
to one day, resulting in the elimination of certain rituals carried out by the bobohizan, 
and the enforcement of tight security measures, which prevented participation by 
many ordinary Kadazan from various parts of Sabah. A ceremony of conversion of 
some Kadazan to Islam was also included in the King's programme. To allow for the 
participation of people from all around Sabah and because the usual harvest rituals for 
the year had not been carried out, and interpreting the take over by the state as a 
denial of their identity, the Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA) and the United 
Sabah Dusun Association (USDA) joined forces to organise an alternative Harvest 
Festival. The government strongly opposed the project, refusing to provide any 
funding or to allow the use of government facilities, and ordering party and 
government members to boycott the event, which was also ignored by the media. 
Despite- the absence of government officials, apart from Joseph Pairin Kitingan (KCA 
leader) and Mark Koding (USDA leader), and the goverment opposition, the 
celebration,, held on the 26'h and 27 th of June in an open field on the river near 
Tambunan,, Kitingan's hometown, was a great success, attracting KD and Murut from 
all over Sabah in a powerful show of disaffection with the government 
(Loh, 1992: 
245-46). 
As argued by Loh (1992), the event still holds an important place 
in the individual 
and collective memory of the Kadazan, as exemplified 
by the story told me by 
Augusta, who was in her late teens at the time, who 
described how people of 
Penarnpang attended the celebration in great numbers, covering the 
60 kilometres 
separating them from Tambunan in public transport 
buses that had suspended the 
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regular service for the occasion and been used to carry the party. She remembered 
arguing with her parents who were worried about letting her go, and then getting the 
permission thanks to the intervention of older villagers who promised to look after 
her, she remembered the sense of excitement and of doing something necessary and 
important, the sense of togetherness and of cooperation among all those who 
participated, the sense of security and joy deriving from doing what they thought was 
right and necessary. She told me of a 'perfect organisation' deriving from the 
contribution of everybody, of the generosity of the hosts, of the fond memory of being 
part of such an event. These examples show the extent to which Kaamatan is an 
essential node in the relationship between the Kadazan and the state, as it constitutes 
an essential site of struggle between the two. 
The celebration at KDCA headquarters 
The celebration I attended at KDCA started at 8.45 in the morning with the arrival 
of the most prominent KD politician, Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan, the Chairman of 
the State Level Kaamatan as well as the Deputy Chief Minister, followed by State and 
Federal MPs as well as other local authorities at 9.00, then the Chief Minister of 
Sabah at 9.15, and finally the Governor of Sabah, whose arrival was greeted by the 
national and Sabah anthems. Following the anthems, the event followed with the 
performance of the magavau ritual by KD priestesses from Kota Marudu, the district 
that acted as host for the launching of the month-long celebrations in 2006. The 
Governor then proceeded to close the Festival Month by performing the main ritual, 
involving cutting seven padi stalks, putting them in the tangkob, the traditional rice 
container, and then beating a special gong seven times. This ritual unique to 
Kaamatan was followed by the presentation of a memento to the highest authority, the 
Governor, from the Chairman Kitingan, the singing of Kaamatan songs by a choir, 
then a welcoming address by the host, followed by a speech 
by the Chief Minister. 
After watching a 'dance drama' performed by members of 
local cultural associations, 
representing the myth of Huminodun, the authorities were taken on a 
tour of the 
exhibitions and replicas of traditional houses outside the 
hall, offered lunch, after 
which they left. The event continued with the performance 
by various singers and 
ensembles of musicians, including the performance 
by Atama, a young Kadazan artist 
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blending hip-hop with traditional tunes, whose lyrics mix English with Kadazan and 
express the pride of his ethnic origin while at the same time demonstrating his 
involvement in a cosmopolitan global culture. Finally, the show ended with another 
highlight, possibly the most popular among the public, the finals of the beauty 
pageant, culminating in the nomination of the Unduk Ngadau 2006 among the 
representatives of each district. 
While the highlight of the celebrations went on in the main hall, a series of other 
events took place at different sites within the KDCA compound. Among many stands 
promoting commercial products or local singers, notable was the one organised by 
CASH,, a local consumer's association, collecting signatures for a petition to establish 
a Commission of Enquiry into the problem of illegal immigrants in Sabah, which at 
present is one of the issues most strongly felt by the KDs (cf. chapter 7). Nearby a 
group of bobohizan were showing a video, filmed by the Sabah Museum crew, of a 
traditional religious ritual, trying to raise awareness of Kadazan cultural traditions. 
There was also an outdoor stage on which various bands played traditional tunes, 
including 'Kaamatan anthems' written by famous 'golden age' KD singers and radio 
celebrities such as Claudius Sundang Alex, or a past politician such as James Ongkili. 
A band also played another 'unofficial anthem' calling people to take part in aramaiti. 
Much partying also went on in the traditional houses of the different KD sub-groups 
reconstructed in the KDCA headquarters, run by members of the sub-group 
themselves and showing their costumes, dancing and music, all accompanied by much 
eating and drinking of native drinks such as tapai or talak. As different events were 
taking place at the same time at different sites, each participant could select the ones 
he/she was most interested in and, as a result, have a partially unique experience of 
the day. While the main show taking place in the hall, and especially the Unduk 
Ngadau final, seemed, judging from the number of people gathered inside, the most 
popular, some people chose to spend most of the day together with their village 
friends at the house of their sub-group or just drinking and eating at one of the stalls. 
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Figure 19 A band playing on one of the stages outside of the main 
hall; special seats are placed in 
the front for guests of honour. 
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Figure 18 The celebrations at the House of the Dusun Tindal at the KDCA compound. 
The celebration at UMS 
The campus of Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS), consisting of various faculty 
buildings spread over many hectares of land covered with luxuriant,, well tended 
vegetation, presented all the signs of a major stately event taking place: army 
personnel in high uniform, Malaysian flags, many forms of decoration, major media 
presence and a tight security, all gathered around the Chancellor's Hall, the vast 
domed building at the centre of the campus in which the event would take place. A 
great crowd had gathered at the venue, probably attracted by the panem et circenses 
given by the performance of some of Malaysia's most popular singers, as well as the 
spectacle associated with the presence of the country's highest political authorities 
and the food offered. 
For those who were able to secure a seat within the hall, the show started with the 
entertainment offered by a popular KD comedian, Abu Bakarela, who left the scene at 
the arrival of the important guests: Pairin Kitingan, Sabah's Chief Minister, the 
Federal Minister of Culture, the Prime Minister and the Head of state (Agong). At the 
arrival of the latter, all those present stood up, singing Malaysia's national anthem, 
followed by that of Sabah and by the exclamation 'Malaysia boleh' ('Malaysia can'), 
followed by 'Sabah boleh', both repeated three times and accompanied by the raising 
of the right hand. After everybody returned to their seats, it was the turn for the 
speeches, delivered in Malay, by the Minister of Culture, the Prime Minister and the 
Chief Minister of Sabah,, followed by the great opening officiated by the Agong, 
consisting in the ritual cutting of the padi stalks and beating of the gong. The event 
then followed with the show, in which local dancers interpreted Huminodun's legend, 
accompanied by the famous singers performing various songs. 
Then it was the 
moment of the offering of mementoes to the invited guests, who then proceeded 
to 
leave the venue, while the show went on for more than an 
hour. 
The event was highly mediatised, both in terms of media, such as audio and 
lighting systems, used as part - of the show and in terms of those used 
to relay it to a 
wider public not physically present. The 
latter included reports in the press by 
journalists attending the event, as well as a live television 
broadcast on the public 
channel TVI, and broadcast of highlights 
by the commercial channel TV3. The two 
forms of mediation overlapped in the presence of screens 
distributed around the hall 
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that showed the TV broadcast to the present as it was filmed , in a sort of show of 
hyper-reality. 
Figure 21 The Agmig appears on one of the screens located in the hall while ceremonially 
cutting the seven stalks of padi in a field reconstructed 
indoors, wearing the si, -ah, the 
traditional Kadazan headgear and the common Malay dress for formal occasions, a 
batik shirt. 
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Figure 20 A moment in the theatrical rendition of Huminodun's legend interpreted by a local 
cultural group; the famous Malay singer Siti Nurhaliza can be seen at centre stage wearing the 
traditional Kadazan dress. 
Similarity between the two events: the programme as a 
modular social script 
The Highlight of the KDCA celebration and that held at UMS were similar in 
following a standard protocol for public events well established all over Malaysia, 
taking place according to a strict timetable, featuring competent presenters and 
political authorities, who arrived at the venue in reverse order of importance and were 
welcomed as prescribed by precise protocols, including the singing of the national and 
state anthems, the giving of mementoes and the delivery of speeches. Analysing a 
very similar type of event in the case of a celebration for Gawai Dayak, the 
Sarawakian equivalent to Kaamatan, held at a hotel in Kuching in 2001, Postill (2006: 
173-79) describes the programme, including the arrival and departure of guests, a 
beauty pageant and a midnight count-up to the official start of the Gawai, followed by 
handshakes, as a uniquely Malaysian 'sequence of modular, mostly imported, social 
scripts', which be defines as 'a culturally shared mental schema B or performing 
actions in a structured manner' (2006: 177). Connecting this modularity of public 
events to that of the nation, remarked upon by Anderson (1991), Postill argues the 
former to be an expression of the latter within seemingly banal practices. Central is, 
according to him, the role of clock- and-calendar time (CCT), the basic forin of 
modularity, imported by the West but mediated by the intervention of the Malaysian 
state, on which the programme of public event rests. CCT, according to him, regulates 
not only the programme of public events, but also their position in the annual 
calendar, punctuated by the main holidays, corresponding to national celebrations 
such as Independence Day or the religious holidays of the main ethnic groups. As the 
celebration of Gawai Dayak signifies the status of the Dayak as one of the ethnic 
groups of Malaysia, putting them at symbolic parity with the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians (Postill, 2006: 178), so is arguably for the KD and Kaamatan. While the 
t organisers of both the KDCA and UMS celebration stress this symbolic pari y, 
however, what this parity entails seems to be at the heart of the struggle between the 
Kadazan and the state. 
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Differences between the two events: struggle over the 
political significance 
The event at UMS, differently from that held at KDCA,, belonged to a category of 
Malaysian public events taking place in correspondence with the main annual 
celebrations belonging to the main ethnic groups of the country such as Hari Raya 
Aidiýfitri, the Muslim end of Ramadan, for the Malays, Chinese New Year and 
Deepavali for the Hindu Indians, the rumah terbuka, 'open house'. According to this 
Malaysian institution, supported by the Ministry of National Unity, prominent 
members of the ethnic and religious group that is celebrating a holiday, among which 
is included the Prime Minister during HariRaya, open their house to those who wish 
to participate, offering them food and hospitality. The members of indigenous groups 
of Sabah and Sarawak have started holding 'open houses' only in the last years, and in 
Sabah the rumah terbuka for Kaamatan was organised for the second time by the 
federal government in 2006. In the tradition of the open house, food was offered to 
the participants, and members of all ethnic groups were encouraged to attend. 
Differently from the traditional 'open house', however, the event consisted mostly in 
a show held for the highest federal and state authorities, for the national media and for 
the general public. I 
The spirit of the 'open house', a modem institution elaborated by Malaysia's 
political elites, 
. 
is an expression of one of the principles underlying the central 
government ,s nation building agenda, based on the idea of a country characterised by 
a ýunity in diversity', within which all the diverse ethnic and religious cultures 
contribute some elements to the overall Malaysian culture. This ideology can be 
compared with the four possible strategies that the government could use to create a 
sense of nationhood described by Nagata (1979), and it could be argued that it comes 
closer to that constituted by a pluralistic arrangement in which the main communities 
retain their cultural distinctiveness, as it emphasises the uniqueness of the single 
ethnic and religious cultures, in this case that of the KDs, while fostering 
understanding and appreciation among members of other communities. While this 
principle is undoubtedly at the basis of the institution of the rumah terbuka, another 
principle can be found alongside it, one that was particularly prominent 
in the 
Kaamatan celebration which took place at UMS, that of the creation of a hybrid 
Malaysian culture comprising elements deriving from different ethnic groups. This 
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concept of nation building, expressed by the recent idea of a bangsa Malaysia 
proinoted by the government since the 1990s, is particularly evident in the stress put 
within the event on the blending of various ethnic cultures. The project was expressed 
by the fact that a prominent Malay artist, Siti Nurhaliza, in some way symbolising the 
new, urban Malayness, sang a KID Kaamatan song while wearing the traditional 
black-and-gold KID costume; on the other hand, young KD singers appreciated all 
over Sabah, sang a Malay song characterised by Arabic-inspired tunes and an Indian 
one, and a famous Chinese mouth organ player played his instrument wearing the KD 
costume. 
The climax of the event, taking place before the authorities left the venue, 
however,, consisted of joget, a popular Malay rhythm, which was sung by all the 
artists, a fact that immediately recalls another possible nation building strategy 
described by Nagata (1979), that of assimilation to Malayness. However, I would 
rather read the climax as a sign of the primacy of the Malays within an ambiguous 
nation-building agenda that privileges in certain instances the creation of a hybrid 
Malaysian culture and in others a pluralistic arrangement in which each community 
retains its uniqueness. The message sent by the UMS event to the nation, and 
primarily to the KDs, seems to be that cultural, and even religious, distinctive 
uniqueness is acceptable within Malaysia as long as it remains within the cultural 
sphere and it does not challenge the political and cultural domination of the Malays, 
and therefore does not interfere with the nation-building agenda set by the elites in 
power. The organisation of the rumah terbuka on the same day as the event taking 
place at the KDCA headquarters, moreover with the two events almost temporally 
overlapping and being located at the opposite ends of Kota Kinabalu, seems to be a 
clear sign of the will of the government to take the control symbolically of the 
Kaamatan holiday, and to break the monopoly of the Association over the 
organisation of the event. 
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Participation in the events 
While the vast majority of the Kadazan I knew attended the KDCA celebration, 
only five of them also went to UMS, taking part, as I did, to both events. In the 
following days, back at the village, I asked many of the residents whether they had 
attended either of the two (or both) events and what was the reason for their choice. 
The answers I received consistently conveyed the idea that the event held at UMS had 
nothing to do with Kaamatan and its spirit, and many identified it as an attempt by the 
Federal Government to exert control on the Kaamatan. The pattern of participation to 
the two events seemed to prove the general agreement over these opinions: from what 
I could ascertain, the event at UMS was mostly attended by Muslim natives and 
ethnic Indians and Chinese, who probably did not identify Kaamatan as belonging to 
their tradition, but were more interested in the show. The only positive comment 
about the UMS event was given to me by a woman working in a local cultural 
association and involved in the organisation of the events at both KDCA and UMS. 
She saw the event as a good opportunity for the KDs to express their culture in novel 
and creative ways and to be showcased and appreciated on a national level. She 
particularly appreciated the mix of ethnic cultures exemplified by the fact that a 
Malay, Siti Nurhaliza, wore a Kadazan dress and sang Kadazan songs, a homage to 
her culture that was a source of great pride for her. On the other hand, she criticised 
KDCA for not looking for any innovation and being content with the Unduk Ngadau 
competition and the general merrymaking ending in the usual generalised 
drunkenness. 
The dismissal of the event held at UNIS was based on a political reading of its 
organisation, implicitly acknowledging it as an attempt by the Federal 
Government to 
appropriate the Kaamatan and to control its meaning. 
The general sense of 
disillusionment towards politics informing this reading and the choice not to 
participate, however, is not limited to the political elites ruling 
the country, but also to 
the institutions representing the KDs. While politicians are generally perceived as 
being primarily animated by self-interest, cultural 
institutions such as KDCA are also 
perceived as being used by KD leaders as platforms 
for obtaining support or to further 
their agendas. As a result, ordinary Kadazan oppose 
the monopoly over the definition 
of their identity held by cultural associations such as 
KDCA and the cultural and 
political elites at their top. 
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One of the forms taken by this opposition is that of a discourse of authenticity: 
while many Kadazan rejected the federal - organi sed celebration as being inauthentic. 
the celebrations organised by KDCA were also criticised as not being fully authentic 
and tainted by political and commercial interests alien to the original spirit. This view 
was explicitly expressed by a veteran member of the Kadazan intelligentsia, Herman 
Luping, who, in an article in the Borneo Post (4/6/2006), criticised today's Kaamatan 
as a 'huge commercial venture', arguing that 'we seem to have lost sight of what 
"Tadau Kaamatan" is all about - especially the religious connotation and implication'. 
While he praised the attempt to use the event to create unity among Malaysians, he 
seemed worried about the inclusion of foreign elements, such as some 'western 
dancing' taking place at the Hongkod Koisaan on the 31 st of May, and the loss of the 
'indigenous entity' of the celebration, which he attributes to the fact that Kaamatan 
has now become 'a national event', which exposes it to the risk of becoming 
'Malaysianised'. He contrasted the present condition with that of the past, in which 
the celebration was 'simple and yet full of meaning', expressing a discourse of loss of 
authenticity that is widely shared among ordinary Kadazan. 
Kaamatan as a commercial event 
As with all major holidays of Malaysia, such as Hari Raya, Chinese New Year and 
Independence Day, Kaamatan does not only have an ethnic, religious and political 
valence, but also a commercial one. The fact is evident from the great number of 
advertisements and commercial initiatives associated with the holiday, which can be 
found in newspapers, on billboards, in supermarket lanes and at the venues -of 
Kaamatan celebrations. The most conspicuous example is constituted by Nestle and 
its subsidiary Maggi, the most common household brand of instant 
food, especially 
popular with its instant noodles. These companies acted as official sponsors of all 
events organised by KDCA, including both those at 
district level and the final 
celebration at the Hongkod Koisaan. As a result, the 
headquarters of the Association 
were covered with posters showing cups of 
instant coffee alongside traditional KD 
decorative patterns or the Nescafe logo next to the image of a 
field full of ripe padi 
and of a group of people in traditional 
dress or a young smiling woman wearing the 
Kadazan costume next to Maggi's logo. The brands were also present at 
the venue 
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with stands offering free instant coffee or soup or offering people participation in a 
draw to win a four-wheel -drive Isuzu. Despite Nestle and Maggi having the prIvileged 
places thanks to their sponsorships, other brands were also much present during the 
period through posters found on the streets and in restaurants and pubs, especially 
those producing beer of which the KD are the main consumers in Sabah. Smaller 
companies, such as local supermarket chains and even family-run shops or service 
providers also participated by offering special promotions, organising special displays 
at their premises, or advertising their business in the newspapers while wishing a 
happy Kaamatan. All of these advertisements display some of the main KD ethnic 
markers: people in traditional dress, traditional decorative patterns, ripe fields 
awaiting harvest, stalks of padi, gongs, sompoton, conical hats, traditional baskets. 
Considering Foster's (2002) argument that national communities are also 
constituted as communities of consumers and that advertisements play an essential 
role in the process in Papua New Guinea, it could be asked whether it applies to the 
advertisement and the consuming practices connected with Kaamatan. First of all, it 
must be considered that the Festival does not have national importance, but only a 
state-wide one, as it does not constitute a holiday outside Sabah, where it is not well 
known and is only celebrated by limited communities of KD who migrated from their 
homeland, primarily to Kuala Lumpur. Secondly, even within Sabah, the interest in 
the event, and in all consuming practices connected with it, is mostly limited to the 
KDs, and,, in particular, many Muslim people are naturally not attracted by its staples 
of alcohol and pork consumption, as well as by some of its pagan undertones. Despite 
being celebrated primarily by KDs, Kaamatan is, however at least acknowledged by 
all Sabahans and constitutes a relevant point in all Sabahans' calendar. 
Advertisement, while displaying much of KD's ethnic markers, moreover, is usually 
made in a way that allows it to speak to all Sabahans, and arguably consumption 
practices, be they taking advantage of special offers or spending the two 
days off 
work in some leisure activity, are the ones in which, more than any other, 
Kaamatan 
unites Sabahans. Nevertheless, I would not conclude that consumption practices 
connected with the festivity constitute the KD as a community of consumers 
distinguished and opposed to the nation, as the aspects that mostly constitute a sense 
of community are symbolic and cultural rather than 
linked to consumerism. 
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Lived culture vs. objectified culture 
Many of the people I talked with, in criticising the 'commercialised' celebration 
held at KDCA's main hall contrasted them not only with those of the past, but also 
with those taking place in the houses of the sub-groups in the KDCA compound and 
in the villages. The latter, organised by committees formed by a handful of inhabitants 
of one or more kampung, often including the headman and the JKK chairman,, usually 
take place throughout the whole month of May, constituting an alternative festive 
calendar published in the Kadazan section of the local newspapers. The village 
celebrations, moreover, constitute an essential collective memory of the kampung, 
enriched,, as is the case with other forms of kampung sociality I have described in 
chapter 5, by the sense of sharing with people closely connected by kinship and 
neighbourhood, but also by common concerns and interests, as well as by the unique 
character of the individual participants. The authentic spirit of Kaamatan and of 
Kadazan culture is therefore located within events that are informally organised by the 
participants themselves. 
This position, opposing an ideal 'lived culture', constituted by the 'real' practices 
of 'real' people in 'real' locations, to a display of symbols that have lost their initial 
meaning and acquired political and economic importance, seems to be a radical 
critique not only to the use made of symbols and traditions, but to the whole 
connection between identity and objectified culture. Finding themselves na situation 
in which they feel they have lost control over their objectified culture, which they 
have leamt over the years to understand as identifying them as who they are, ordinary 
Kadazan seem to have responded by rejecting its primary role in the definition of their 
identity, resorting to a folk notion of 'lived culture'. This position is radically 
different from that of those using culture within a nation building agenda (the state), 
as a rallying point to obtain political goals for their group or for themselves 
(the KD 
political leaders), or even celebrating it for its own value, as a sort of artefact 
(intellectuals such as the woman working in the Sabah Museum). 
This position could be interpreted as a forin of what De 
Certeau (1984) calls 
tactics,, a set of popular practices opposed to strategy, distinguished 
by not having a 
place of their own, but rather by applying contingent and one-off 
tricks to obtain their 
results by transforming events into 'occasions'. 
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Conclusion 
The Kaamatan has acquired different significance under different historical 
circumstances, acting as a symbol of ethnic self-consciousness and desire of 
recognition in the 1960s, a rallying point for fighting religious and political 
oppression in the 1970s and early 1980s, a catalyst for a renewed self-consciousness 
and cultural and political revival in the 1980s, a ritual of identity in the 1990s. 
No matter what significance was conferred upon it, the event always acquired and 
realised it through the display of the most powerful Kadazan cultural symbols, 
coming to embody over the years the foremost 'celebration and assertion of Kadazan- 
ness'(Loh, 1992: 247-48). As such, it has become at Present an essential locus of 
struggle for the definition of Kadazan-ness and of its role, primarily, as exemplified 
by the events I have considered, between the nation building agenda of the state and a 
more important and autonomous role implicitly desired by the Kadazan and their 
leaders. The results of this struggle are highly ambiguous as, while there is strong 
evidence to the rejection by the Kadazan of the model of nation brought for-ýNýard by 
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Figuic Y... , nnuren (lancing lor a dancing competition during the district-level Kaamatan 
celebrations taking place at the Dewan Tun Fuad Stephens in Penampang. 
the central government and of the enduring use of Kaamatan as a means to express 
ti-tis resistance, the Kadazan have indeed become part of the nation by becoming 
involved in phenomena such as, among others, the spread of CCT and of 
consumerism which, despite being of foreign origin, assume a uniquely Malaysian 
form controlled by the national elites located at the national centres. The language 
itself in which Kadazan are able to express their resistance is a national one 
materialised by the nation building process. 
Possibly because of the present situation, characterised by the retreat of ordinary 
Kadazan from the realm of politics, or possibly despite it, Kaamatan has also gained, 
or re-gained, a value as symbol of what people feel they really are, detached from an 
objectified culture that can be controlled by the elites and experienced as 'lived 
culture', constituted by the practices and strategies adopted by people 
in their 
everyday life, using a label to define something that goes beyond labels. 
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Chapter 7 
The threatening Other: citizenship rights and anti- state nationalism as reactions to illegal immigration 
18/3 3/2006. A demonstration had been organised at Kampung Maang against the 
government's plan, transpired through trustworthy rumours, to relocate there about 
2,000 squatters (most of whom were allegedly illegal Immigrants) from Sri Tanjungg, 
an area that needed to be cleared to leave space for the expansion of Kota Kinabalu 
airport. Judeth, the friend who had helped me to find a house in which to reside, 
where I bad moved on that same day, had dissuaded me from going to the 
demonstration site, being afraid that my presence might have been noticed by the 
police or some 'special branches' and that the fact could have jeopardised my 
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research, convincing the government that I was involved in political activities or even 
that I wanted to be a new Bruno Manser 32 ,a point about which various authorities had 
already shown some concern. Finally I persuaded her to take me there to have a look 
in the late afternoon, after the end of the demonstration, with the promise that I would 
get off the car only for a minute, just to take some pictures, and that I would try to be 
as discreet as possible. 
The site of the demonstration lies along the main road from Penampang to Papar, just 
about 4 kilometres from Kituau, on the opposite side from the village of Maang. Cars 
were parked on both sides of the road for more than one kilometre, as well as in open 
areas on the roadside and in the compounds of many houses. From the number of cars 
and people standing by the roadside, it was immediately obvious that the 
demonstration had attracted a great number of participants, as probably many had 
already left. As I got out of the car and leant on the demonstration site at the foot of a 
hill, separated by the road from a broad drain crossed by a small bridge, I could see 
people moving around, and notably quite a few veiled women among them, gathering 
in small groups, talking, standing by banners fixed to the ground and displaying 
protest messages in Malay, policemen making sure that everything went according to 
plans and j ournalists filming the scene. 
The main aim of the demonstration, organised by the Kampung Maang Action 
Committee,, was to appeal to the State Government to choose a different site for 
relocating the squatters, as well as to collect signatures for a petition to be submitted 
to the Prime Minister in case the State Government refused to reconsider the plan. 
As I learned from the newspaper the next day, the demonstration was attended by 
around 5,000 people coming not only from Penampang but from all districts of Sabah, 
as well as the State Assemblyman and Federal MP for the local constituency, the 
leaders of two KD-majority parties members of the ruling coalition and Sabah's 
deputy chief and chief of two opposition parties. Among the participants was also 
Atama, a Kadazan rapper famous for his supporting of the cause of KDs, who played, 
together with some youths from Maang, at the end of the demonstration. A journalist 
remarked that the demonstration had been 'probably the first' time in Sabah's 
history 
a Chief Minister 'face[d] public protest over [.. ] an "unpopular" government 
decisioný 
(Daily Express, 19/3/2006). 
32 Bruno Manser was a Swiss shepherd who organised groups of nomadic Penan of Sarawak into 
protesting against logging into their territory. 
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demand the rights of the 'original people" 
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Figure 23 One of the demonstration banners, saying (in Malay): 'an invitation to fight together to 
Figure 24 People at the site atter the eno of tne aemonstratimi. 
Introduction 
The demonstration which I described at the start of the chapter was significant in 
representing the most dramatic expression of the fears of the Kadazan living in 
Penampang about the manifestation at their very doorstep of one of the most serious 
problems affecting Sabah, illegal immigration. Immigration is a phenomenon that has 
reached great proportions, to the point that almost one third of the population of 
Sabah is considered to be of foreign origin (Sadiq, 2005), and it is widely connected,, 
and almost equated, with criminality in the press and in public opinion. 
Following Hall et al. (1978), this chapter is considering crime as an idea of the 
reverse of a normal 'way of life', the analysis of which can facilitate the 
understanding of what it is perceived to subvert the normal order of society and the 
'images of society' at the basis of widely shared and mostly unquestioned ideas of 
what the defining features of a society are. The immigrants are perceived primarily as 
a threat to values corresponding to 'images of society' such as that of work, 
respectability and the family, and the reaction involves the summoning of law, which 
becomes the only institutional and powerful force which can maintain the conditions 
of a certain 'way of life', becoming a powerful mobiliser against crime, the 'evil' 
which is the reverse of the 'normality' (Hall et al., 1978: 148). 
This perspective brings the issue of immigration within a conception of the state 
based on the principles of popular sovereignty, in which citizens are defined as right- 
bearing individuals and contrasted with non-citizens and based on presupposing the 
identity of the people with the nation and of the nation with the state (Chatterjee, 
2004). Within this perspective, however, the definition of the nation remains at a 
legalistic level, and belonging to the nation is limited to identifying oneself with a 
group of individuals with certain rights and certain duties. This is the way in which 
many Kadazan seem to conceive their being Malaysian. 
In Malaysia, however, as in most post-colonial states of Africa and Asia 
(Chatterjee, 2004), individuals are not simply and not primarily considered as citizens 
equal in all rights, but rather as members of groups with unique characteristics and 
often a unique identity that need to be governed through adequate 
techniques of 
governmentality. This principle situates the Kadazan within 
two categories, that of 
bumiputera, comprising all indigenous peoples of Malaysia, and that of 
Kadazandusun. Despite the promise of special rights granted by their 
bumiptitera 
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status,, the Kadazan see themselves being defined as a marginal group by the forms of 
governmentality practised within the Malaysian multi-ethnic system. They react by 
identifying Malaysia and Malaysian-ness with the government on the one hand and 
with the Malays on the other,, and reject both by stressing their cultural and religious 
elements of distinction. 
The Kadazan, therefore, while internalising the definition of citizenship underlying 
the modem state,, reject their marginality by opposing at the same time the 'external 
Other', the immigrant, and the 'internal Other', the forces deten-nining their very 
marginal status, identified with the government and the Malays. This struggle takes 
the form of a defence of what both forms of the Other seem to threaten,, the kampung 
as a physical and ideological expression of Kadazan-ness and of its values and 'ideas 
of society', such as respectability, work, cooperation, solidarity, the family. The 
feared results of the presence of the immigrants and the actions of the government are 
ultimately the alteration of the local ethnic and religious balance and, with it, the 
demise of Kadazan identity and way of life. Finally, the presence of immigrants is one 
of the most significant elements influencing the material conditions of life in Sabah, 
and determining its status of borderland. The experience of these conditions of life, 
which are unique to Sabah, and the consciousness that they are shared throughout the 
State, has determined the development of a Sabahan identity, which has all the 
characteristics of what Kaplan (1999) calls a 'borderland identity', strongly felt 
among individuals belonging to different ethnic and religious groups. This identity is 
upheld through an emphasis on a racial harmony and ability to interact positively that 
is felt to be uniquely Sabahan and contrasted with the racial divisions of the 
Peninsula. This Sabahan identity, while strongly felt on certain occasions, however, 
becomes secondary when more powerful forms of identity, such as the ethnic or 
religious one, come to the fore. 
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The expression of different positions on the relocation in the 
media 
The three protagonists taking part in the events were the people of Maang and the 
surrounding area, the State authorities and KD political leaders. The local people 
identified the Sri Tanjung squatters with illegal immigrants, and therefore considered 
the resettlement as a plan to be fought not only because of its possible direct results, 
but also as a step in the struggle to find a solution to the general problem of illegal 
immigration, of which the Maang issue was perceived as just one manifestation. This 
was the general perception among the people of Maang and of surrounding villages, 
but also, arguably, of the many Sabahans, including KD political leaders, who 
participated in the demonstration or supported the struggle of the people of Maang. 
The political authorities of the State, on the other hand, tried to deny this relationship 
and to minimise the significance of the Maang issue through their statements 
published in the press. The leaders of the KD-majority political parties, finally, while 
not directly opposing or criticising the government, put the emphasis on the 
relationship between the issue and the problem of illegal immigration. 
The position of the local people 
The news about the possible relocation plan was spread from those who first came 
to know about it to their networks of neighbours and friends through word-of-mouth 
and mobile phone text messages, making the issue rapidly known to the whole 
Penampang. The people of Maang and surrounding villages reacted through the 
Kampung Maang Action Committee, who raised awareness about the issue, organised 
the demonstration and expressed their position through public statements. 
Small media such as mobile phones and printed leaflets were essential in 
mobilising people for the demonstration, providing the easiest way to circulate 
information rapidly. Mobile phones provided the fastest and simplest way of 
obtaining participation through text messages, which can easily 
be forwarded and 
create a chain reaching many hundreds of people, carrying contents as simple as the 
one I received from a local friend, just saying, using 
English and standard SMS 
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abbreviations, 'Let's join together 2 stop the immigrants resettlement in Kg. Maang. 
Come to Maang on 18-03 (0,2 pm. Pass this sms 2 all ur friends. Tq'. 
The leaflet prepared to encourage participation to the demonstration, on the other 
hand, while requiring more effort to be printed and circulated, offered the opportunity 
of giving more in-depth information about the issue, supporting the rejection of the 
squatters' relocation by qualifying the area as adat land by virtue of being inhabited 
by the ancestors of the present inhabitants for at least ten generations. Moreover, the 
leaflet identified some serious problems that could have derived from the seizing of 
the land by the government, including the risk of pollution and the disturbance of the 
local ecosystem, including water and the forest, which could result in natural 
disasters, as well as the violation of a sacred Christian site, used for Good Friday's 
Station of the Cross procession (see below). 
The press: outlet for the authorities 
The issue loomed large in the newspapers, the main media dealing regularly with 
sub-national news, with frequent reports, almost daily in April, as exemplified by the 
Daily Express (21/3/06,25/3/06,4/4/06,6/4/06,7/4/06,8/4/06,19/4/06,11/5/06, 
29/6/06,5/7/06,6/7/06,2/8/06,4/8/06,8/8/06,13/8/06,3/9/06,11/10/06,24/11/06, 
16/12/06,10/1/07). The Sabahan press dealt with the issue mostly by publishing 
official statements by public authorities or by a few recognised organisations, while 
statements by the Kampung Maang Action Committee were published only once 
(Daily Express, 16/3/2006). Among the examples of official statements by authorities 
were those by unspecified 'highly placed sources', guaranteeing that the project was 
meant to accommodate only squatters with citizenship status, and that there was no 
reason for the people of Maang to fear the resettlement (Daily Express, 21/3/06), and 
of the former Berjaya-era Chief Minister Salleh Tun Said, who encouraged the KD 
leaders within the ruling coalition to explain the rationale behind the relocation to 
Maang to the people, rather than 'turning it into a racial issue in the media', and stated 
that "This is not a racial issue or Penampang but only involves Kampung 
Maang" 
(Daily Express, 25/3/06). Similarly, the Deputy Chief Minister Chong Kah Kiat 
guaranteed that the Home Ministry would ascertain the authenticity of 
the Sri 
Tanjung's squatters identity cards as well as their real identities, and said the 
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perception had been very strong, 'as if Kampung Maang was invaded, shifting from 
initiai fear of the illegal immigrants in the Sri Tanjung squatter colony. He also 
underlined that the reason for the relocation, the expansion of Kota Kinabalu airport, 
would brings benefits, in terms of economic spin-offs, to everybody in Sabah (Daily 
Express, 6/4/06). The authorities, while denying the connection between the 
relocation of the squatters and the problem of illegal immigration, indirectly 
reinforced people's belief in it through their very emphasis in the denial. 
The middle-ground position taken by leaders of KD parties was exemplified by the 
position of UPKO, taking the occasion to demand on the Federal Government to set 
up a Royal Commission of Enquiry to verify the authenticity of citizenship documents 
awarded to foreigners (Daily Express, 4/4/06). Penampang MP Donald Mojuntin, one 
of the most vocal of KD political leaders, commented on the appointment of Joseph 
Pairin Kitingan - the leader of PBS, KDCA president and Deputy Chief Minister - as 
chainnan for the Selection Committee,, saying that Maang residents were placing high 
hopes on him, as he had been always expressed a strong concern with the issue of 
illegal immigrants. Mojuntin also clarified that the objections of the people had 
nothing to do with race (Daily Express, 6/7/06). Finally, replying to the State 
Secretary's declaration that the Sri Tanjung squatters would be relocated in Kinarut, 
but that the site at Maang would be used for housing other squatters from surrounding 
areas, Dompok said that 'he hoped the State Government will really mean it this time 
when it said it will rid Pulau Gaya 33 of illegal immigrants and demolish their squatter 
homes once and for all. He also said that "Illegal immigrants have no place in this 
country" (Daily Express, 13/8/06). 
33 An island just off Kota Kinabalu which is famous all over 
Sabah for its squatter settlements, mostly 
inhabited by illegal immigrants, and for the high concentration of crime and 
drug dealing 
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Public opinion and ideology 
The association between the immigrants, especially the illegal ones, and crime is 
constant in Sabah's press 34 , to the point that, as remarked by Sadiq (2005: 115, note 
40),, 'local newspapers carry news about illegal immigrants every day. Much of the 
local news reporting is devoted to crimes committed by illegal immigrants'. 
This section analyses the reaction to the issue of illegal immigrants by the Kadazan 
people by applying Hall et al. 's (1978) discussion about 'clusters' of recurrent themes 
and images within public reactions to crime in England. As described by Hall et al. 
(1978: 135), the media reports are preceded by a primary level of opinion formation, 
constituted by the circulation of information, opinions and rumours, 'framed by 
interpretation, shaped by common-sense views and received wisdom', only a small 
portion of which generally find their way into the local press. These local 
communication channels are, however, soon integrated, in a highly selective way, into 
a more public and formal level by the network of the 'mass media', which crystallise 
-public opinion'. Communication and communication networks, then, bring into 
relationship with one another 'the relatively 'separate worlds' of professional and lay 
opinion, of controller and controlled, making events and issues public in the full sense 
and creating public opinion (Hall et al., 1978: 135-136). Moreover, they argue, the 
more an issue becomes public, the more it is possible to find 'a highly structured, 
though by no means complete, or coherent, or internally consistent, set of ideologies 
about crime' (1978: 136). While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse in 
detail the media coverage of immigration and crime, I will limit the discussion to a 
few cases, with the aim of clarifying the themes underlying the reports, without the 
pretension of providing a representative sample. Similarly to what was done by Hall 
et al.,, I will concentrate on letters to newspapers rather than on reports by journalists. 
Hall et al. (1978: 137) consider letters to the editor as a primary example of public 
opinion coming back the opposite way from its non-nal flow, from the 
domain of the 
private and the local into that of public opinion. According to Hall et al., the status of 
34j, ust as an example consider the news reported by the Daily Express on a random 
day (19/8/2006). At 
the centre of page 4 there is an article titled 'Cheating and having a 
fake IC: Man jailed', reporting 
about a man, whose country of origin is not specified, sentenced to 
15 months'jall for the two crimes, 
and ending by reporting, after the common formula 'in another case', that 
two Filipinos were jailed 
after testing positive for Syabu, a locally used type of amphetamine. 
Below is another article titled 
'Immigration offences: 21 jailed', reporting that the foreigners, Indonesians and 
Filipinos, had received 
a three months' jail sentence. 
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crime is central as it 'both touches the material conditions in which life is lived, and is 
appropriated in the ideological representations of that life'(1978: 150), the latter 
involving core 'images of society' - such as those of respectability, work, discipline, 
hierarchy and authority - which constitute the 'unquestioned substratum of truth' and 
the 'source of [.. ] collective emotional force and appeal' of a specific view of society 
(1978: 140). Asa consequence 
This 'complex centrality of crime gives 'crime as a public issue' a powerful 
mobilising force - support can be rallied to a campaign against it, not by presenting it as an abstract issue, but as a tangible force which threatens the complexly balanced stabilities which represent the 'English way of life'. Crime is summoned 
- through this ideology - as the 'evil' which is the reverse of the 'non-nality' of 
'Englishness', and an evil which if left unchecked can rot away the stable order of 
normality' (Hall et al., 1978: 150) 
Many aspects of the discussion of Hall et al. (1978), which deals specifically with 
the English situation (see below), seem directly applicable to the case I am 
considering. Similarly to what was argued by them, the issue of crime, and in 
particular in its association with immigration, seems to be perceived as a threat to a 
whole way of life and to be the opposite of normality, threatening to subvert its order. 
This view is implicit, for example, in a letter sent by a reader, signing as Anti-Crime, 
to the Daily Express Forum 'What The People Say' (10/9/2006), who lamented the 
crimes committed by the illegal immigrants in his area over 12 years, which included 
'breaking into people's houses, stealing, robbing, vandalism, bullying, killing pets and 
other animals,, threatening, beating up the residents, stealing their letters by smashing 
open their mail-boxes, disturbing public peace', which had caused the 'near- 
destruction of the residents' livelihood'. The writer of another letter, Bumiputera 
Tulin (Daily Express, 3/9/2006) similarly accused illegal immigrants of uncivilised 
acts such as 'cultural pollution, VCD peddling on the streets, unruly behaviour, 
pissing and littering in public places'. The acts of these criminals are perceived as the 
reverse of normality, threatening it by constituting an attack on the essential laws and 
conventions regulating it. They are a clear threat to respectability, constituted by 
conformity to established social standards, defining 'upright, decent conduct' (Hall et 
al.!, 1978: 140), to the public image of work, based on what Hall et al. (1978: 141-42) 
call the 'calculus of work', the belief that 'valued things [.. ] are a reward 
for the 
diligent application to long-term productive goals through work', entailing a strong 
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moral condemnation of those getting a livelihood without putting in their efforts or 
giving their contribution. 
The perceived attack made by the immigrants to these principles is stated even 
more explicitly in another letter, published on the same day (10/9/2006), in which the 
author accuses the foreigners of easily finding jobs, differently from the locals who 
are often unemployed, because they can be content with very low salaries, as they are 
not paying for the facilities they enjoy, which they obtain by theft rather than by 
paying taxes. Burniputera Tulin touched on similar points by arguing that illegal 
immigrants commit theft of electricity and water 'while locals have to pay bills' and 
that 'locals in the rural areas miss their chances to pursue higher education because 
many of their places are taken by immigrants' children. 
Another element considered by Hall et al. (1978: 72-73) to be implied in the social 
understanding of crime, that of 'an implied 'rational calculus' about the relation 
between violence and the results gained from its use, is evident in the concerns 
expressed by Anti-Crime, who describes gratuitous acts, such as the stealing of a 
priceless glass bowl by burglars breaking into his house, the breaking of a glass 
window by throwing a stone, the killing and torturing of pets, stealing people's mail 
or causing problems to the customers of a cybercaf6. 
All these acts seem to qualify the immigrants, referred to as 'invaders', as not only 
irreconcilable, but as completely contrary, in the perception of the letter's author as 
well as of many ordinary Sabahans, to the conventions of the decent and respectable 
way of life of the local residents, to which they constitute a dangerous threat. 
The only possible solution to these troubles seem to be constituted by the law, 
which according to Hall et al., is summoned in defence of all the other images of 
society - respectability, work, discipline - 'in the last instance', when people seem 
not able, or willing, to regulate themselves. The law 'can be used as a mobillser when 
it becomes the only institutional and powerful force which can maintain the 
conditions of [the] 'way of life' (1978: 148). 
The recourse to the law, which is called upon within all letters, is, however. 
problematic because of the apparent inability or unwillingness of the authorities to 
solve the issues of illegal immigration. This ambivalent position towards the 
enforcement of law is expressed by Anti-Crime, who states that 'the 
Government has 
talked about getting rid of these "invaders" but nothing more than empty promises', 
adding that 'Sabah is definitely turning into an illegal 
immigrants' destination' rather 
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than, as envisaged by the government and local people, a tourist destination. 
Similarly, the other letter published on the same day, by Kecewa, was titled, again 
mocking a tourist promotion slogan, 'Malaysia truly Asia while Sabah is truly Manila, 
Jakarta", and argued that 'Our Government is cradling other people's babies while its 
own babies are left to the flies', and that 'until now, the problems not only remain 
unsolved but compounded. I haven't seen the faintest positive impact of the supposed 
good measures taken by the Government in all these years'. Burniputera Tulin defined 
that of the leaders as omong kosong ('empty talk'), and described 'the problems 
caused by illegals to us now' as 'not very much different from the war problems faced 
by our ancestors', argued that 'Sabah is being over protective of the immigrants', who 
would be 'holding even Government jobs', that illegal immigrants in detention centres 
'come and go as they wish by escaping'. 
Two of the letters, those of Burniputera Tulin and Kecewa, also directly touch on 
the issue of the relocation of the Sri Tanjung people, the former remarking that the 
problem of whether the squatters were truly locals had not yet been addressed by the 
authorities,, and the latter that the opposition by 'our' rakyat (M. 'people') and leaders 
had been successful in stopping the relocation to Maang, while the people of Kinarut, 
who had supported the Government's decision, had to accept the relocation. 
Hall et al. considered the social images they described as producing and sustaining 
'an uncodified but immensely powerful, conservative sense of Englishness, of an 
English 'way of life', of an 'English' viewpoint which - it also, by its very density of 
reference, asserts - everyone shares to some extent' (1978: 140, emphasis 
in original). 
The question that we should ask now is: what sense of belonging do similar images 
produce and sustain in the case we are considering? 
The rest of the chapter will attempt to answer this question for what concerns the 
Kadazan living in Penampang. Before starting to address this question, however. a 
more general consideration about the size and consequences of the presence of 
immigrants in Sabah, as well as of the agendas connected to it, is required. 
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Immigration in Sabah 
According to the general perception shared by most Sabahans I spoke t03 5, the 
immigrant population has, over the years since the 1970s, come to constitute a 
significant proportion of the State's population. Supporting this perception, an 
international academic, Karnal Sadiq, argues (2005: 108) that 'almost one in every 
three residents of Sabah may be a foreigner', including both illegal immigrants and 
legal workers, questioning the data presented in the 1991 census, which, according to 
him, seriously underestimated the number of foreigners, especially Filipinos. More 
recent official statistics (Malaysia Department of Statistics, 2005, cited in Leete,, 
2007), on the other hand, give the proportion of non-citizens as 24.8 percent of 
Sabah's population. 
Azizah Kassim. (1998, cited in Sadiq, 2005: 107) reports that a former Chief 
Minister estimated the number of foreigners to be between 400,000 and 500,000, 
while the leaders of PBS estimate a figure of one million foreigners out of a 
population of 2.8 million on the basis of the unpublished Transient Population Study 
they carried out in 1988, during the period the party was in power; similar estimates 
are given by Filipino sources (Sadiq, 2005: 108). 
These accounts are notably consistent with the dramatic population growth 
experienced by Sabah since the 1980s, with an annual 5.5 percent against a Malaysian 
average of 2.6 between 1981 and 1991, and of 6.2 compared with the Malaysian 2.7 
between 1991 and 1995,, with a growth rate of almost three times that of other States. 
Comparing Sabah with neighbouring Sarawak, which has similar fertility and death 
rates , it 
is possible to see that, while the latter had a larger population in 1980, the 
estimated population of the two states according to the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1995- 
2000) are of 2.06 million for Sarawak and 3.3. million for Sabah, with about 1.3 
million more people (Kadiq, 2005: 109). 
If these figures are contrasted with the unpublished data from the state immigration 
reported by Azizah Kassim (1998, cited in Sadiq, 2005: 107) of only 
120,719 alien 
workers registered in Sabah in 1997, it is easy to infer that a great proportion of the 
immigrants are illegal. Estimating the number of immigrants, and 
in particular of 
35 See also, for example, the already mentioned letter 
by Kecewa, (Daily Express, 10/9/2006), who 
states that 'Statistics show that 24.82 per cent of 
Sabah's population comprises Filipinos and 
Indonesians. This amounts to 727,647 persons, which is a lot' 
169 
illegals, is further complicated by the fact that many of them become regularised 
through various procedures. These are either legal, such as government programmes, 
marriages with local people, or the granting of refugee status, or illegal, such as the 
use of fake documents. As is common knowledge around Sabah, it is quite easy to 
obtain a fake identity card: while Sadiq (2005: 115) argues they can be obtained for as 
little as 10 ringgits, my local friends told me they knew the price depended on the 
immigrant's origin, but generally could be around 100, and they even jokingly 
encouraged me to get one. 
The ease with which an IC can be obtained partly depends on the fact that the use 
of legal documents is rare or absent among the natives in rural areas, as people do not 
normally need them and might need to travel long distance or go through much hassle 
in order to get them. A good example of the situation is given by the fact, reported by 
the national newspaper The Sun (1999, cited in Sadiq, 2005: 114), that the National 
Registration Department complained that in Sabah over two million people did not 
possess a birth certificate. The result is what Sadiq defines as a 'weakly 
institutionalised citizenship' in Malaysia, and in particular in Sabah, where, because 
of the particular circumstances, 'the state does not insist on the possession of a 
standard document for the exercise of an individual's civil, political, economic, or 
social rights'(2005: 114). While since 1987 a birth certificate is required to obtain a 
Malaysian IC, the Registration Department often needs to acquire information about 
the identity of people from village headmen or other community leaders as the only 
means to provide individuals from remote areas with identity cards, and these 
individuals have sometimes been bribed or misled into helping non-citizens to obtain 
documents. At times illegal immigrants have also obtained Malaysian ICs by 
presenting genuine birth certificates belonging to natives. As reported by the Borneo 
Post (1999, cited in Sadiq, 2005: 116), a former detainee who held a leading role 
in an 
operation to provide ICs to illegal foreigners, confessed that a total of 
130,000 
documents were provided in 1985 alone. 
The fact that the majority of the immigrants are Muslim, and mostly belonging to 
ethnic groups with cultural and physical features that make it easy 
for them to be 
assimilated within the Malays, and that by obtaining 
ICs they directly get the right to 
vote, provides evidence to the fact that they are given citizenship rights 
by various 
means not simply for the economic advantage of 
those involved, but also for a 
political agenda. The fact was 
demonstrated within court cases in which the 
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involvement of senior UMNO members in the falsification of ICs transpired in the 
hearings (Sadiq, 2005: 116). 
As remarked by Sadiq: 
Legalizing illegal immigrants becomes the preferred strategy of the dominant Malay parties when overt Malayization does not proceed quickly enough. The goal 
of the Malays, who dominate the federal government, is to change the demographic and political character of Sabah so that it becomes Malay Muslim- 
dominated, and because of cultural and religious commonalities, these immigrant 
Indonesians and Filipinos can easily be Malayized over time and will support 
Malay-Muslim parties. 
(2005: 116) 
The strategy seems to have been successful, as demonstrated by the defeat of PBS 
in 1995 and the victory of UNINO in the elections held since then. The voting 
immigrants have until now been loyal to UNINO, knowing that their benefits would 
be guaranteed by the ruling party, while, as I was told by some of my Kadazan 
friends, the number of voting Indonesians is so high in certain areas in the East coast 
that they even filed their candidates and got some elected in the State Assembly. 
Being Malaysian: between dissatisfaction with the 
government and the discourse of citizenship 
The main characteristic of immigrants, whether they commit crimes or not, is that 
of not being citizens, and, in the case of illegal ones, their living in Sabah Is already a 
crime. One of the most relevant ideas emerging from the analysis of the letters written 
to the D, aily Express's forum is that people perceive them as benefiting, through 
stealth and theft and sometimes violence, of the services that local, law-abiding 
citizens, are paying for through their work and their contribution through taxes. In this 
perception, the attitudes related to the ideology of work, and the condemnation of the 
'scroungers', 'layabouts', those who get something without 'putting anything into it' 
(Hall et aL, 1978: 142) are equated with a discourse of citizenship. In their outrage 
against the non-citizens who enjoy rights that should by definition 
belong only to 
citizens, the writers of the letters, and the Kadazan I spoke to, who shared the same 
attitude, seem to have completely intemalised the 
discourse of citizenship at the basis 
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of the modern state, and to think of themselves primarily as citizens whose rights are 
being violated. 
Within this perspective, however, Malaysian-ness seems more ajuridical category, 
distinguishing the bearers of certain rights on the basis of criteria defined by the law 
rather than on a 'way of life' that is perceived as being commonly shared. This view 
corresponds to the principle of popular sovereignty, established by the French 
Revolution,, based on presupposing the identity of the people with the nation and of 
the nation with the state, in which the inhabitants of the country are right-bearing 
citizens (Chatterjee, 2004). As is the case in many post-colonial multi-ethnic states 
like Mauritius (Eriksen, 1993: 118), nationalism in Malaysia expresses a polyethnic or 
supraethnic ideology stressing shared civil rights rather than cultural roots. 
These principles are clearly at odds with the fact, discussed in the previous section, 
that the State and Federal governments have actively encouraged and favoured the 
influx of immigrants and their exercise of rights that should in principle be limited to 
citizens, such as voting, and their naturalisation, practically 'preferring non-citizens 
over citizens'(Sadiq, 2005). In light of the general and widespread knowledge of this 
fact, the government is perceived as not fulfilling its defining function, which is that 
of serving the interests of its own citizens. As expressed by Bumiputera Tulin, 'the 
acceptance of immigrants by our past and present leaders as citizens is indication of 
the leaders' disregard of the country's sovereignty' (Daily Express, 3/9/2006). As a 
result, contrary to what could be presupposed from the principles at the basis of 
nationalism,, the rejection of the foreigners in Sabah partly corresponds to a rejection 
of the state system and of its ruling elites, guilty of carrying out their nation 
building 
agenda at the expenses of the citizens of the country. 
While traditional formulations of the state are based on the principle of popular 
sovereignty, the inhabitants of most post-colonial states of 
Asia and Africa, according 
to Chatterjee, would in fact be only tenuously and ambiguously right-bearing citizens 
in the sense imagined by the constitution, and should rather 
be considered as subjects 
of governance, a 'body of knowledge and set of techniques used 
by, or on behalf of, 
those who govern' (2004: 4). This state of things would 
be a consequence of the shift 
from popular sovereignty to governmentality, which 
'operates on a heterogeneous 
social field' in which 'there is no equal and uniform 
exercise of the rights of 
citizenship' (2004: 60), and which 
is based on the division of population into different 
groups and classes to which special practices of governance 
are targeted. While in 
172 
India they took the form of castes and in Africa that of tribes, in South-East Asia these 
classes took the primary form of ethnic groups within the post-colonial state. 
Following this principle, the Kadazan are treated, for the purpose of governance, as 
members of two groups: bumiputera and Kadazandusun. While, as bumiputera, the 
KI)s benefit from special rights granted them by the constitution, in fact they do not 
enjoy them to the same extent as the Malays and the Malayised Muslim bumiputera, 
and, similarly to other non-Muslim indigenous peoples of Sarawak (Boulanger, 2002; 
Postill,, 2006; Chua,, 2007), they consider themselves to be, and affectively are, 
(second-class bumiputera' (Loh, 1992; Sadiq, 2005). 
The contradictions between the principles inherent in the legalistic conception of 
the state, based on the principle of citizenship, and reality are obvious to the KDs,, 
who experience them in their everyday life in the form of political, economic and 
cultural marginality. The contradiction is made even, stronger by the fact that, as 
bumiputera, they are theoretically granted special rights by the constitution. Within 
this condition,, Malaysia becomes identified with the Government, especially with the 
Federal one, and therefore as an external agency, promoting development and 
prosperity primarily for the members of the ruling groups, often leaving behind, when 
not directly going against their interests, indigenous minorities such as the KDs. On 
the basis of this perception, it follows that the KI)s cannot fully identify with 
Malaysia as long as they feel they are a marginalised section of a national community 
that is primarily defined in terms of rights and benefits. On the other hand, by 
rejecting the government and their marginal status within the Malaysian multi-ethnic 
system, the Kadazan do not challenge the system itself, but rather they take it for 
granted, as shown by the fact that the immigrants are primarily challenged on the 
basis of their being non-citizens. 
Moreover, the media rhetoric of 'banal nationalism' (Billig, 1995) has penetrated 
the worldview of people, as demonstrated by the correspondence between the press 
representation of the immigrants as 'the source of all evils' and the discourse of the 
Kadazan about the squatters, implicitly sustaining the imagining of the nation as a 
community of citizens by contrasting them with what they are not, the foreigners, by 
defining the Self through the representation of the archetypal Other. 
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Being Kadazan: between rights and 'way of life' 
The main perspective within which the discourse of citizenship is conjugated in 
ethnic terms is in what Boulanger (2002) defines as the 'numbers game', the idea that 
numbers are necessary to 'have a fair share' of the State and national resources and 
adequate political bargaining power and representation. 
This view, which she found to be prevalent among urban Dayak and Melanau of 
Sarawak, is very common, according to my experience, also among the Kadazan. In 
the light of this perspective should be considered the great concern, widely shared by 
all KD groups, about the decrease of the proportion of the KDs within the State 
population from 42 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century to 32 percent in 
1960ý 29.9 in 1970 and to 19.6 percent by 1990 (Sadiq, 2005: 108), and to 17.5 
percent by 2005 (Malaysia Department of Statistics, cited in Leete, 2007). 
The relevance of this perspective is determined by the domination of the principle 
of governmentality, by which the population is divided into groups with unequal 
access to rights (Chatterjee, 2004) in the Malaysian political system, which, as argued 
by Boulanger (2002: 225), was itself constituted by a great 'numbers game', won by 
the bumiputera. As we have already seen, however, the real winners of the 'numbers 
game' is in fact just a section of the bumiputera, that constituted by the Malays and 
their Muslim allies in Sabah and Sarawak. 
Religion emerges as an essential element of distinction: the upholding of 
Christianity by the majority of the KDs is at the same time a rejection of the 
government's Malayisation agenda and a rallying around what has established itself 
as a central element of identity for a great part of the KDs since its modem 
elaboration in the 1950s, as described in chapter 3. 
Christianity is the element that distinguishes the Kadazan from their 'internal' 
Other: the Malays. The importance of this role played by Christianity is evident from 
countless examples, such as the connection between the Catholic Church and the 
first 
Harvest Festival, the defence of the foreign missionaries and Christianity in general 
during the period of Mustafa rule or the emphasis on Christianity put 
by all KD 
leaders, just to mention a few. Christianity also played an essential role within the 
protest against the relocation of the Sri Tanjung squatters in 
Maang, as one of the 
reasons for the opposition to the resettlement on the site was constituted 
by the fact 
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that it is the site where an important Good Friday procession takes place, in which 
people ascend the hill, stopping at various crosses placed on the ground, performing 
the Stations of the Cross ritual. The procession taking place on the 14t" of April 2006, 
at the height of the public attention over the possible relocation, seemed, despite a 
lack of direct reference. to the issue, an implicit affirmation of the importance of the 
site for the people of Penampang and of the determination to defend what was felt to 
be not only a sacred site, but a symbol of Kadazan-ness in the form of a territory 
inscribed by a 'Kadazan way of life', one main element of which is Christianity. 
Similarly it was the case with the celebration of Kaamatan at the same site, at the 
foothill, on the 10"' of June, an occasion in which the political leaders who were 
presenting made explicit reference to the issue of the relocation in their speeches, 
assuring those present that they were doing everything they could to stop the plan. 
Figure 25 The Good Friday procession going up the Maang 
hill. 
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Fig"re 27 A Kadazan politician dancing Nvith a local girl at the 
Maang Kaamatan celebration 
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Figure 26 The final prayer on the top of the hill. 
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These instances, by mobilising key identity markers, show how the possible 
relocation and more generally the problem of immigration are felt by the Kadazan as 
constituting not only a threat to their interests, but to their 'way of life' and ultimately 
to their very existence qua Kadazan. Kadazan identity, therefore, becomes embodied 
in a narrative of resistance against the forces of the Other - internal (the Malays and 
the government) and external (the immigrants) - by a people who can overcome it by 
holding tight to their traditional values, expressed in the ideology of the kampung I 
have already described: solidarity, cooperation, respect for people and for the 
environment, modesty. This conservative ideology is based on some of the same 
images of society described by Hall et al. (1978) for England: respectability, work, 
discipline, the family. Differently from England, however, this ideology does not 
contemplate an image of hierarchy or of the city, while it strongly upholds those of 
solidarity and of the village. 
Differently from that of England, which is based on the idea of superiority of the 
English over all other nations, based on its imperial past (Hall et al., 1978: 147), the 
image of the Kadazan is based on the perception of a state of inferiority, determined 
by being a relatively peripheral minority within a relatively peripheral country. The 
solution for the Kadazan, as referred to me by a KD leader, is that of 'following the 
example of the Jews', a relatively small population who have been able to reach great 
success thanks to their initiative and the emphasis on culture and learning. 
To conclude, the contradictions inherent in the nation-building agenda and the 
propaganda supporting it, resulting in the attempted Malayisation of the bumiputera 
of Sabah and Sarawak and in the overt damaging of the interests of those not willing 
to become Malayisied in Sabah, constitute the basis of the unwillingness of the 
Kadazan to imagine themselves as members of a national community beyond its 
aspect constituted by the sharing of common rights. Within this situation, then, 
cultural distinctiveness becomes strengthened and becomes the 
basis of an 
oppositional form of identity politics in which, ironically, the sense of 
being 
discriminated against or persecuted becomes an essential element of that same 
distinctiveness. 
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Being Sabahan: a common 'way of life"? 
Hitter says lie feels Sabahan first, then Kadazan, but not much Malaysian. 'Those 
Malaysians' he says 'do not respect our religion and try to make it disappear. Why is it 
that in Indonesia it is legal to marry a Muslim and remain Christian, but not in 
Malaysia? ' 
The primary image of society at the basis of Sabahan-ness is that of tolerance. This 
widespread connection is well expressed by an article published by the Daily Express 
(11/9/2006) within the fortnightly column 'Sabah's Architectural Heritage' by 
Richard Nelson Sokial. The sharing of a unique crossed-braced roof ornamentation in 
the Kota Belud district by three different ethnic groups, the Dusun Tindal, Bajau and 
Iranun, is considered by the young Kadazan architect to be an example of strong 
integration between different ethnic communities and as reflecting 'the spirit of 
mutual respect, harmony and goodwill that is a common aspect of all local 
communities in Sabah'. Further,, he argues Sabahans represent 'the ideal model of 
racial integration for Malaysia'. This principle is well expressed by a contrast with 
other realities dealing with everyday experience: 'where else in Malaysia', Richard 
asks, 'can one see a Malay man having a drink with his Chinese or Kadazan 
counterpart in a Chinese coffee shop? '. Unfortunately, the author argues, 'certain 
negative elements are at play', brought in by those who 'endeavor to stamp their 
authority based on 4 narrow-minded perception of race'. These remarks are directed 
to some people within Sabah but, primarily, to the Other compared with Sabah, the 
Malay Peninsula. In the same article, the difference between Sabah and Semenanjung 
is thrown into relief through the telling of the author's personal experience of being 
the object of prejudices, including views of Sabahans as culturally inferior or even 
(still living on the trees', and discrimination while a student in Kuala Lumpur. 
Moreover, Sabahan graduates would be 'pressured to feel guilty and ashamed for 
interacting so freely with other races', according to principles of seclusion that would 
be common not only to university but also to the working environment in the 
Peninsula. According to the author the situation in Semenanjung, which is in stark 
contrast with the picture presented in the national unity advertising campaigns 
broadcast on television, should be defined as one of 'restrained racial tolerance' rather 
than 'racial integration! ý. 
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This view of Sabah as 'happy island' of racial integration compared with the 
segregation of Semenanjung is a very common topos not only in the discourses of 
Kadazan like the author of the abovementioned article, but also of Sabahans of a 
different ethnic origin. That was the case when some Malay friends of mine, running a 
guesthouse in Kota Kinabalu, reacted with annoyance to the suggestions of a guest 
that they should mix as little as possible with Christian people as that was not 
ýappropriate' for them, and they commented with me that these 'people from 
Semenanjung', especially the Malays, not only cannot understand the openness and 
racial and religious integration of the people of Sabah, but also unfortunately, they try 
to impose their way of doing things on the people of Sabah. 
The discourses of racial integration and of discrimination by the Semenanjung are 
just aspects of a more general idea of a 'Sabahan way of life', defined by characters 
that are uniquely Sabahan and that distinguish Sabahans at the same time from people 
of the Peninsula and from foreigners. This way of life is primarily determined by 
unique conditions of life that determine a certain type of life experience. These 
material conditions are many, but they mainly derive from living in a geographically 
and politically peripheral territory with a few densely populated urban and suburban 
areas and a vast sparsely populated hinterland, with a population divided between 
more than 30 ethnic groups and between two main world religions, Islam and 
Christianity, with an economy still primarily based on the extraction of natural 
resources,, and with a much lower development of infrastructure than in the Peninsula. 
The geographic, economic, ethnic, religious and social conditions of Sabah, as well 
as its history, are therefore the primary elements determining material conditions of 
life that are relatively similar within Sabah and different from those found outside. As 
expressed in a joke, circulated by e-mail among some of my friends, 'you are a 
Sabahan if,, among other thingsý 'have candies always ready at hand in the house', a 
reference to the very erratic electricity supply, 'own a bakakuk', a home-made 
shotgun used to hunt wild animals, conjuring an image of rurality as well as of not 
having problems in 'bending a few rules', such as the fact that a licence be needed to 
own a gun. References to things being done in 'Sabah style', that is informal and 
relaxed yet obtaining the desired result are often heard, as are those made to 'Sabah 
time', a masa gumi, (M. 'rubber time') often found in Malaysia and Indonesia, 
which, as described by Postill (2006: 187), is a practice of which foreigners are 
warned by well-meaning locals, but, as is often the case, the warning 
is given with a 
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sense of pride in what is an element of Sabahan 'way of life, which the visitor cannot 
but accept. 
Finally, the close proximity with two other countries, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, a proximity that is even more relevant if we consider that those two 
countries are much closer to Sabah than Peninsular Malaysia and that Manila is closer 
than Kuala Lumpur, coupled with the great numbers of immigrants from these 
countries present in the State, makes the situation of Sabah unique in the region and 
distinguishes it even from its neighbour Sarawak, which is similar on many counts. 
All these characters qualify Sabah as a borderland, defined by Augelli (1980, cited 
in Kaplan, 1999: 37) as a 'zone of cultural overlap and political instability where the 
national identity and loyalties of the people often become blurred'. Kaplan (1999: 3 7) 
lists three main spatial identities, linked to different geographical scales, at work in 
borderlands: that based on the state controlling the area, that based on the nation with 
which local people mostly identify, and a borderland identity 'generated from the 
occupance and the symbolism of the borderland itself. While the fornier two 
correspond to the national (Malaysian) and ethnic (Kadazan) identity, Kaplan gave a 
clue to the recognition of another essential level of collective identity, which I would 
define as sub-national (Sabahan). 
Coming back to the issue with which the chapter began, the significant presence of 
immigrants and their constant influx, as well as the role they play in the local 
economic, political and social scene, has had a constant,, although changing, impact on 
the material conditions of life of all Sabahans. The consciousness of the similarity in 
conditions of life, and the belief in the fact that there could and should be commonly 
shared solutions to the problems inherent to them, illegal immigration in primis, are 
what constitute and give substance to a sense of being Sabahan, which coexists 
alongside, and at times in conflict with, that of being Malaysian, members of a certain 
ethnic group or of a certain region or kampting. This sense of being Sabahan seems to 
be felt as strongly substantial, especially within the context of discourses dealing with 
problems of the State, as expressed by Bumiputera Tulin, who argued that 'Sabahans' 
and not bumiputera or Kadazan, being outnumbered by the immigrants 'are beginning 
to show signs of "extinction", like what happened to the aborigines in Tasmania' 
(Daily Express, 3/9/2006). On the other hand, however, the population of Sabah is 
highly heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, religion, social and economic status, and 
this sub-national form of identification is sustained neither 
by the attachment to the 
180 
familiar and everyday of the kampung belongi nor by the powerful symbols and ng, 
discourses of ethnicity, religion or the nation. 
Conclusion 
The intensity of the reaction against the relocation of the squatters in Maang shows 
the extent to which the issue of illegal immigration is perceived by Kadazan villagers 
as a threat not only to their interests but to their very way of life. This perception has 
its source in the media discourse identifying the immigrants as the sources of all ills 
and equating their activities with crime. A common reaction to this threat among 
Kadazan individuals is to position themselves as Malaysian citizens and expect the 
government to defend their rights. The realisation that the goverm-nent 'prefers non- 
citizens over citizens' (Sadiq, 2005), however, materialises as the ultimate source of 
marginalisation and lack of participation. These individuals therefore situate 
themselves as Malaysian citizens against the state but also as Kadazan, a marginalised 
and oppressed ethnic and religious minority, and as Sabahan, a population living in 
marginal borderland, left behind in the development promised by the nation-building 
propaganda, sharing common life experiences derived from this broken promise of 
development as well as from the struggle to be recognised as full members of the 
Malaysian nation. These reactions also define belonging through the contrast with 
three forms of Other: Kadazan as non-Malay, Sabahan as non-West Malaysian, 
Malaysian as non-foreigner. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
The effects that being part of a colonial and later post-colonial state have had on 
the Kadazan can hardly be over-emphasised. Like many other indigenous peoples of 
the Borneo interior and more generally of South-East Asia (Dentan, 1976), the 
Kadazan did not have precise ethnic categories in the pre-colonial period, and 
identified themselves as belonging to their village and to river-based groups defined 
by the sharing of dialect and adat customary laws. They also distinguished themselves 
from the Muslim coastal dwellers, with whom they had a long history of interaction. 
The village constituted their only political unit and the level at which the prescriptions 
and sanctions of adat were applied (chapter 2). 
The development of the British-controlled colonial state of North Borneo brought 
fundamental changes which have had lasting consequences on the future of the 
Kadazan. The most important innovations were the establishment of formal education, 
the spread of Christianity and the building of infrastructures connecting different 
areas of the territory. The needs of the colonial administration also led to the 
collection of information about the inhabitants of North Borneo, which primarily took 
the form of reports, ethnographic accounts and censuses. As in the rest of what was to 
become Malaysia (King and Wilder, 2003), this classificatory effort determined the 
creation of ethnicity through the creation of clearly defined ethnic categories, which 
were broader than the units previously used by the indigenous population to classify 
themselves. 
A part of the Kadazan elite internalised this classificatory approach and 
its power 
to provide a sense of belonging and common aim from their 
Western mission 
education and contact with the colonial administration and 
became active in the 
promotion of a sense of unity among previously 
divided indigenous groups. The 
fori-nation of this sense of unity was based on the elaboration of a common culture, 
which came into being through a process of selective preservation, aiming 
at 
salvaging those elements of traditional culture that could 
be adjusted to the modernist 
and Christian values informing the worldview of this 
'intelligentsia'. This process 
involved the objectification (Wagner, 1981; Winzeler, 1997a, 
1997b) of these selected 
cultural traits and their ascription as 
defining features of the ethnic group that was 
being put into being. This process set the conditions 
for the Dusunic peoples to 
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imagine themselves as members of a group defined by this culture. The creation of a 
common culture was accompanied, as it is the case in classic cases of nationalism (see 
Gellner,, 1983; Roff, 1969) by the idea of a common goal and the consciousness that 
the sense of unity formed among a larger group of people could constitute the basis 
for acquiring some forin of political power. The Kadazan therefore emerged as both a 
community of imagination and a community of alignment. 
The Kadazan experienced even more substantial changes as a result of the 
formation of Malaysia through the joining of the colony of North Borneo with 
Sarawak, Malaya and Singapore. While the Dusunic peoples had constituted a 
majority within North Bomeo, they found themselves to be an ethnic and religious 
minority with little weight within a modem, multi-ethnic state. Immediately after 
formation,. the Malaysian government embarked on a nation-building project aiming 
at reaching economic development and political stability, but also at generating a 
national culture and identity. The process of building a national culture involved the 
use by the state of what Postill considers to be 'foundational media forms', 
ýpropaganda, writing (literacy), television and clock- and-calendar time'(2006: 3). The 
effective use of these media was achieved through the establishment of state control 
over the educational system and the broadcast media, which became the essential 
means of the propagation of the state ideology and of the official language, Malay 
and , in a more indirect way, of the official religion, Islam. The nation-building agenda 
also involved the sidelining of minority cultures, especially those of the indigenous 
peoples of Bomeo, and the creation of conditions that effectively limited their 
development and mediation and the use of languages other than Malay. This project 
took the forin of a direct attempt to assimilation to Malayness and closing of all 
Kadazan-language media outlets in the 1970s. The assimilationist tendencies softened 
in the 1980s., but the Kadazan nevertheless found themselves mostly unable to defend 
their culture and language against the hegemony of a state-promoted and, to a certain 
extent,, already established national culture. While the Chinese and the Indian 
minorities were able to obtain some space in the media, the Kadazan and other non- 
Muslim indigenous groups were relegated to a position from which their voices 
cannot be heard at the national level, and they can only appear as exotic tourist 
attractions or repositories of colourful ethnic traditions that can enrich, within the 
limit of 'tolerable difference' (Rival, 1997) the national culture (chapter 3). 
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Differently from what Postill (2006) argued about Sarawak, however, the Kadazan 
of Penampang, as well as other Dusunic peoples (see Doolittle, 2005), do not seem to 
smoothly internalise the government propaganda, but rather in many cases assume an 
oppositional stance towards it,, seeing it as being aimed at increasing the Federal 
control rather than at improving the material conditions of life of villagers. The same 
anti-government and anti-Malay attitude can be found in the way Kadazan villagers 
position themselves in relation to media products such as Malay TV dramas, a popular 
reality show, and newspaper articles (chapter 4). The same unwillingness to accept the 
government's nation-building can be found in the dismissal of the Kaamatan 'open 
house' organised by the Federal Government, perceived as an attempt to de- 
Kadazanise the celebration and to appropriate it as a Malaysian cultural event whose 
meaning is established by the government. This is particularly significant considering 
that the Kaamatan constitutes the most important 'celebration and assertion of 
Kadazan-ness' (Loh, 1992: 243), and 'the most important symbol' (Loh, 1992: 247- 
48), and that it has historically had a great significance as a site of struggle between 
the Kadazan and the Malaysian state (chapter 6). 
Finally, the problem of illegal immigrants constitutes a very significant, possibly 
the most significant, cause of conflict between the Kadazan, and all inhabitants of 
Sabah,, and the government. The fact that the massive presence, and continuous flow, 
of illegal immigrants in Sabah is widely believed, by academics as much as by 
Kadazan villagers, to be encouraged by the government as a means to alter the ethnic 
and electoral balance of the State against the Dusunic peoples cannot but be a source 
of great resentment on their part. In this case, the Kadazan feel not only treated a 
second-class citizens vis-d-vis other Malaysian citizens, but also in comparison to 
foreign illegal immigrants (chapter 7). 
The attitude towards the state that I have observed and described can be 
understood as the reaction to the experience of being a second-class marginalised 
group. Following Rosaldo (2003), it can be attributed to the 'striv[ing] to 
be treated 
with what they define as respect' (2003: 1) and as a form of struggle over the 
definition of what belonging to the nation 'means[s] in practice' (2003: 
3). So, while 
the Malaysian state asks the Kadazan to become assimilated in order to become 
full 
citizens, they make claims to full citizen rights, 
including rights to have their religion 
and way of life respected, their land kept safe, their voice 
heard, and to enjoy at the 
same time the other benefits of the development as other groups. 
In sum, these are 
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claims to the right to participate as full members in the nation, while, at the same 
time, to be able to do so without stopping to 'be who they are' (Rosaldo, 2003: 1). 
These claims are made against a state which, thanks to the nation-building efforts 
of the government - but also to non-state nation making (Foster, 2002) - has come to 
correspond, as argued by Postill. (2006: 192-196), to Anthony Smith's definition 
(1995: 56-57) of a nation as a 'named human population which shares myth and 
memories, a mass public culture, a designated homeland'. The Malaysian state, 
however, as already pointed out by Postill (2006: 196) does not provide 'equal rights 
and duties for all its members'. In this respect, while the Kadazan are classified within 
the category bumiputera, whose members enjoy special rights over the non-native 
Chinese and Indian, they are in fact second-class bumiputera (Loh, 1992; Sadiq, 
2005). The second-class status of the Kadazan derives primarily, as demonstrated by 
Loh (1992) and expressed on various occasions by my informants, from their being 
Christian,, a fact that makes their presence hard to reconcile with a national 
community - or at least bumiputera community - imagined as Muslim by the Malay 
ruling elite. 
While religion is the central point of the marginalisation of the Kadazan, and other 
indigenous peoples of Borneo, it is not the only one. Other important aspects of 
marginality involve the lack of representation in the national seats of political, 
economic and cultural power, the limited amount to which they have enjoyed the 
benefits of economic development and modemisation, the fact that their voices cannot 
be heard at the national level. Moreover, they experience a further marginality as 
inhabitants of a State,, Sabah,, which itself has a marginal role within Malaysia, being 
primarily a resource-producing State with a low level of industrial i sation, the lowest 
GDP of all Malaysian States and the lowest literacy rate (Leete, 2007). 
The status of the Kadazan can therefore be considered as one of marginality, 
defined as a condition of limited participation dominated by the aspect of non- 
participation (Wenger, 1998: 166), within the institution of the Malaysian state. I 
attribute the limited development of a sense of belonging to the Malaysian nation 
among the Kadazan to the marginal position, and therefore limited participation in it. 
As argued by Wenger (1998: 169-172), institutional non-participation can 
lead to the 
developing of practices of non-participation, which, in turn, can be the basis for the 
constitution of identities. The identity derived from the sense of 
belonging to groups 
185 
different from the nation., such as the ethnic group and the kampung, can thereforeý to 
a certain extent, be considered as an identity of non-participation in the nation. 
The boundary between participation and non-participation, however, is blurred, as 
the Kadazan identify themselves and their practices as Kadazan, Malaysian and 
belonging to the kampung at different times under different circumstances. I have 
highlighted the, often implicit, positioning of individuals within different categories at 
different times (a concept already considered by Dentan, 1976 and Nagata, 1974) in 
various instances in this thesis. An example of this phenomenon is the implicit self- 
identification as Malaysian in relationship to news items dealing with foreign affairs 
or Malaysian international relations, as in the case of the Singapore bridge case, or in 
relation to some home affairs such as the Sipadan incident, but as a Christian minority 
in relation to the Danish cartoon events (chapter 4). Another instance is the way in 
which my informants categorised themselves as Kadazan in discussions about the 
1-1 - A-aamatan, yet attributed its 'authentic spirit' to the celebrations taking place within a 
restricted community of practice (chapter 6). The most striking example is constituted 
by the way in which the Kadazan oppose the presence of illegal immigrants through a 
discourse of citizenship rights and a call to the law while at the same time protesting 
against the way in which the state uses the situation to destroy the ethnic and religious 
homogeneity of the 'Kadazan heartland' of Penampang and, more generally, to alter 
the demographic and political balance against the Kadazan and Christians (chapter 7). 
Many of the articulations of belonging to collective categories also make use of 
dominant discourses and ideologies propagated by the state, as is the case in the 
identification with kampung, which is based not only on Kadazan tradition, but also 
on a hegemonic discourse about rurality widely circulating in the media (chapter 5). 
Finally, Kadazan (and non-Kadazan) individuals identify themselves as Sabahan 
on certain occasions, as in relation to the issue of illegal immigration or when 
distinguishing themselves from the people of Semenanjung. The Sabahan identity is 
defined negatively in contrast to a Peninsular Other, but also positively as emerging 
from a 'borderland status' (Kaplan, 1999) as well as material conditions of life, 
problems, styles of inter-ethnic relations and from the sharing of a marginal status 
within Malaysia. 
. 
Moreover, the enduring of forms of identification alternative to the nation can be 
attributed to the ambiguity inherent to the Malaysian nation-building, which 
bases its 
political and economic actions on a well-defined modernist 
ideology, but does not 
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have a coherent strategy in regards to issues of culture and identity. The nation- 
building project has been ambiguously swinging between a pluralist model, based on 
the 'unity in diversity' principle, and a drive towards deeper integration, aiming at 
creating a more culturally homogeneous population, either through assimilation to the 
majority, the Malays, or through the creation of a hybrid culture mixing selected and 
decontextualised elements of the different ethnic groups (Nagata, 1979). This 
ambiguity can be attributed to the fact that, while aiming at forming a cohesive 
national culture, in continuity with the way in which the colonies that were to form 
Malaysia had been administrated, Malaysia was imagined and institutionalised as a 
multi-ethnic, 'plural' state. 
The ambiguity between these different models of nation-building, all of which are 
and have been applied in different circumstances, can therefore be considered as 
another reason for the relative lack of success obtained by the Malaysian nation- 
builders in establishing national belonging as the primary form of identification for its 
citizens. More specifically, the influence of the 'plural model' within present-day 
Malaysian official institutions and discourses, as well as in the sphere of the media, 
economy and everyday life, continuously renews the role of ethnic-based distinctions 
as the primary sources of identity for individuals. 
However, the identification as Kadazan, member of the kampung or Sabahan 
should not be simply considered as a forin of resistance or a reaction to a marginal 
status determined by the configuration of power within the Malaysian state. I consider 
identity as ultimately deriving from lived experience, and therefore the sense of 
belonging to a group as arising from actual interaction and shared experiences leading 
to the formation of similarities or to the possibility to imagine their presence. From 
these premises, the sense of belonging to the kampung, the Kadazan, Sabah or 
Malaysia can be attributed to the similarity between the lived experiences of those 
identifying themselves as fellow members of such groups or to the plausibility of 
imagining fellow members as sharing common experiences. From this point of view, 
the closer to direct experience a form of identification is, the stronger can 
be predicted 
to be the sense of belonging and attachment to it. However, each of these collective 
forms of identification has a correspondence with some relevant experience of 
its 
members: personal knowledge and frequent 
interaction for the kampung, a common 
language, a similar way of life and marginal status for the 
Kadazan, similar material 
conditions of life, common problems and a common 
history for Sabah. Finally. while 
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the Malaysian nation-building can be considered to have failed in generating a strong 
sense of belonging to the nation, its success in creating national political and 
economic institutions, a public mass culture and educational system, a mediascape 
and a shared consumer culture has had a significant impact on the conditions of life of 
all Malaysian citizens. These conditions of life generate a limited sense of common 
belonging but also, more importantly, provide the context and frame of reference 
within which the experience of marginality crystallises into different forms of 
identification. 
The contribution to knowledge offered by this thesis 
This thesis provides a contribution to the understanding of the effects of being part 
of the Malaysian state on the Kadazan of Sabah. By doing so, it partially fills a gap in 
the ethnographic knowledge about the Dusunic peoples, which has generally paid 
limited attention to the importance of the state presence. The findings I have proposed 
here also add empirical knowledge about the relationship between nation-building 
processes and the way of life of the Kadazan. This knowledge can possibly be 
relevant to broader contexts, including other peoples of Malaysia and, to a certain 
extent indigenous peoples in other parts of South-East Asia and the rest of the world. 
This empirical knowledge can give insights useful to the understanding of nation- 
building processes worldwide, showing how their effects can be various, 
unpredictable, reversible and often different from those initially planned by the nation 
builders. 
My enquiry into the relationship between the state and its nation-building efforts 
and the indigenous people has mainly focused on one aspect, the formation of and 
everyday positioning in collective forms of identification. This 
is an aspect that, 
despite its importance, I feel has often been neglected in studies of nati on-buil ding. 
The findings of this research also provide empirical knowledge that should prove 
useful in the understanding of the dynamics of 
formation and situational use of 
collective forms of identification. These empirical 
insights would hopefully provide a 
small contribution to the reaching of a deeper understanding of 
identity and to the 
elaboration of theorisation of it that may 
be more systematic than the ones presently 
available. 
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Appendix 2: Glossary 
Acronyms 
Berjaya Parti Bersatu. Rakyat Jelata Sabah ('Sabah People's United Front') a Sabahan 
multi-ethnic party founded in 1975 by Harris Salleh; it ruled Sabah between 1976 and 
1985 
BN Barisan nasional ('National front') the coalition of parties, led by UMNO, which 
has been ruling Malaysia since its formation 
JKKK Jawatankuasa Kemajuan & Keselamatan. Kampung, 'Village Development 
and Security Committee', a committee forming part of the village administration 
taking care of development and security issues; it is formed by residents and presided 
by a chairman 
Kl[) Kadazandusun, the official name used for the portion of the indigenous peoples of 
Sabah previously referred to as 'Dusun' and later as 'Kadazan' 
KCA Kadazan Cultural Association,, also known as Sinompuuvan Koubasan Kadazan 
Sabah, the main KD cultural association formed in 1964 and registered in 1966; it 
became the Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association in 1989 
KIDCA Kadazandusun Cultural Association 
KDM 'KadazandusunMurut', a label first used in the press since the late 1990s to 
refer to the Dusunic and Murut peoples 
KLF Kadazandusun Language Foundation (KLF), an organisation founded in 1995, 
taking over its predecessor Kadazandusun language Cente (KLC), with the alms of 
studying and preserving Dusunic languages and to promote their teaching in schools 
KSS Kadazan Society Sabah, a cultural and political association created on the 27th 
of January 2007 
PAS Parti Islam Se-Malaysia ('Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party'), the name taken in the 
1970s by an Islamist party active during colonial times in 
Malaya and contesting in 
the general election of 1955 as Pan-Malayan Islamic 
Party (PMIP). It is one of the 
main opposition parties of Malaysia and is particularly strong in 
the Peninsular States 
of Kelantan and Terengganu 
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PBS Parti Bersatu Sabah ('Sabah United party'), a multi-ethnic Sabahan party, 
founded by Joseph Pairin Kitingan in 1985, its electoral basis and leadership mostly 
consists of Kadazandusun 
RTM Radio Televisyen Malaysia, the Malaysian public radio and television 
broadcast company 
SAMORA Sabah Momogun Rungus Association (Persatuan Momogun Rungus 
Sabah), an association promoting the culture and interests of the Rungus Dusun 
SKKS Sinompuuvan Koubasan Kadazan Sabah, the Kadazan name of KCA (see 
above) 
UMNO United Malays National Organisation, the main Malay Malaysian party and 
main component of the BN ruling coalition 
UMS Universiti Malaysia Sabah, the only national public university present in the 
State,, opened in 1994 in Kota Kinabalu 
UNKO United National Kadazan Organisation, a Sabahan party founded by Donald 
Stephens and other Kadazan leaders in 1961 
UPKO United Pasok Momogun Kadazan Organisation, one of the early parties of 
Sabah, constituted by the merger between Stephens' UNKO (see) and Pertubuhan 
Pasok Momogun Bersatu (United Pasok Momogun Organisation), formed by G. S. 
Sundang. It is also the acronym for United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut 
Organisation, a present-day Sabahan party founded after 1994 Sabah State elections 
by Bernard Dompok 
USDA United Sabah Dusun Association, formed in 1967 by the advocates of the label 
Dusun as a reaction to the establishment of the label Kadazan through the Sociey of 
Kadazan 
USNO United Sabah National Organisation, one of the early parties of Sabah, 
founded by Tun Mustapha, it represented the Muslim indigenous population 
Terms 
Adat term used in the Malay world to refer to the traditional customary 
laws of a 
group 
Agong short form of 'Yang di-Pertuan Agong', the Malay term used to refer 
to the 
elected Head of State of the Malaysian Federation, 
literally it means 'He who is made 
Lord', but it can also be translated as 'King' 
2 02 
Ahasu (alasu) 'hot' in Kadazan, a term used to refer to the state of heat in the 
spiritual world caused by the breach of adat rules 
Angpau a Chinese term used to refer to a small gif of cash, usually given in a red 
envelope, traditionally for Chinese New Year. The term has been adopted by the 
Kadazan of Penampang 
Aramaiti (alamaiti) a term deriving from the Austronesian root ramai ('many'), 
used in Kadazan, and more generally in Sabah, to refer to a get-together of people 
which involves eating together, merry-making and often the consumption of alcohol 
Bakakuk a Sabahan term used to refer to a home-made shotgun used to hunt 
Bambaazon (Bambarayon) the Kadazandusun spirit of rice, responsible for the 
growth of the crops 
Bambangan a sour fruit belonging to the mango family used in various 
Kadazandusun recipes 
Bangsa a Malay term (bansa in Kadazan) through which the concept of 'ethnic 
group' is usually expressed in Malaysia; it can be translated in different contexts as 
ýrace I, 'ethnic group, or 'nation' 
Batik a wax-resist dyeing technique used on a textile, or any garment decorated with 
such a technique and patterns (literally 'baju batik'); batik-decorated shirts constitute 
a common form of formal dress in Malaysia, particularly for the Malays 
Bilek (Bilek-family) an Than term meaning the 'room' or 'apartment' (Malay 'bilik') 
of a longhouse; the term was used by Derek Freeman and later social anthropologists 
like to refer to the basic dwelling and economic unit of the longhouse, the household 
Bobohizan (Bobolian) a Kadazandusun traditional religious specialist, most often 
female 
Bumiputera, 'son of the soil', the legal category comprising all native peoples of 
I igenous Malaysia, with the notable exception of the Orang Asli, the pre-Malay 
peoples of the Malay Peninsula 
Dewan Raya a public building found in all Malaysian villages, used for any type of 
village-level meeting or celebration as well as for receiving officials 
Dunia Moden ýmodern world' in Malay 
Gawai Dayak the indigenous peoples' festival (the tem literally means something 
like 'Dayak Festival'), and the corresponding public holiday, celebrated in Sarawak 
every I st of June, it can be considered Sarawak's equivalent 
to Sabah's Pesta 
Kaamatan 
0)' 
Gotong-royong a form of collective labour freely offered by participants for a 
specific task 
Hinava a traditional Kadazan dish consisting of raw fish marinated in lemon juice 
and flavoured with chillies and bambangan seeds 
Hisad (Silad) a type of palm (Licula sp. ) whose leaves are dried and made into 
bundles used by bobohizan during rituals and worn by men as decoration while 
dancing sumazau 
Huguan Siou a Kadazan term variously translated as 'brave leader' or 'paramount 
chief, traditionally referring, according to Luping (1994: 33), to a 'descent group 
chief , guiding war and head-hunting raids; in modem times the title was conferred 
upon Donald Stephens in 1964 and Joseph Pairin Kitingan in 1984 
Joget a very popular Malay folk dance, performed at weddings and other social 
events 
Kaamatan (Pesta Kaamatan) the Kadazandusun Harvest Festival and corresponding 
public holiday, celebrated every 3 01h and 31" of May in Sabah 
Kampung Malay and Kadazan word for village 
Kedai Kopi Malay terni for 'coffee shop', usually selling food as well as beverages 
Kedai Runcit Malay term for 'grocery shop' 
Ketua Kampung 'village headman', also informally referred to as orang tua ('old 
man') 
Lihing (ihing) traditional Kadazan rice wine 
Malu a Malay term which can be translated as 'shy', 'modest, 'reluctant' or 
- ashamed' 
Masih 'still' in Malay; implying a sense of traditional and backwards 
Masa Gumi, 'rubber time', an expression used to refer to a very flexible concept of 
time present in the Malay world 
Magavau a ceremony officiated by the bobohizan to recover grains of rice that might 
have been lost during the harvest or left in the field for some reason, carrying the 
Bambaazon with them and therefore causing a scarcity of future crops 
Mitatabang 'working together', a Dusunic term referring to the practice of sharing 
I labour between individuals belonging to different families, especially at particular 
times such as harvest 
Moginakan a traditional ritual of the Dusunic peoples held on occasion of 
particularly good harvests, reconstruction of a 
house, delivery of a baby or recovery 
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from illness; it consisted of a feast lasting up to three days in which great amounts of 
food and alcohol were consumed and it involved great expenses for the family 
holding it 
Monogit, also referred to as makan sogit ('the eating of the sogit'), a traditional 
Dusunic ritual, usually officiated by a bobohizan, carried out to cool the heat (ahasu) 
produced by a breach of adat; it involved the offering of an animal (its type being 
determined by the gravity of the offence) from the offending to the offended party 
Omong Kosong 'empty talk' in Malay 
Orang Putih 'white man' in Malay, term used to refer to the Westerners 
Pinang the Malay and Kadazan word for betel. nut 
Pribumi a term used in Indonesia to refer to the whole of the members of indigenous 
groups; the terin was adopted in Sabah by the Berjaya government and, after strong 
opposition by the representatives of Dusunic peoples, its use was terminated by the 
PBS government when it came to power 
Pusas a Kadazan term used to refer to small portions of food eaten while drinking 
alcoholic beverages 
Rakyat '*people' in Malay 
Rinait sacred verses traditionally used by ritual specialists of various Dusunic groups 
Rumah Terbuka 'open house', a Malaysian custom, supported and institutionalised 
by the Ministry of National Unity, according to which prominent (and non) members 
of an ethnic and religious group celebrating a holiday open their house to those who 
wish to participate, offering them food and hospitality 
Semenanjung the Malay name for Peninsular Malaysia, also referred to as West 
Malaysia 
Senang "easy' or 'happy' in Malay 
Sepuluh-Tiga literally 'ten-three' in Malay, the expression is used to refer to the 
custom of selling three cans of beer (a 'set') for ten ringgit, a custom common n 
various Sabahan coffee-shops and pubs thanks to the availability of 
beer smuggled 
from the duty-free island of Labuan or from the Philippines 
Sigah a colourful Kadazan headgear wom With the black and gold traditional 
dress 
Sogit 'cool' in Kadazan, a term used to refer to a state of peace in the spiritual realm, 
the opposite of ahasu; it can be restored through the monogit ritual 
Sompoton a form of mouth-organ constituted by a dried gourd and eight 
bamboo 
pipes; it is one of the most characteristic instruments of 
the Dusunic peoples 
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Suku a term used by the indigenous peoples of Sabah to refer to sub-groups (for 
example the Kadazan of Penampang) of ethnic groups (such as the Dusunic peoples 
or Kadazandusun), characterised by their own dialect and adat 
Sumazau traditional Kadazan dance 
Tabang a group whose members regularly provide free labour (practice mitatabang) 
to each other at particular times when it is most needed 
Talak a traditional Kadazan distilled liqueur made from rice. 
Tamu a periodic market, held either weekly or more rarely, typical of Sabah 
Tangkob a traditional rice container used by the Dusunic peoples 
Tapai a Kadazandusun alcoholic drink made from fermented rice 
Tuahi a bamboo nose flute played to express grief after death in the Penampang area 
'106 2 
